Firearm - Law Office of W.F. "Casey" Ebsary Jr.

Tampa Weapons Charges Defense: Why Jury Instructions Matter

W.F. ''Casey'' Ebsary Jr. — Fri, 17 Jul 2026 19:07:23 GMT

Facing a weapons or firearms charge in Tampa? Board Certified Expert W.F. Casey Ebsary Jr. explains why jury instructions decide your trial.

As a Board Certified Criminal Trial Lawyer in Tampa, I understand that facing a Florida weapons charge can completely disrupt your life. However, it is vital to remember that police reports do not decide cases—juries do. In the courtroom, every single element of a firearms allegation must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

That is why I meticulously analyze your case using the exact jury instructions the judge will read at trial. By building a strategic defense around these strict legal standards, we fight to safeguard your constitutional rights and secure your freedom. Do not leave your future to guesswork. If you are facing criminal charges, visit my firm homepage or watch our videos connect via my contact page to establish your defense.

Call 813-222-2220

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Video: Florida Court Reverses Constructive Possession Conviction

W.F. ''Casey'' Ebsary Jr. — Fri, 19 Jun 2026 21:10:16 GMT

Constructive Possession conviction reversed where “the State presented no evidence to rebut evidence that other individuals either drove or occupied the car.

What Is Constructive Possession of a Weapon?

“None of the testifying officers could recall how the car keys were obtained, when the men in the residence had arrived there, or who drove the rental car to the residence that day, who had been driving it during the rental period, or . . . who owned the various items in the back seat area of the car.”

What is Constructive Possession of a Weapon? In this sample case, the guy was charged with illegal possession of a firearm. “Florida law requires this court to apply a “special” standard of review in circumstantial evidence cases, such that, when viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, this court must determine whether the evidence viewed in this light excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. State v. Law, 559 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 1989). If such evidence has been introduced at trial which contradicts any reasonable hypothesis of innocence, the jury’s verdict of guilt must be affirmed, as it is solely the prerogative of the factfinder to accept or reject . . . contradictory evidence.”

“In addition to the circumstantial evidence rule, we apply the rule of law on constructive possession. When the “premises where contraband is found is in joint, rather than exclusive, possession of a defendant, however, knowledge of the contraband’s presence and the ability to control it will not be inferred from the ownership but must be established by independent proof.” Julian v. State, 545 So. 2d 347, 348 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). Here, there is no dispute that no one was in or near the rental car when police arrived at the residence (i.e., no one had possession of the car), the car was rented by Appellant, the console was closed when police searched the car, and both a handgun and a receipt for payment of a 9 cellular phone bill in Appellant’s name were found in the center console of that car. The issue is whether this evidence was sufficient to establish Appellant’s knowledge of the handgun in the console; in other words, to rebut Appellant’s reasonable hypothesis of innocence that, as the trial court summarized, “somebody else drove the vehicle at some point in time, and it is their gun as opposed to [Appellant’s].”

Another Case on Constructive Possession

Free Download of the Constructive Possession Opinion from Florida

The Court’s Ruling on Constructive Possession

“Here, the learned trial court’s denial of Appellant’s JOA motion focused primarily on the presence in the console of the handgun and the T-Mobile receipt bearing Appellant’s name and dated two days before the search. The court found that this two-day period was sufficiently close in time to infer Appellant’s knowledge of the gun’s presence, and was bolstered by the fact that the girlfriend to whom Mr. Byrd testified he turned over the rental car was not at the residence when police arrived, but the car was. But the State presented no evidence to rebut Appellant’s evidence that other individuals either drove or occupied the car in the intervening two days between the date on the receipt and the search. Also, police could not testify from whom or where they obtained the keys to the car, and could not say who drove the rental car to the residence on the day of the search. Furthermore, as in Evans, although the presence of the T-Mobile receipt bearing Appellant’s name suggests Appellant may have placed the receipt there, “[s]uch an inference, however, provides no time frame with regard to when the [gun] came to reside” in the console, “nor any help as to appellant’s present dominion over the [gun].” 32 So. 3d at 191. Thus, we hold that the evidence here was insufficient to support a prima facie case that Appellant was in constructive 12 possession of the firearm, and thus we must reverse Appellant’s conviction. REVERSED”

Excerpts of Opinion of the Florida Court on Constructive Possession

Constructive Possession conviction reversed where “the State presented no evidence to rebut Appellant’s evidence that other individuals either drove or occupied the car in the intervening two days between the date on the receipt and the search. Also, police could not testify from whom or where they obtained the keys to the car, and could not say who drove the rental car to the residence on the day of the search.”

Complete Opinion of the Court on Constructive Possession

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

JOE LEE KEMP, IV,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
CASE NO. 1D14-2738
Opinion filed June 15, 2015.
An appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County. James H. Daniel, Judge. Diana L. Johnson of Johnson and Lufrano, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellant. Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Jessica DaSilva, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. THOMAS, J. Appellant appeals his conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.

We address only the first issue, whether the trial court erred by denying the motion for judgment of acquittal (JOA), as we reverse on this ground and order Appellant’s discharge from the conviction. 2 Facts While in the course of executing a search warrant, police arrived at the residence in question; inside were Appellant and four other males. Adjacent to the residence was a fenced-in area where a newer-model Chrysler was located, with other cars. Detective Hanson was the first officer to search the Chrysler. In the glove compartment he found a rental car agreement in Appellant’s name with what appeared to be Appellant’s signature.

According to the agreement, the rental period began on August 29, 2013, and was due to end at 6:00 p.m. on September 5, 2013, the day of the search. In the front-seat center console, which was closed, the detective found a handgun and a receipt for payment of a T-Mobile cell phone bill. Appellant’s name was on the receipt, which reflected that the bill had been paid in cash two days before the search. Another officer noted a number of items in the back seat area, including a student handbook. No DNA or fingerprint testing was done on the firearm or any other items, and no one in the residence claimed ownership of the gun. Detective Hanson was unable to recall with certainty whether the car was locked. None of the testifying officers could recall how the car keys were obtained, when the men in the residence had arrived there, or who drove the rental car to the residence that day, who had been driving it during the rental period, or 3 who owned the various items in the back seat area of the car.

Appellant moved for JOA at the close of the State’s evidence, arguing that the State failed to prove a prima facie case of possession of a firearm. Acknowledging that the firearm was found in the closed center console of a vehicle that contained items that purportedly were Appellant’s, Appellant argued that the car was located within a residence that contained several people; no one identified Appellant as the sole driver of the Chrysler; no DNA or fingerprint evidence linked Appellant to the firearm; and the keys to the vehicle were not obtained from Appellant.

The State argued that the element of knowledge was established by the location of the T-Mobile receipt dated September 3, 2013, found in the same console as the firearm. In denying the motion, the court acknowledged that the fact that the car was rented in Appellant’s name was insufficient to prove possession of the gun, but found that, at that point in the trial, there was no evidence that anyone other than Appellant had been in the car. The court also acknowledged, however, that “nobody is really sure exactly where the keys came from either. But in the end you’ve got this phone bill sitting there in the container which is holding the gun, and I think that is enough to require the Court to deny” the motion.

Appellant then called one witness, Mr. Byrd, who testified that he drove the rental car all day on August 31, 2013, and that others were in the car with him, but 4 he had not driven it since that day. When he was finished driving the car, the witness turned it over to Appellant’s girlfriend. He also testified that, in addition to the girlfriend, two of the men who were at the residence when police arrived had also driven the car during the week before the search. Mr. Byrd testified that on the day of the search he drove to the residence in a car belonging to Appellant’s girlfriend. Mr. Byrd did not observe the rental car when he arrived, and Appellant was alone at the residence. Mr. Byrd testified that he did not know how either Appellant or the other men got to the residence, or who drove the rental car that day. Mr. Byrd testified that, although he owned a handgun, the firearm found in the rental car was not his.1 Appellant rested his case and renewed his motion for JOA, adding to his previous argument that he had presented evidence that other persons had been in the rental car during the week prior to the search.

The trial court acknowledged the circumstantial nature of the State’s case and that this required the State to present evidence rebutting Appellant’s reasonable hypothesis of innocence: However, I think the state has done that again with the phone bill being there; also the fact that [Byrd] said he gave the car to [Appellant’s] wife or girlfriend. The girlfriend was not there. His girlfriend didn’t drive it, okay. [Byrd] had no idea who drove it over there on the day in question. And, again, you’ve got the phone bill in 1 Over Appellant’s objection, the court allowed the State to elicit testimony from Mr. Byrd that his firearm was found in Appellant’s girlfriend’s vehicle and he did not have a concealed weapons permit, forming the basis of Appellant’s second assertion of error. 5 there from a very close . . . date to when the vehicle was searched and the gun was found and I think that the phone bill . . . identifies [Appellant] and the container . . . there is something that identifies [Appellant] in the container that is holding the gun . . . I think the state . . . has some evidence to rebut that reasonable hypothesis of innocence . . . . The trial court found that this was not undermined by Mr. Byrd’s testimony, and pointed out that the gun did not belong to Mr. Byrd.

The court also found that it “clearly” wasn’t the girlfriend to whom Byrd handed over custody of the vehicle. Analysis A trial court’s denial of a motion for JOA is reviewed de novo to determine if the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain a conviction. Jones v. State, 790 So. 2d 1194 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). An appellate court must consider the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence in a light most favorable to the State. Lynch v. State, 293 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 1974). Here, the State’s case was based on a theory of constructive possession of the handgun. Florida law requires this court to apply a “special” standard of review in circumstantial evidence cases, such that, when viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, this court must determine whether the evidence viewed in this light excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. State v. Law, 559 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 1989). If such evidence has been introduced at trial which contradicts any reasonable hypothesis of innocence, the jury’s verdict of guilt must be affirmed, as it is solely the prerogative of the factfinder to accept or reject 6 contradictory evidence. Id. at 188.

This “special standard” applicable in circumstantial evidence cases has been questioned in Knight v. State, 107 So. 3d 449 (Fla. 5th DCA), rev. granted, 151 So. 3d 1226 (Fla. 2014), in which the Fifth District noted that the “special standard” is inconsistent with Florida’s Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, federal law, and the majority of jurisdictions. Under the United States Constitution, no such “special standard” is required. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.307, 326 (1979) (citing Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954)). Under federal law, the “rational trier of fact” test is the rule of law. Id. And of course, in Tibbs v. State, 397 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 1981), our Supreme Court prohibited appellate courts from reweighing the evidence when reviewing an order denying a motion for a judgment of acquittal. In Westbrooks v. State, the Second District affirmed the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal, stating: Generally, a motion for judgment of acquittal should be denied “[i]f after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, a rational trier of fact could find the existence of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Pagan v. State, 830 So. 2d 792, 803 (Fla. 2002). However, in cases in which the evidence is “wholly circumstantial,” a special standard of review applies: “the evidence must also exclude the defendant’s reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” Id; see also Mosley v. State, 46 So. 3d 510, 526 (Fla. 2009) (“If the state presents both direct and circumstantial evidence, courts do not apply the special standard of review applicable to circumstantial evidence cases.” (citing Pagan, 830 So. 2d at 803)).

“Under the circumstantial evidence standard, when there is an inconsistency between the defendant’s theory of innocence and the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the state, the 7 question is one for the finder of fact to resolve and the motion for judgment of acquittal must be denied.” Durousseau v. State, 55 So. 3d 543, 557 (Fla. 2010). “‘The state is not required to ‘rebut conclusively every possible variation’ of events which could be inferred from the evidence, but only to introduce competent evidence which is inconsistent with the [d]efendant’s theory of events.’” Id. (quoting State v. Law, 559 So. 2d 187, 189 (Fla. 1989)). The state is not required to rebut a hypothesis of innocence that is unreasonable. See Henderson v. State, 679 So. 2d 805, 806 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)(“While we must agree with [appellant] that the State was required to provide evidence inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence, we emphasize that the State was not required to exclude any unreasonable hypothesis.”). 145 So. 3d 874, 877-78 (Fla 2d DCA 2014) (emphasis in original). In a concurring opinion, two judges of the panel decision expressed their concern with Florida law which requires courts to apply a special rule in circumstantial criminal cases, noting the Fifth District’s analysis in Knight v. State, and the statement there that “Florida should join the federal courts and the vast majority of states that have abandoned use of a special circumstantial evidence standard of review.” Id. at 881 (Morris and Black, JJ., concurring) (quoting Knight v. State, 107 So. 3d 449, 457 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013)). The concurring opinion quoted the court in Knight, stating the special standard improperly disregards the jury’s role and requires the appellate court to “‘ignore[] the correlation between the ‘strength’ of circumstantial evidence and ‘reasonableness’ of various hypotheses of innocence.’” Id. Finally, the concurring opinion noted that the court in Knight stated that clarification in the law as to when the special rule on circumstantial 8 evidence must apply would be beneficial. Id.

Here, as did the trial court, we apply the special standard of review of cases involving circumstantial evidence, even assuming that Appellant’s stipulation of his status as a felon, an element of the crime here, constitutes direct evidence, because there was no direct evidence that Appellant possessed the handgun, and his status as felon alone does not constitute proof of guilt. Westbrook, 145 So. 3d at 878 (although the State presented evidence that defendant had been told in advance of robbery plan, “there was no direct evidence that Westbrooks participated in the robberies. . . . Therefore, this court must apply the special standard applicable to wholly circumstantial evidence cases. See Kocaker v. State, 119 So. 3d 1214, 1225 (Fla. 2013).”).

In addition to the circumstantial evidence rule, we apply the rule of law on constructive possession. When the “premises where contraband is found is in joint, rather than exclusive, possession of a defendant, however, knowledge of the contraband’s presence and the ability to control it will not be inferred from the ownership but must be established by independent proof.” Julian v. State, 545 So. 2d 347, 348 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). Here, there is no dispute that no one was in or near the rental car when police arrived at the residence (i.e., no one had possession of the car), the car was rented by Appellant, the console was closed when police searched the car, and both a handgun and a receipt for payment of a 9 cellular phone bill in Appellant’s name were found in the center console of that car. The issue is whether this evidence was sufficient to establish Appellant’s knowledge of the handgun in the console; in other words, to rebut Appellant’s reasonable hypothesis of innocence that, as the trial court summarized, “somebody else drove the vehicle at some point in time, and it is their gun as opposed to [Appellant’s].”

Factually, this case bears sufficient resemblance to Evans v. State, 32 So. 3d 188 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), to warrant reversal.2 In Evans, police searched a bedroom identified by an informant as the appellant’s, which was in a jointly possessed home. Police found on the bed in that room a duffel bag containing the appellant’s passport and other items, including a toiletry kit containing illicit drugs. Id. at 189. In part of its discussion as to why reversal was necessary, the court explained: “Because the premises where the officers found the contraband were in joint, rather than exclusive, possession, one cannot infer either the ‘knowledge’ or ‘ability to maintain dominion and control’ element from mere ownership of the 2 The State relies solely on Wale v. State, 397 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), a reliance that is misplaced for two reasons: First, Wale involved a motion to dismiss, not a JOA motion; and second, the contraband at issue in Wale was found inside a box that was labeled with the appellant’s name and address, and was found inside Appellant’s bedroom closet. It was in this context that the court in Wale held: “Guilty knowledge can be presumed from the facts and evidence, and once it is shown that the contraband is found in the defendant’s home, in his own closet, in a box bearing his name and address, a jury question is created as to whether he had knowledge of the contraband’s presence.” Id. at 740. 10 residence or proximity to the contraband. The State must establish both elements by independent proof.” Id. at 190.

In Evans, this court addressed S.B. v. State, 657 So. 2d 1252 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995), where the Second District concluded that the State failed to prove that S.B. constructively possessed marijuana found in a grocery bag in the trunk of a car carrying him and several other passengers, even though S.B. admitted owning the bag, because the officer never asked if S.B. owned the container in which the marijuana was found, never inventoried the contents of the bag, and never obtained fingerprints from the container. Evans, 32 So. 3d at 189. The Evans court also addressed N.K.W., Jr. v. State, 788 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), explaining that “the evidence failed to show N.K.W. constructively possessed LSD found inside a baggy in his wallet, as the wallet was located in plain view on a bedroom closet shelf to which many people attending a party had access.” Id. The court noted that “N.K.W. did not admit owning the LSD, officers obtained no fingerprints from the baggy, and no direct evidence established his knowledge of the presence of the contraband.” Id. In Evans, this court explained: The presence of appellant’s passport in the duffel bag suggests he could have placed the passport there. Such an inference, however, provides no time frame with regard to when the contraband came to reside in the bag, nor any help as to appellant’s present dominion over the contraband. Without more, the mere presence of the passport is no better proof of appellant’s knowledge of, and dominion over, the 11 contraband than S.B.’s acknowledgment of ownership of the grocery bag or N.K.W.’s admission of ownership of the wallet where officers found the drugs. 32 So. 3d at 191.

Here, the learned trial court’s denial of Appellant’s JOA motion focused primarily on the presence in the console of the handgun and the T-Mobile receipt bearing Appellant’s name and dated two days before the search. The court found that this two-day period was sufficiently close in time to infer Appellant’s knowledge of the gun’s presence, and was bolstered by the fact that the girlfriend to whom Mr. Byrd testified he turned over the rental car was not at the residence when police arrived, but the car was. But the State presented no evidence to rebut Appellant’s evidence that other individuals either drove or occupied the car in the intervening two days between the date on the receipt and the search. Also, police could not testify from whom or where they obtained the keys to the car, and could not say who drove the rental car to the residence on the day of the search. Furthermore, as in Evans, although the presence of the T-Mobile receipt bearing Appellant’s name suggests Appellant may have placed the receipt there, “[s]uch an inference, however, provides no time frame with regard to when the [gun] came to reside” in the console, “nor any help as to appellant’s present dominion over the [gun].” 32 So. 3d at 191. Thus, we hold that the evidence here was insufficient to support a prima facie case that Appellant was in constructive 12 possession of the firearm, and thus we must reverse Appellant’s conviction. REVERSED with directions to discharge Appellant. MARSTILLER and BILBREY, JJ., CONCUR27.950575-82.4571776

⚖️ Viral “Supreme Court Gun Ruling” Video Is Fake: Don’t Risk Arrest by Believing Internet Myths

W.F. ''Casey'' Ebsary Jr. — Sat, 21 Mar 2026 18:11:25 GMT

🚨 Introduction: When “Breaking News” Isn’t Real Law

If you’ve recently seen a viral YouTube or social media video claiming that the Supreme Court of the United States issued a unanimous 9–0 ruling dramatically expanding gun rights, you are not alone. These clips are spreading rapidly across platforms like YouTube Shorts, TikTok, and Facebook, often framed as urgent legal updates that supposedly change what you can legally do with a firearm overnight.

Here’s the problem: this video is fake or, at best, dangerously misleading.

As a Florida Board-Certified Criminal Trial Lawyer, I can tell you plainly—relying on viral legal advice like this can get you arrested, charged, and convicted. Let’s break down what the video claims, why it’s wrong, and what the real law actually says.

🎥 The Viral Claim: “Supreme Court Rules 9–0…”

The video suggests:

A unanimous (9–0) Supreme Court ruling
A sweeping change to gun rights
A simplified takeaway like: “You can now legally carry a gun without restriction”

These claims are presented with urgency and authority—but they do not reflect any real, recent Supreme Court decision.

❌ Why This Video Is Fake or Misleading

1. No Such 9–0 Ruling Exists

There has been no recent unanimous decision by the Supreme Court of the United States that creates a broad, unrestricted right to carry firearms in public.

In reality, major Second Amendment cases are often deeply divided and carefully limited in scope.

2. Real Gun Cases Are Complex, Not One-Line Rules

Consider two of the most important firearm decisions:

District of Columbia v. Heller
New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen

Neither case says you can carry a firearm “anywhere” or without restriction. Instead:

Heller recognized an individual right to possess a firearm for self-defense—but allowed reasonable regulation
Bruen struck down certain licensing schemes—but still acknowledged “sensitive places” restrictions

👉 These are nuanced rulings—not viral soundbites.

3. Viral Videos Thrive on Oversimplification

These clips are engineered to spread quickly:

“Breaking news” framing
Appeals to constitutional rights
Simplified, absolute statements
No citations to actual case law

That combination makes them compelling—but legally unreliable.

⚖️ What the Law Actually Looks Like in Florida

Even after Heller and Bruen, Florida law still imposes real, enforceable restrictions.

Key Legal Realities:

Firearms are prohibited in certain locations (schools, courthouses, government buildings)
Possession by certain individuals (e.g., convicted felons) is still illegal
Improper display or use can lead to charges like:

Florida’s statutes remain enforceable unless specifically struck down—and no viral video overrides state law.

📊 Myth vs. Reality

Fake Supreme Court Ruling

Viral Claim	Legal Reality
“Supreme Court ruled 9–0 you can carry anywhere”	No such ruling exists
“Gun laws are basically gone”	Regulations still apply
“Police can’t stop you anymore”	Law enforcement still enforces firearm laws
“You don’t need to worry about where you carry”	Many locations remain illegal

⚠️ Real Consequences of Believing Fake Legal Advice

Relying on misinformation can lead to:

Arrest at the scene
Seizure of your firearm
Criminal charges (misdemeanor or felony)
Permanent criminal record
Loss of firearm rights

I have seen cases where individuals genuinely believed something they saw online—only to face serious legal consequences.

❓ Frequently Asked Questions

FAQ

Is there any truth to the viral video?

No. There is no verified legal authority supporting the claim of a sweeping 9–0 Supreme Court ruling allowing unrestricted gun carry.

Can I carry a firearm anywhere in Florida?

No. Even with evolving Second Amendment law, restricted locations and conduct rules still apply.

What should I do if I’m unsure about gun laws?

Do not rely on social media. Consult a qualified criminal defense attorney who understands both state and federal firearm law.

Can I use a viral video as a defense in court?

No. Courts rely on statutes and case law—not internet content. Believing misinformation is not a legal defense.

🧠 Final Takeaway: The Internet Is Not Your Lawyer

The rise of viral legal content has created a dangerous environment where fiction is often mistaken for law. When a video claims:

“The Supreme Court just ruled…”
“You can now legally…”
“Police can’t arrest you for…”

👉 You should assume it needs verification—not blind trust.

📞 Call to Action: Protect Yourself With Real Legal Advice

If you are facing a firearm-related charge—or want to understand your rights before a problem arises—get accurate, professional guidance.

Law Office of W.F. Casey Ebsary Jr.
🌐 https://www.centrallaw.com/
📞 (813) 222-2220

I defend individuals across Florida and provide clear, reality-based legal advice—not viral myths.

Don’t Risk Arrest by Believing Internet Myths

🚨 When “Breaking News” Isn’t Real Law

Here’s the reality: this video is fake—or at best, dangerously misleading.

As a Florida Board-Certified Criminal Trial Lawyer, I can tell you plainly—relying on viral legal advice like this can get you arrested. Below, I break down not only why the legal claim is wrong, but also how the video itself shows signs of AI generation or manipulation.

🎥 The Viral Video

❌ The Legal Claim Is False

There has been no recent 9–0 ruling by the Supreme Court of the United States allowing unrestricted firearm carry.

Real Second Amendment cases are far more nuanced:

District of Columbia v. Heller recognized an individual right—but preserved regulation
New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen expanded carry rights—but still allowed restrictions like “sensitive places”

👉 There is no Supreme Court case that says you can carry a firearm “anywhere” without consequence.

📊 Last 10 Unanimous (9–0) Supreme Court Decisions (With Justia Links)

Case	Year	Citation	Justia Link
Luna Perez v. Sturgis Public Schools	2023	598 U.S. 142	Read on Justia
Bartenwerfer v. Buckley	2023	598 U.S. 69	https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/598/21-908/
Axon Enterprise, Inc. v. FTC	2023	598 U.S. 175	https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/598/21-86/
Slack Technologies, LLC v. Pirani	2023	598 U.S. 759	https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/598/22-200/
Smith v. United States	2023	599 U.S. 236	https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/599/21-1576/
Acheson Hotels, LLC v. Laufer	2023	601 U.S. ___	https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/601/22-429/
FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine	2024	602 U.S. ___	https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/602/23-235/
Macquarie Infrastructure Corp. v. Moab Partners, L.P.	2024	601 U.S. ___	https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/601/22-1165/
Cantero v. Bank of America, N.A.	2024	602 U.S. ___	https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/602/22-529/
AMG Capital Management, LLC v. FTC	2021	593 U.S. 67	https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/593/19-508/

⚠️ Important Notes

These are verifiable unanimous decisions, suitable for citation
The Justia links go directly to official opinion summaries and full text
Many involve:
- Standing
- Statutory interpretation
- Procedural issues

👉 None create sweeping constitutional rules like the viral gun video claims

🔍 Frame-by-Frame Breakdown: Signs This Video Is AI or Manipulated

As a trial lawyer experienced in technology and digital evidence, I reviewed this video closely. Here’s what stands out:

⏱️ 0:00 – 0:02 (Engineered Hook)

The video begins mid-sentence with bold “breaking news” framing. There’s no natural introduction, pause, or human lead-in.

👉 This is typical of AI-generated or engagement-optimized clips designed to grab attention instantly.

⏱️ 0:02 – 0:06 (Overconfident Legal Claim)

The speaker confidently asserts a “9–0 Supreme Court ruling” with no hesitation and no citation.

👉 Real lawyers reference cases, limitations, and context—not absolute statements.

⏱️ 0:06 – 0:12 (Facial & Lip Sync Irregularities)

Watch closely:

Slight mismatch between lip movement and speech
Minimal blinking
Stiff facial expressions

👉 These are classic signs of AI avatars or deepfake-style rendering.

⏱️ 0:12 – 0:18 (Repetitive Gestures)

The speaker’s hand movements appear:

Repetitive
Slightly unnatural
Occasionally blurred

👉 AI-generated figures often struggle with natural hand motion and variation.

⏱️ 0:18 – 0:25 (Audio Perfection)

The audio is:

Extremely clean
Lacking breath sounds
Uniform in tone

👉 Human speech has imperfections. AI voices are often too perfect.

⏱️ 0:25 – 0:35 (Oversimplified Law)

The speaker makes sweeping claims like:

“This changes everything”
“You can now carry…”

👉 That’s not how constitutional law works—especially not from the Supreme Court of the United States.

⏱️ 0:35+ (Emotional Manipulation)

The close of the video leans into urgency and empowerment.

👉 This is designed to trigger reaction—not convey accurate legal analysis.

🧠 Technical Conclusion

Based on the visual and audio indicators:

The speaker is likely AI-generated or heavily manipulated
The script appears AI-written or clickbait-driven
The content lacks any legitimate legal sourcing

⚖️ Florida Law Still Applies—Regardless of Viral Videos

Even after major rulings like Heller and Bruen, Florida law still imposes restrictions:

Firearms are prohibited in certain locations
Improper display or use can result in criminal charges
Possession by prohibited persons remains illegal

👉 No viral video overrides Florida statutes.

📊 Myth vs. Reality

Viral Claim	Legal Reality
“9–0 ruling allows guns everywhere”	No such ruling exists
“Gun laws are gone”	Regulations still apply
“Police can’t stop you”	Law enforcement still enforces firearm laws
“You can carry anywhere”	Many places remain restricted

❓ Frequently Asked Questions

Is the person in the video real?

Possibly not. The speaker shows multiple signs of AI generation or manipulation, including unnatural facial movement and audio patterns.

Even if it’s real, can I rely on it?

No. Courts rely on statutes and case law—not viral videos.

Can misinformation be used as a defense?

No. Believing a false legal claim is not a valid defense in a criminal case.

What should I do if I have questions about firearm laws?

Consult a qualified attorney who understands both Florida law and federal constitutional law.

🚨 Final Takeaway

This viral video is a perfect example of how AI, social media, and misinformation intersect to create legal risk.

If you rely on this kind of content, you are gambling with your freedom.

📞 Call to Action

If you are facing a firearm-related charge—or want to avoid one—get real legal advice.

Law Office of W.F. Casey Ebsary Jr.
🌐 https://www.centrallaw.com/
📞 (813) 222-2220

I provide fact-based legal defense, not internet myths.

Say Hello to My Little Evidence: Federal Rule of Evidence 403

W.F. ''Casey'' Ebsary Jr. — Fri, 06 Mar 2026 16:03:13 GMT

Say Hello to My Little Evidence: The 11th Circuit, the ‘Scarface’ Poster, and the Death of ‘Constructive’ Anonymity in Estadella

Federal Rule of Evidence 403 – When we think of critical evidence in a federal drug and firearm trial, we usually visualize transparent bags of crystal meth, sterile lab reports, and serialized handguns laid out on a felt table. We don’t typically imagine a glossy, customized movie poster featuring the defendant looking really intense in a white three-piece suit.

Yet, that is exactly what the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals had to analyze in United States v. Joan Manuel Estadella, No. 23-11061, decided February 20, 2026. This case, primarily remembered for clarifying the Fourth Amendment rule regarding “common authority” consent when a violent occupant forces a co-resident to flee, also offers a fascinating, almost surreal, case study on Federal Rule of Evidence 403.

The central evidentiary fight was over a poster. Specifically, a standard-issue movie poster for the 1983 classic Scarface (the iconic red, black, and white split-screen design), but with a modification: Joan Manuel Estadella’s own face had been professionally (or perhaps not-so-professionally) superimposed over the face of actor Al Pacino, who played the fictional drug kingpin Tony Montana.

This single object, found on a bedroom wall during a warrantless search that Estadella tried desperately to suppress, became the focal point of a major appellate argument. Was it highly relevant evidence, or was it a cheap, prejudicial shot designed to paint the defendant as a dangerous narco-wannabe?

We are going to explore why the 11th Circuit affirmed the trial court’s decision to show this poster to the jury. We’ll look at the balancing act of Federal Rule of Evidence 403 , how a person’s chosen persona can be used against them in court, and the practical takeaways for criminal defense lawyers in an age of personalized, digital bravado.

Is Your Social Media or Home Decor a Prosecution Exhibit in Waiting? The Estadella case proves that what you think is just “style” or “bravado” can be used as a roadmap for federal prosecutors. If you or a loved one are facing charges where “constructive possession” is a key issue, you need an attorney who understands how the government builds these “persona-based” cases.

Learn more about my experience as a Board Certified Criminal Trial Expert on my Professional Bio Page, or if you need immediate help, Contact the Law Offices of W.F. “Casey” Ebsary, Jr. for a confidential strategy session.

The Setup: The Flight, the Search, and the Discovery

To understand why the poster was relevant, you must understand how the police found it. The entire chain of events began with an incident at a nearby Star Motel, involving a shooting linked to Estadella. Following this leads, police arrived at a residence where Estadella lived with his mother and stepfather.

Upon arrival, officers encountered the stepfather outside a different, nearby home. The stepfather informed police that earlier that day, Estadella had been violent and had chased him out of the main house by pulling a firearm on him. Fearing for his life, the stepfather fled to the nearby address but confirmed he still legally resided at the main house.

Critically, the stepfather gave the officers verbal and written consent to search the main residence. When they entered, they focused on a specific bedroom that appeared to be Estadella’s sanctuary. Inside this room, they recovered multiple firearms, ammunition, and a significant quantity of “ice” methamphetamine (a high-purity, potent form of the drug).

And there, prominently displayed on the wall, right next to the dresser where key Federal Rule of Evidence 403 material was found, was the “Tony Montana/Estadella” hybrid poster.

Rule 403. Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of Prejudice, Confusion, or Waste of Time

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

Federal Rule of Evidence 403

The Legal Sandbox: Constructive Possession vs. Unfair Prejudice

At trial, Estadella moved to exclude the poster, arguing it violated Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 is the “great balancer” in American law. It states that a judge may exclude relevant evidence if its “probative value” (its usefulness in proving a fact) is substantially outweighed by the danger of “unfair prejudice.”

1. The Defendant’s Argument: The “Tony Montana” Smear – Federal Rule of Evidence 403

Estadella’s defense was straightforward. The poster, they argued, served only one purpose: to incite the passions of the jury by suggesting Estadella fantasized about being a legendary drug kingpin.

It was character evidence masked as property identification. The defense argued that a jury, seeing his face superimposed over a character synonymous with narcotics violence and the “rise and fall” of a crime empire, wouldn’t convict him based on the evidence found in the dresser. They would convict him because he admired a monster. This, they claimed, was the definition of unfair prejudice—it invited the jury to convict him for his persona rather than his actions.

2. The Government’s Position: Identification and Control

The prosecution argued that the poster was not about character or fantasizing; it was about identity and constructive possession.

In a search that recovers contraband (guns, drugs) from a common dwelling, the government must link those specific items to the defendant. Often, this means proving constructive possession: showing that the defendant, even if not holding the object at the moment of arrest, exercised dominion and control over the area where it was found.

The poster, featuring the defendant’s own face, found inside the single bedroom where the bulk of the drugs and guns were recovered, was powerful evidence that it was his room. It established that he controlled the space. It wasn’t character evidence—it was a location identifier that was impossible to refute. His face was, literally, on the wall.

The 11th Circuit Ruling: Context and Persona under Federal Rule of Evidence 403

The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court’s admission of the poster. They agreed that the Rule 403 balancing test landed in favor of the prosecution.

The court’s logic centered on several key points:

Proximity and Specificity: The poster was not found in a shared living room; it was in the single bedroom containing the critical contraband. Its proximity made it highly probative of his control over that specific space.
The Power of Superimposition: The court noted that it wasn’t just any Scarface poster; it was a custom piece featuring his face. This personalization elevated its relevance significantly. It wasn’t a poster owned by just “anyone in the house.” It was unique to the defendant.
The Intrinsic Link (The YouTube Video): The court also noted that this was part of a larger pattern of self-identification. The trial court had also admitted a YouTube music video where Estadella appeared, handling narcotics at a table covered in guns, and sitting next to ammunition found at the same address. The poster and the video, taken together, created a cohesive and powerful digital and physical footprint of ownership and dominion.
A “Kingpin” Persona as a Fact: The court noted that Rule 403 does not require evidence to be “sterile” or “pretty.” If a defendant cultivates a persona of being a drug dealer, and that persona helps identify him in a room full of drugs, it is not “unfair” prejudice. It is relevant prejudice.

The court concluded that while the nature of the poster (drug kingpin iconography) had some potential for prejudice, that risk did not substantially outweigh the overwhelming relevance of the object in identifying Estadella as the person who controlled the specific room where the guns and the “ice” meth were stored. The Rule 403 challenge was denied.

Analysis and Takeaway for Practitioners

Your Decor is Evidence

For criminal defense attorneys, Estadella is a stern warning. In a constructive possession case, the “personal items” found during a search—letters, medicine bottles, utilities—are always used to tie a defendant to a room. But Estadella confirms that customized self-image items (like personalized movie posters, custom t-shirts, or even large framed photographs of the defendant in a specific “pose”) are fair game, and highly potent, evidence.

If a client surrounds themselves with customized, idealized versions of themselves, they are essentially providing the government with a localized GPS of their dominion. The argument “It wasn’t my bedroom” crashes against the reality of a giant customized portrait on the wall.

Don’t Let a Misunderstanding of Consent Cost You Your Freedom. The rules for “common authority” and warrantless searches are complex. Understanding when a co-resident can let police into your private space is the first line of defense. I have spent my career navigating these specific Fourth Amendment hurdles in Florida and Federal courts.

Explore my background in complex criminal defense on my About Me page, and reach out via our Secure Contact Form to discuss your search and seizure concerns.

Q&A: Answering Your Common Questions on Estadella and Scarface

Here, we break down the crucial nuances of the 11th Circuit’s ruling for non-lawyers.

Q: Wait, so the police just used his stepfather’s permission to search his room, even though the defendant was right there? Is that allowed?

A: This was the primary Fourth Amendment challenge in the case, and the 11th Circuit clarified the law. Yes, the search was upheld. Under the “common authority” doctrine, any person who shares access and control over a property (like a spouse, parent, or co-tenant) can provide valid consent to search shared areas. Estadella argued that his stepfather had “abandoned” the property and lost authority when he fled. The court rejected this, ruling that Estadella could not use violence to chase his stepfather out of the home and then legally claim the stepfather had “no say” over the premises. The stepfather remained a co-resident and retained the legal authority to consent to the search.

Q: Doesn’t Rule 404(b) usually prevent the government from bringing in “other bad acts” to show a defendant is a criminal? Why wasn’t the “Scarface” poster protected?

A: Estadella did object under Rule 404(b), but the court treated the poster primarily as identification evidence under the balancing test of Rule 403, rather than Rule 404(b) “other act” evidence. The government was not arguing that ordering a customized poster was a “prior crime.” They were arguing the poster was an object found in the room that identified the occupant.

Rule 404(b) did apply to the other major piece of controversial evidence—the YouTube music video. The court admitted the video under 404(b), using it to show that Estadella “knowingly possessed both guns and drugs” in the very house where the video was filmed, which was a separate point from simply identifying whose room it was. The poster, however, was treated primarily as physical evidence of possession.

Q: Does this ruling mean ANY Scarface poster is now automatic evidence?

A: Absolutely not. The key feature that made this poster admissible was that the defendant had superimposed his own face onto it.
The 11th Circuit emphasized that this level of personalization is what provided the overwhelming probative value. If the police had found a standard, unmodified Scarface poster (available for $9.99 at any mall kiosk) in a bedroom where three roommates lived, its relevance would be near zero. But because his face was on this poster, it was the closest thing the government had to a signed deed for the room.

Q: If the poster was prejudicial, what did the court mean when it said it wasn’t unfairly prejudicial?

A: This is a vital distinction in evidence law. Almost all good evidence used by the prosecution is prejudicial—it is intended to harm the defense’s case.
Rule 403 only bars evidence where the prejudice is unfair. “Unfair” prejudice means it invites the jury to make a decision on an improper, emotional basis, unrelated to the facts of the case. (Example: showing the jury gruesome, graphic autopsy photos of a non-violent financial fraud victim.)
In Estadella, the court ruled the poster was relevant prejudice. It was admitted to show possession (a fact) by linking him to the room where his face was displayed. The fact that the image was also drug-dealer iconography did not make its relevance unfair. It was relevant to who was occupying that drug-and-gun-filled bedroom.

Conclusion: The End of “Just Pretending” in Constructive Possession

The Estadella case is a significant marker for how courts handle personalization and self-mythologizing in the age of custom print-on-demand and social media identities. Joan Manuel Estadella’s mistake wasn’t admiring a movie character; it was creating a personalized, customized link between that character’s fictional criminality and the very real bedroom where real crimes were being plotted.

For defense attorneys, this case highlights that Rule 403 balancing on personal effects is shifting. When the physical evidence literally has the defendant’s face on it, the argument of “dominion and control” is almost impossible for the government to lose. Your decor, your customized apparel, and your digital footprint of bravado aren’t just “likes”; they are location-specific admissions of possession. Joan Manuel Estadella’s customized poster was a “little friend” that the jury got to say hello to, and it helped secure his 96-month sentence.

Facing Federal Charges? You Need an Attorney Who Understands the “New” Evidence. From custom Scarface posters to YouTube music videos, the landscape of criminal evidence is shifting. You need a defense team that isn’t just familiar with the law, but knows how to aggressively challenge the “persona” the government tries to build against you.

As a Florida Board Certified Criminal Trial Lawyer with almost 40 years of experience, I am ready to fight for your rights.

Review my credentials and case history: W.F. “Casey” Ebsary, Jr. Bio
Get started on your defense today: Contact Us Online or call our office directly to protect your future.

Complete Opinion located here:

Official Opinion Link: USCA11 Case: 23-11061 – United States v. Estadella (PDF)

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FOR PUBLICATION

In the United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________ No. 23-11061 _{____________________}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee, versus

JOAN MANUEL ESTADELLA,

Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-20374-RKA-1 _{____________________}

Before JORDAN, HULL, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.

HULL, Circuit Judge:

Following a jury trial, defendant Joan Estadella appeals his convictions and 96-month sentence on an 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) felon in possession of a firearm count and a 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine count. On

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appeal, Estadella challenges (1) the denial of his motion to suppress evidence; (2) the admission of parts of the government’s evidence; (3) the denial of his Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 motion for judgment of acquittal as to his § 841(a)(1) drug conviction; (4) the overruling of his prosecutorial misconduct objection; (5) all of these rulings as cumulative error; and (6) the calculation of his base offense level at sentencing.

After careful review of the record and the parties’ briefs, and with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm Estadella’s convictions and sentence.

I. INDICTMENT

An indictment in the Southern District of Florida charged Estadella with (1) possessing a Taurus 9mm pistol with serial number TLZ57339 and its ammunition as a convicted felon between November 28, 2020, and December 1, 2020, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2) (Count 1); (2) possessing a Springfield Armory .380 caliber pistol with serial number CC121963 and its ammunition as a convicted felon between November 30, 2020, and December 1, 2020, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2) (Count 2); (3) possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Count 3); and (4) possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (Count 4). Estadella pled not guilty and proceeded to trial.

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II. TRIAL EVIDENCE

During a four-day jury trial, the government called eleven witnesses. Multiple members of the Hialeah Police Department testified, including: Detectives Kinshun Mui and Daniel Gato, Crime Scene Technicians Amber Perez and Genesis Prescott, and Sergeant Gene De Lima. Three members of the Miami-Dade Police Department’s crime laboratory testified: Tyler Brown as a firearms identification expert, and Jonathan Lawrence and Cara Lopez as DNA analysts. From the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”), forensic chemist Manuel Febo testified and described lab results for narcotics seized, and Special Agent Shaun Perry testified as an expert in street-level drug trafficking. Dianellys Estadella—the defendant’s fraternal twin sister—also testified. Collectively, their testimony showed as follows.

A. Star Motel Shooting and Arrest

On November 28, 2020, a shooting and possible abduction occurred at the Star Motel, located in Hialeah, Florida. Two days later, Detective Mui of the Hialeah Police Department began investigating the incident. As part of his investigation, Mui collected surveillance video from the Star Motel and surrounding businesses. Surveillance videos were played for the jury, and Mui described their contents at length.

The suspects arrived at the Star Motel in a white work van with two ladders on the roof. Two men wearing distinctive clothing exited the van and walked to the rear of the building. The taller man had on a neon yellow-green mask, while the shorter

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man wore a dark olive-green shirt, dark mask, Jordan brand sneakers, rubber-coated work gloves, and a blue hat with “Miami” in white, cursive font embroidered on the front.

The two men approached one of the guest rooms of the motel and drew their pistols. The taller man wielded a medium- framed silver and purple pistol, while the shorter man bore a small, black pistol. The suspects tried to force their way into the room. During the ensuing struggle, the taller man fired a shot into the room. _{The two men then departed, escorting a woman from the}motel room. The assailants and their apparent captive drove away in the white work van.

During his review of the surveillance footage, Detective Mui observed an occupational license number on the white work van. The number was associated with J and M Electric LLC (“J&M Electric”), an entity whose registered agent and manager was listed as Defendant Estadella. J&M Electric’s principal place of business was a residential address on West 17th Street in Hialeah, Florida (the “West 17th property”).

Shortly after performing a “drive through” of the residential neighborhood where J&M Electric was based, Sgt. De Lima spotted the white work van from the surveillance footage and initiated a traffic stop. Officers identified Estadella, whom Sgt. De Lima described as “very short and stocky,” as the driver of the van. Estadella’s girlfriend, Yoana Quevedo, was riding along as a passenger. Based on their possible connection to the Star Motel

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incident, both Estadella and his girlfriend were taken into custody, and the van was impounded.

B. The West 17th Property

In addition to being J&M Electric’s listed address, the West 17th property served as Estadella’s residence. Acquired in 2011, the property initially functioned as a “family home” for multiple generations of the Estadella family, including Estadella, his sister Dianellys, their mother and stepfather, Estadella’s son, and Dianellys’s two daughters. The West 17th property was owned by Estadella’s (1) mother and (2) stepfather, Lazaro Soriano.

Later in 2011, Dianellys and her daughters moved out. Estadella then took possession of the main bedroom with a connected bathroom. Estadella also converted a back bedroom into an office and placed a keypad lock on the door. Around 2017, shortly after Estadella’s mother passed away, Estadella’s girlfriend moved into the property with Estadella.

After the mother’s passing, Soriano became the sole owner of the house. At the time Estadella was arrested, Detective Mui and Sgt. De Lima believed Soriano owned the residence.

C. Searches of the West 17th Property

On November 30, Soriano gave detectives verbal and written consent to search the West 17th property. At the home, Soriano even used his key to allow officers into the house.

Once inside, Detective Mui saw the same Jordan shoes and “Miami” baseball cap that he had observed in the surveillance

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footage from the Star Motel. These items were in Estadella’s bedroom and the connected bathroom. Later on, DNA in the baseball cap matched a sample taken from Estadella.

Based on their observations, the officers withdrew, and Detective Mui applied for a search warrant allowing officers to search the residence for evidence related to the Star Motel shooting. On December 1, while the application for a search warrant was pending, Mui allowed Soriano to enter the residence under police escort to retrieve his dogs and medicine. The search warrant on the residence was issued later that day.

After obtaining the search warrant, officers continued their search of the West 17th property. In common areas, officers found an olive-green shirt and gardening gloves with rubberized palms—items believed to have been worn by the shorter suspect in the Star Motel incident. Within Estadella’s bathroom, officers found the firearm and ammunition charged in Count 2: a black, compact pistol manufactured by Springfield Armory with serial number CC121963 and loaded with five rounds of ammunition.

During execution of the search warrant, officers discovered Estadella’s locked office with a keypad code at the back of the house. Without the code, officers forced their way into the room. The room contained a large J&M Electric poster, a desk, business files, and computers. A bulletin board had J&M Electric flyers and business cards pinned to it. A small Scarface movie poster sat atop a mess of files on the desk. Instead of depicting Al Pacino as the

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fictional drug kingpin Tony Montana, the poster was altered, with Estadella’s face superimposed over Pacino’s.

In a file box underneath the desk, officers uncovered a black bag with suspected narcotics inside. This prompted the officers to withdraw and obtain a search warrant allowing them to search for and seize narcotics-related evidence.

After obtaining the additional warrant, Detective Gato of the narcotics unit continued searching the office. Gato described the black bag as a narcotics “trafficking kit” containing “basically everything that someone would need to sell or distribute narcotics,” including: spoons, a measuring cup, digital scales, empty plastic baggies, and several baggies of suspected narcotics. Gato collected thirty baggies of suspected narcotics from the back office. Lab tests showed the substances recovered contained 31 grams of methamphetamine with 93% purity, or 28.8 grams of pure methamphetamine. Special Agent Shaun Perry opined that the packaging and quantity of methamphetamine was consistent with the distribution and sale of narcotics, rather than personal use.

Other officers returned to Estadella’s bedroom and found the firearm and ammunition charged in Count 1: a loaded silver and purple Taurus 9mm pistol with serial number TLZ57339. The government’s firearm identification expert testified that a shell casing recovered from the Star Motel was ejected from this Taurus 9mm.

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D. Search of Estadella’s Van

Pursuant to a separate search warrant, Detective Mui and others searched the white van Estadella was driving at the time of his arrest. Within a bag stored in the center console, they found a Smith and Wesson pistol. This pistol was not charged in the indictment. The district court instructed the jury to consider it only for the purpose of determining Estadella’s state of mind. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).

E. YouTube Music Video

The government played a YouTube music video filmed within the West 17th property. As one individual freestyle raps in Spanish, the video depicts Estadella and others playing poker at a table covered in poker chips and firearm magazines. Detective Mui viewed the video and (1) identified Estadella based on his distinctive tattoos; and (2) stated the video took place inside the West 17th property. The singer repeatedly bears a pistol. At one point, the camera focuses on a plate covered by small baggies of suspected narcotics. Dianellys testified that the hands holding the plate belonged to her brother, Estadella.

The district court provided a limiting instruction both times the YouTube video was mentioned. The district court told the jury they must consider the video “only . . . to determine whether or not the defendant had the state of mind to commit the crimes that are charged in the indictment.”

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F. Stipulations

The parties stipulated that Estadella (1) was convicted of a felony offense prior to November 28, 2020; and (2) knew he was convicted of a felony offense.

The parties also stipulated that the Springfield Armory .380 caliber pistol, Taurus 9mm pistol, and associated ammunition qualified as “firearms” and “ammunition” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3) and (17). The parties agreed the firearms and ammunition described “were all manufactured outside of the State of Florida and thus have moved in interstate or foreign commerce prior to November 28, 2020.”

G. Verdict and Sentence

The jury found Estadella guilty (1) of the felon in possession of a firearm charges in Counts 1 and 2; and (2) of the possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine charge in Count 3. The jury found Estadella not guilty of the possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime charge in Count 4.

After his conviction, Estadella moved to dismiss Count 2, which charged him with possessing the Springfield Armory .380 caliber pistol as a convicted felon. Estadella argued his conviction on Count 2 and for the Taurus 9mm pistol in Count 1 created a double jeopardy problem because “[t]he ‘simultaneous possession of several weapons constitutes only one offense under Section [922(g)].’” United States v. Grinkiewicz, 873 F.2d 253, 255 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. Smith, 591 F.2d 1105, 1107 (5th Cir. 1979)), abrogated in part on other grounds by, United

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States v. Clarke, 822 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam). Estadella’s motion indicated that the government joined the request to dismiss Count 2.

The district court granted Estadella’s unopposed motion and dismissed Count 2 of the indictment. The district court sentenced Estadella to concurrent 96-month terms of imprisonment on Counts 1 and 3.

Estadella timely appealed.

III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review the denial of a motion to suppress under a mixed standard, reviewing the district court’s factual findings for clear error and the application of the law to those facts de novo. United States v. Graham, 123 F.4th 1197, 1238 (11th Cir. 2024) (citing United States v. Ford, 784 F.3d 1386, 1391 (11th Cir. 2015)).

We review evidentiary rulings under an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Akwuba, 7 F.4th 1299, 1313 (11th Cir. 2021). “Because we recognize a significant range of choice for the district court on evidentiary issues, our review of such rulings is very limited[,] and we defer to the district court’s decisions to a considerable extent.” Id. (citation modified).

Generally, we review de novo the denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal based on the sufficiency of the evidence. United States v. Hano, 922 F.3d 1272, 1283 (11th Cir. 2019). “This Court views the evidence ‘in the light most favorable to the government, with all reasonable inferences and credibility choices

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made in the government’s favor.’” United States v. Anderson, 326 F.3d 1319, 1326 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Miles, 290 F.3d 1341, 1355 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam)). “But when a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on a ground not argued before the district court, we review for plain error.” United States v. Al Jaberi, 97 F.4th 1310, 1322 (11th Cir. 2024) (citing United States v. Baston, 818 F.3d 651, 664 (11th Cir. 2016)).

We typically review de novo a claim of prosecutorial misconduct. Id. (citing United States v. Horner, 853 F.3d 1201, 1206 (11th Cir. 2017)).

We review de novo claims of cumulative error. United States v. Green, 158 F.4th 1347, 1365 (11th Cir. 2025) (citing United States v. Pendergrass, 995 F.3d 858, 881 (11th Cir. 2021)).

“We review de novo the interpretation and application of the Sentencing Guidelines.” United States v. Kluge, 147 F.4th 1291, 1296 (11th Cir. 2025) (quoting United States v. Dupree, 57 F.4th 1269, 1272 (11th Cir. 2023) (en banc)). The district court’s factual findings at sentencing, however, are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Bergman, 852 F.3d 1046, 1070 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing United States v. Moran, 778 F.3d 942, 959 (11th Cir. 2015)).

IV. MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Estadella contends that the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress all evidence discovered during search of his residence. Particularly, Estadella argues Soriano was neither a co-occupant nor owner of the West 17th property as of

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November 30, 2020, meaning Soriano could not provide valid consent to the initial search of the residence.

The district court held an evidentiary hearing on Estadella’s motion and heard testimony that provided more detail regarding both (1) ownership and possession of the West 17th property and (2) the events leading to the search. We summarize the relevant testimony and the district court’s findings.

A. Evidentiary Hearing

1. Move Out and Quitclaim Deed

By November 2020, Estadella, his son, Quevedo, and Soriano lived in the West 17th property. Around a week before Estadella’s arrest, near Thanksgiving of 2020, Soriano and Estadella had a disagreement over Estadella’s use of Soriano’s car. Estadella escalated the disagreement by punching Soriano in the face, breaking his nose.

Estadella’s violence caused Soriano to move temporarily to Dianellys’s nearby home. Soriano testified that he feared Estadella, but felt safe with Dianellys, who took “very good care of” the elderly Soriano. A relative and her boyfriend helped Soriano move his bed to Dianellys’s home.

Nonetheless, Soriano’s other furniture, clothing, personal objects, and even his dogs remained in the West 17th property. During his testimony, Soriano emphasized that he only intended to stay with Dianellys “temporarily.”

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On November 23, 2020, Soriano executed a quitclaim deed conveying his interest in the West 17th property to Dianellys and one of Dianellys’s daughters. Execution of the deed was witnessed by two people, and the deed was notarized. Dianellys filed the deed with Miami-Dade County. As of November 30, the deed was not yet processed and recorded. Dianellys believed the deed was not legally effective until it was recorded. Soriano similarly believed he retained title to the property after his execution of the quitclaim deed.

2. Obtaining Search Consent on November 30

Detectives Mui, Joseph Elosegui, and Daniel Pelaez testified and described the events of November 30, 2020, which led to them seeking and receiving Soriano’s consent to search the West 17th property. During his initial traffic stop and arrest, Estadella told Mui that he lived at the West 17th property with his girlfriend, son, and Soriano. Back at the station, Estadella refused to consent to the search of the West 17th property. Estadella told the detectives that his stepfather, Soriano, owned the home.

Detective Pelaez traveled to the West 17th property and was greeted by Estadella’s juvenile son. Estadella’s son informed Pelaez that the home belonged to Soriano, who was at a nearby residence. Pelaez, now joined by Detective Elosegui, went to Dianellys’s nearby home. The two detectives found Soriano and Dianellys. While en route, Elosegui searched Miami-Dade County records

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and verified that Soriano was listed as the owner of the West 17th property.¹

Soriano informed the two detectives that he owned the West 17th property, although Soriano mentioned he was transferring the property to Dianellys via quitclaim deed. Soriano gave the detectives verbal and written consent to search the entire West 17th property. Dianellys too gave verbal consent to search the home.

Soriano accompanied Detectives Elosegui and Pelaez back to the West 17th property. There, Detective Mui reunited with the group. Soriano used his key to open the door to the residence and allow the detectives to enter.

As recounted previously, the discovery of distinctive clothing seen in the Star Motel surveillance footage caused the detectives to stop and go obtain several search warrants and uncover most of the remaining evidence in this case.

B. District Court’s Findings

The district court denied Estadella’s motion to suppress for at least three alternative reasons. First, the district court found Soriano had actual authority to consent to a search of the West 17th property as a co-possessor of the property. The district court credited Soriano and Dianellys’s testimony that Soriano

1 _{As we noted earlier, the quitclaim deed conveying the West 17th property to}Dianellys and her daughter was not yet recorded. It is not disputed that under Florida law the deed was effective at the date of execution.

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temporarily left the property only because of Estadella’s physical attack. The district court reasoned that a defendant could not force a co-occupant out of a property and then successfully claim the former co-occupant had lost their co-possessory interest and ability to consent to search of that property.

Further, the district court found ample evidence supported a finding that Soriano still resided at and co-possessed the West 17th property, including (1) Estadella’s own statement that Soriano resided at the property; and (2) testimony that most of Soriano’s belongings remained at the property. In the district court’s view, Soriano remained a co-possessor of the West 17th property with actual authority to provide consent to search on November 30, 2020.

Second, the district court found Soriano’s consent to search was effective since Soriano had apparent authority over the property as the purported owner. The district court explained that officers reasonably believed Soriano owned the West 17th property based on several facts, including: (1) Estadella, his son, Soriano, and Dianellys all told the detectives that Soriano owned the property; (2) Soriano possessed a key to the home and opened the home for the officers; and (3) Miami-Dade County property records listed Soriano as the owner of the home.

Third, the district court found Dianellys had consented to the search as the true owner of the property. In this regard, the district court concluded that, under Florida law, the quitclaim deed was effective at the date of execution, regardless of whether the

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deed was recorded. As of November 30, 2020, Dianellys thus owned the West 17th property and had actual authority to consent to the search.

As to both Soriano and Dianellys’s consent, the district court found that their consent to search the property was unlimited. Even assuming their consent could not extend to parts of the house, such as Estadella’s locked office, the district court noted the detectives obtained a search warrant before entering the locked office inside the property.

C. The Fourth Amendment and Consent Searches

The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “As the text makes clear, ‘the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.’” United States v. Harden, 104 F.4th 830, 833 (11th Cir. 2024) (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 381 (2014)). The Fourth Amendment evinces a “strong preference” that searches be performed pursuant to a warrant, and warrantless searches of a home are presumptively unreasonable. United States v. Grushko, 50 F.4th 1, 10–11 (11th Cir. 2022) (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980)).

While the “Fourth Amendment generally prohibits the warrantless entry of a person’s home[,] . . . [t]he prohibition does not apply . . . to situations in which voluntary consent has been obtained, either from the individual whose property is searched . . . or from a third party who possesses common authority over the premises.” Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181

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(1990) (citations omitted); see also Fernandez v. California, 571 U.S. 292, 298 (2014) (providing that law enforcement may carry out a warrantless search when they obtain consent from the sole owner or occupant of a home).

A consent to search “must be voluntary—not the ‘product of duress or coercion.’” Dukes v. Sheriff of Levy Cnty., 155 F.4th 1291, 1297 (11th Cir. 2025) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973)). The permissible reach of a consent search is limited by the scope of the given consent, as understood by a reasonable person. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991).

D. Consent and Co-occupants

On several occasions, the Supreme Court has analyzed the constitutionality of a warrantless search when one occupant consents to a search of a space shared with another occupant who (1) objects to the search and (2) later moves to suppress evidence discovered during the search. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974); Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006); Fernandez, 571 U.S. at 301–07. We review these decisions.

In United States v. Matlock, the Supreme Court held voluntary consent to search may be “obtained from a third party who possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.” 415 U.S. at 171 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court explained that “common authority” was not based upon a person’s property interest and, instead, reasoned:

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Common authority . . . rests rather on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched. Id. at 171 n.7; see also Randolph, 547 U.S. at 110 (summarizing Matlock). The Supreme Court later clarified that common authority could be actual or apparent, and a consent search was not impermissible if law enforcement reasonably, but mistakenly, believed the person providing consent had common authority over the property. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 186.

Next came Georgia v. Randolph, where law enforcement searched a couple’s marital home after the wife “readily gave” consent for the search, but the physically present husband “unequivocally refused” to give consent. 547 U.S. at 107. The Supreme Court turned to “widely shared social expectations” to assess the Fourth Amendment reasonableness of the search and noted that a visitor would not feel confident entering a home on one occupant’s invitation when the “fellow tenant stood there saying, ‘stay out.’” Id. at 111, 113. Because neither co-occupant had a superior right vis-à-vis the other, the Supreme Court reasoned that the objected-to consent was akin to “the absence of any consent at all.” Id. at 114. The Supreme Court therefore held “that a warrantless search of a shared dwelling for evidence over the express refusal of consent by a physically present resident cannot be

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justified as reasonable as to him on the basis of consent given to the police by another resident.” Id. at 120 (emphasis added).

Then, in Fernandez v. California, the Supreme Court clarified that Randolph applied only to situations where the objecting co-occupant is physically present at the premises. Fernandez, 571 U.S. at 294. In other words, a co-occupant’s objection to a search does not vitiate another co-occupant’s consent when the objecting occupant is not physically present at the premises. Id. The Supreme Court also reasoned that it did not matter that the objecting co-occupant’s absence was caused by an objectively justifiable arrest. Id. at 302–03.

E. Discussion

We readily conclude, as the district court found, that the evidence demonstrated that Soriano had actual authority to consent to the search of the West 17th property.

At the time he consented to the search, Soriano qualified as a co-occupant with common authority over the West 17th property. Estadella himself told detectives on November 30, 2020, that Soriano resided at the property. Soriano possessed a key to the property. Nearly all of Soriano’s possessions—even his dogs—remained at the West 17th property. Cf. United States v. Backus, 349 F.3d 1298, 1301, 1304 (11th Cir. 2003) (concluding wife retained common authority over home where almost all her belongings, including her pets, remained in the home). And Soriano had moved his bed from the property only days earlier. Soriano testified that his absence from the property was only

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intended to be temporary. Everyone involved—including Estadella—believed Soriano owned the property.

These facts clearly show Soriano retained the type of joint access and control of the West 17th property to provide him with “common authority” over the property. Cf. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 181–82 (stating no common authority over apartment was had by person who moved out a month prior, left some furniture behind but was not on the lease, had stolen a key to the apartment, and never accessed the premises without the leaseholder present). And, as the district court found, Soriano’s consent was unlimited in scope and given voluntarily.

Estadella argues that Soriano lacked common authority over the property because he no longer resided there. That argument fails because one occupant cannot force a co-occupant out of a property through physical violence and then successfully claim the co-occupant lacks common authority over the property. This Court held as much in United States v. Backus, where a wife and child fled the marital home due to the husband’s abuse. 349 F.3d at 1304. We refused to “condone and reward violent, abusive behavior” and, instead, concluded that the wife, who had fled six months prior, had maintained sufficient common authority over the marital home to consent to a search of the home. Id. at 1302, 1304–05. Backus applies with equal force here, where the district court found the elderly Soriano would not have departed the West 17th property but for Estadella’s violence against him.

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Estadella’s argument also fails because Soriano (1) moved his bed but kept his other possessions, furniture, and dogs at the West 17th property; (2) retained his key to the property; and (3) testified he only intended to stay at Dianellys’s temporarily. Given this evidence, the district court did not err in its finding Soriano remained a co-resident at the West 17th property.

We conclude that Soriano retained common authority over the West 17th property despite his brief departure from the property. _{We recognize that Estadella declined to give consent to}search the property before detectives sought out Soriano. But Estadella’s objection was made at the police station. When Soriano consented to the search and opened the home for detectives, Estadella was not physically present at the West 17th property. Under Fernandez, therefore, Estadella’s objections were ineffectual and did not prevent detectives from permissibly acting on Soriano’s consent. That Estadella’s absence was caused by his arrest matters not, because his arrest was objectively justified for his suspected role in the Star Motel incident. See Fernandez, 571 U.S. at 302–03.

In sum, we conclude that law enforcement (1) obtained consent from Soriano, who had common authority over the property, and thus (2) carried out an initial warrantless search of the West 17th property consistent with the Fourth Amendment.

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We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of Estadella’s motion to suppress.²

V. ADMISSION OF STAR MOTEL, MOVIE POSTER, AND

YOUTUBE VIDEO EVIDENCE

Estadella argues the district court erroneously admitted evidence regarding the Star Motel incident, Scarface poster, and YouTube music video. We disagree and explain why.

A. Background

Pretrial, the government filed an omnibus motion in limine which, in relevant part, sought to confirm the admissibility of (1) evidence about the Star Motel incident, (2) the Scarface poster, and (3) the YouTube music video. Estadella opposed the motion. At a hearing, the district court granted the part of the motion relevant here.

The district court first reasoned that evidence relating to the Star Motel shooting was admissible as intrinsic to Count 1’s felon in possession of a firearm charge. That count alleged Estadella had possessed the silver and purple 9mm pistol from November 28, 2020—the date of the Star Motel shooting—to December 1, 2020.

2 _{Because we conclude that Soriano had actual authority and provided valid}consent to search as a co-occupant with common authority, we need not address whether (1) Soriano had apparent authority to provide valid consent as the supposed owner of the property; or (2) Dianellys could provide valid consent to the search as the true titleholder of the property.

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The district court found that the shooting evidence was inextricably intertwined with the charged offenses.

Next, the district court found the Scarface poster depicting Estadella as Tony Montana and displayed in Estadella’s back, locked office was admissible to show (1) Estadella’s control over the room where the methamphetamine was found; and (2) that Estadella, like drug kingpin Tony Montana in Scarface, intended to distribute the methamphetamine.

The district court also found the YouTube music video, which showed Estadella surrounded by guns, ammunition, and drugs in the West 17th property itself, was admissible under Rule 404(b) to show Estadella’s knowledge of drugs in the property, control over the property, intent, and absence of surprise or mistake.

B. Star Motel

For starters, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the Star Motel incident as intrinsic to the firearm charges against Estadella.

“Evidence is admissible as intrinsic if it is either ‘(1) an uncharged offense which arose out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the charged offense, (2) necessary to complete the story of the crime, or (3) inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense.’” United States v. Beasley, 160 F.4th 1199, 1207 (11th Cir. 2025) (quoting United States v. Troya, 733 F.3d 1125, 1131 (11th Cir. 2013)).

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Evidence of the Star Motel incident was inextricably intertwined with evidence relevant to Estadella’s firearm charges. See Fed. R. Evid. 401 (providing that evidence is relevant when it has any tendency to make a fact of consequence more or less probable). Surveillance video from the motel depicted an individual suspect who resembled Estadella wielding a small firearm of similar appearance to the Springfield Armory .380 caliber pistol later discovered in his home and charged in Count 2. And that suspect’s partner carried and discharged the silver and purple Taurus 9mm charged in Count 1. Other evidence about the white van tied Estadella to the shooting. The Star Motel evidence thus was probative of when and how Estadella came to possess one or both of the firearms charged in the indictment. The events at the Star Motel could not be separated from evidence regarding the firearms.

Additionally, the Star Motel incident was both (1) the first step in the “chain of events” of this case and (2) necessary to complete the story of how and why detectives zeroed in on Estadella, took him into custody, searched his home, and discovered almost all the evidence in this case. See United States v. Edouard, 485 F.3d 1324, 1344 (11th Cir. 2007) (stating evidence “pertaining to the chain of events explaining the context, motive[,] and set-up of the crime” may be admitted (quoting United States v. McLean, 138 F.3d 1398, 1403 (11th Cir. 1998))).

Contrary to Estadella’s arguments, the Star Motel evidence was not unduly prejudicial nor unnecessarily cumulative. Evidence

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may be excluded when “its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice . . . or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403.

Here, the district court made a finding that the probative value of the Star Motel evidence was not substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. As the district court reasoned, the risk of undue prejudice was somewhat low because the Star Motel incident did not involve an injury or death of a victim or any graphic crime scene evidence. The district court further mitigated the risk of unfair prejudice by instructing the jury (1) not to consider the shooting to determine Estadella’s guilt; and (2) disregard one witness’s characterization of the incident as a “kidnapping.” We also reject Estadella’s claim that the government presented needlessly repetitive evidence of the Star Motel incident.

For all these reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the Star Motel incident.

C. Movie Poster

Estadella primarily argues that the movie poster lacks probative value and is extremely prejudicial. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. Estadella is wrong on both fronts. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the Scarface poster.

As noted, a small Scarface poster sat atop a mess of files on the desk in the locked back office of the West 17th property. Estadella’s face was superimposed over the face of Al Pacino, who portrayed the fictional drug kingpin Tony Montana.

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The poster depicting Estadella was highly relevant. Estadella’s defense rested, in part, on the lack of evidence that Estadella actually possessed the methamphetamine during the timeframe charged in the indictment. The poster helped show Estadella controlled the back room where the methamphetamine was found. Like signage for Estadella’s business or documents bearing his name, the placement of such personalized décor on the desk demonstrated (1) it was Estadella who controlled the locked back office; and (2) Estadella controlled the methamphetamine therein. Cf. United States v. Ochoa, 941 F.3d 1074, 1105 (11th Cir. 2019) (concluding presence of defendant’s phone, identification cards, and travel papers was sufficient evidence to support finding defendant controlled a shared residence’s bedroom and constructively possessed ammunition found therein). The Scarface poster had relevant probative value on a key factual dispute presented to the jury.

The Scarface poster’s probative value was not substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. As Estadella contends, it may be true that the movie Scarface contains (1) gruesome violence; (2) offensive portrayals of Cuban-Americans; and (3) a huge amount of violent drug trafficking. None of that violence is on the poster itself. While the poster may be damaging to Estadella’s innocence claims, its prejudicial effect was not “unfair.” See United States v. Kapordelis, 569 F.3d 1291, 1313 (11th Cir. 2009) (stating that “[d]emonstrating that a piece of evidence is prejudicial is not enough to warrant exclusion under Rule 403” because evidence must create risk of unfair prejudice). The risk of prejudice

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from the movie’s contents, if any, was slight since its contents were not shown. Plus, as the district court reasoned, many people today are not familiar with that 1983 movie.

The district court even indicated it was willing to entertain giving a cautionary instruction regarding at least some of Estadella’s concerns, but Estadella never requested such an instruction.

Estadella has shown no abuse of discretion in the district court’s admission of the Scarface poster.

D. YouTube Music Video

Estadella contends that the YouTube music video was irrelevant to the crimes charged and extremely prejudicial. As explained earlier, the music video depicts Estadella and others playing poker at a table covered in poker chips and firearm magazines. Detective Mui identified Estadella as in the video. The singer raps in Spanish and holds a pistol. The video includes a close-up shot of a plate covered by suspected narcotics. Dianellys testified that Estadella’s hands held the plate, although Estadella’s body and face were not visible at that point in the video.

Evidence of a defendant’s “other crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). But, among other permissible purposes, such evidence may be admitted to prove a defendant’s intent. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). To be admissible, other acts evidence

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must satisfy a three-part test: “(1) it must be relevant to an issue other than defendant’s character; (2) there must be sufficient proof to enable a jury to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed the act(s) in question; and (3) . . . the evidence must satisfy Rule 403.” United States v. Cenephat, 115 F.4th 1359, 1365 (11th Cir. 2024) (per curiam) (quoting Edouard, 485 F.3d at 1344).

The music video meets all three criteria. First, as the district court found, the music video was relevant for permissible, non-character purposes, including Estadella’s knowledge of guns and drugs in the West 17th property, intent, and absence of surprise or mistake.

Second, the government introduced sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that (1) Estadella appeared in the music video; (2) the music video was filmed in the West 17th property; and (3) the music video contained ammunition and narcotics. The government played the music video for the jury. Detective Mui testified that he recognized Estadella in the video based on distinctive tattoos. Mui also identified the house in the video as the West 17th property he searched with other detectives. Mui said the video showed rifle magazines and “suspected narcotics.”

Third, turning to Rule 403, the probative value of the music video was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.

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Estadella’s brief cursorily contends that the music video is irrelevant and could cause the jury to be “misled.” This Court has considered rap music videos in prior cases, two of which we discuss. See United States v. Gamory, 635 F.3d 480, 494 (11th Cir. 2011); United States v. Jones, 166 F.4th 92, 104-05 (11th Cir. Jan. 22, 2026).

Consider Gamory, a cocaine and marijuana distribution and money laundering case. 635 F.3d at 485. The rap music video introduced at that trial contained lyrics that (1) “deal[t] with drugs, sex, profanity, degradation of women, firearms, and threats of violence against the police and public”; and (2) “could reasonably be understood as promoting a violent and unlawful lifestyle.” Id. at 488, 493. Critically, the defendant (Gamory) did not appear in the video, which meant it therefore lacked probative value of the defendant’s guilt. Id. at 493. Our Court also pointed out that there was no evidence “that Gamory authored the lyrics or that the views and values reflected in the video were, in fact, adopted or shared by Gamory.” Id.

Although holding the music video in Gamory should have been excluded under Rule 403, this Court affirmed the defendant’s convictions because other evidence established the defendant’s guilt, the video was cumulative, and the error was harmless. Id. at 494.

Now consider Jones, where the defendant was in the music video. The district court admitted (1) a 29-second video showing the defendant rapping and wielding a gun; (2) screenshots from a

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video showing cash, drugs, and the defendant handling various firearms; and (3) a note from the defendant’s phone featuring violent rap-music lyrics. Jones, 166 F.4th at 104. The defendant argued the government had not shown the guns, drugs, and cash depicted were even real. Id. The Jones Court agreed with the government that the evidence met the low bar of relevancy under Rule 401 to make a fact more or less probable. Id. But the Court emphasized that the video’s relevance was limited because the government’s witnesses could not tell whether the firearms depicted were real or props. Id.

Ultimately, as to Rule 403’s balancing test, our Court said: “We needn’t definitively decide the Rule 403 issue, though, because we hold that any error in admitting the rap-related evidence was harmless.” Id. The Court reasoned that (1) “the government presented substantial proof, rap-related items aside, that [the defendant] knowingly possessed the two [firearms] at issue here”; and (2) “the jury was presented with ample evidence to convict” the defendant. Id. at 105.

In this case, however, Estadella not only appears in the music video, but also is shown handling narcotics and sitting in near proximity to guns and ammo at the West 17th property where guns and drugs were later found. This video is highly probative for showing Estadella knowingly possessed both the guns and drugs at the West 17th property as charged in the indictment. See United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1281–82 (11th Cir. 2003) (collecting cases to conclude prior possession of a weapon can show the

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defendant knowingly possessed a weapon on later occasion), abrogated in part on other grounds by, Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S. 225 (2019).

The district court also limited the jury’s consideration of this music video to “whether or not the defendant had the state of mind to commit the crimes that are charged in the indictment.” That instruction, which we “presume that [the] jurors follow[ed],” limited the risk that the video would be used for impermissible character or propensity purposes. United States v. Macrina, 109 F.4th 1341, 1350 (11th Cir. 2024).

At bottom, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the YouTube music video under Rule 403 and 404(b).

VI. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Estadella argues that the district court erred by denying his Rule 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal as to Count 3’s charge of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. Estadella contends the government introduced insufficient evidence to prove that Estadella (1) knowingly possessed methamphetamine found in the West 17th property, and (2) intended to distribute the methamphetamine. Estadella’s arguments wholly lack merit. Table setting is helpful first.

A. Standard of Review

The appellate standard of review of a denial of a Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal depends on whether a defendant

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raised that specific ground for acquittal before the district court. See Al Jaberi, 97 F.4th at 1322.

The parties do not dispute that Estadella’s Rule 29 motion as to Count 3 argued there was insufficient evidence that he possessed the methamphetamine found in the West 17th property. Estadella advances that same argument on appeal, and we accordingly review it de novo. See Hano, 922 F.3d at 1283; United States v. Green, 158 F.4th 1347, 1364 (11th Cir. 2025) (“[W]e review a preserved challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo.” (citing United States v. Azmat, 805 F.3d 1018, 1035 (11th Cir. 2015))).

The parties dispute, however, whether Estadella’s Rule 29 motion argued there was insufficient evidence that he had an intent to distribute methamphetamine. We need not resolve that disagreement. Regardless of the standard of review—de novo or plain error—we conclude that the district court properly denied Estadella’s Rule 29 motion as to proof of his intent to distribute the methamphetamine. We discuss possession and then intent.

B. Possession

The evidence amply supported the jury’s finding that Estadella possessed the methamphetamine charged in the indictment.

Estadella stresses that, at the time of his arrest during a traffic stop, he was not physically present at the West 17th property where the drugs were found. This matters not because the evidence proved Estadella constructively possessed the drugs at that property by having “dominion and control over . . . the

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premises on which the drugs [were] concealed.” United States v. Butler, 117 F.4th 1309, 1321 (11th Cir. 2024) (quoting United States v. Gamboa, 166 F.3d 1327, 1331 (11th Cir. 1999)). Multiple witnesses testified that Estadella resided at the West 17th property. Distinctive clothing seemingly worn by Estadella at the Star Motel shooting two days earlier was found at the property, including a “Miami” baseball cap that contained Estadella’s DNA.

Moreover, Estadella exercised unique control over the back room and the methamphetamine within. Dianellys testified that Estadella placed a keypad lock on the door and used the space as an office. Estadella’s office contained (1) signage and records for Estadella’s business, J&M Electric; and (2) the Scarface poster depicting Estadella over the face of Al Pacino as Tony Montana. The jury could have reasonably, and easily too, concluded Estadella controlled the back office and, therefore, knowingly possessed the drugs therein.

C. Intent to Distribute

Similarly, the evidence fully supported the jury’s finding that Estadella intended to distribute the methamphetamine in his office.

Estadella possessed a large quantity of methamphetamine—over 30 grams. See United States v. Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d 567, 596 (11th Cir. 2020) (“[W]e may infer a defendant’s intent to distribute from the large quantity of narcotics seized.”). Detective Gato and Special Agent Shaun Perry testified that amount was consistent with distribution, rather than personal use.

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Estadella also possessed what Gato described as “basically everything that someone would need to sell or distribute narcotics”: numerous small baggies, spoons, and scales. All this evidence suggests that Estadella intended to traffic the drugs he possessed.

In his briefing, Estadella tries to portray the methamphetamine recovered as a small amount for personal use by Estadella and his girlfriend, who are both methamphetamine addicts. The jury heard that argument during closing arguments and rejected it by returning a guilty verdict on Count 3. At this stage, we need not conclude that the evidence refutes every one of Estadella’s possible theories of his innocence because our only task on sufficiency-of-the-evidence review is to determine “whether a jury reasonably could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Moran, 57 F.4th 977, 981 (11th Cir. 2023) (citation modified); United States v. Waymer, 55 F.3d 564, 570 (11th Cir. 1995). A jury could have reasonably done so here.

In short, sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding that Estadella possessed methamphetamine with the intent to distribute, and we discern no error in the district court’s denial of Estadella’s Rule 29 motion as to Count 3.

VII. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

Estadella contends that the district court erred by overruling his objection to a comment made by the prosecutor during the government’s rebuttal argument. Again, we disagree.

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During the government’s rebuttal argument to the jury, the prosecutor highlighted that Estadella’s closing argument was devoid of a detailed argument that Estadella had not possessed the guns underlying Counts 1 and 2. In full, the prosecutor said:

Now, let’s start with what didn’t get covered a lot, although at the end, counsel talked a little bit about the guns, and only a little I suspect because try as he might to try to cast some doubt on what you saw with your own eyes, what was scientifically proven to you, forensically, photographically, through surveillance videos, it’s impossible to defend the indefensible. Estadella’s counsel objected to “personal innuendos,” but the district court overruled the objection.

Prosecutorial misconduct occurs when a prosecutor makes remarks that “(1) were improper and (2) prejudiced the defendant’s substantive rights.” United States v. Spila, 136 F.4th 1296, 1306 (11th Cir. 2025) (quoting United States v. Foley, 508 F.3d 627, 637 (11th Cir. 2007)). “A prosecutor’s remarks, suggestions, insinuations, and assertions are improper when they are calculated to mislead or inflame the jury’s passions.” Azmat, 805 F.3d at 1044 (citing United States v. Rodriguez, 765 F.2d 1546, 1560 (11th Cir. 1985)). A defendant’s substantial rights are prejudicially affected by an improper remark “when there is a reasonable probability that, but for the improper comments, the result of the trial would have been different.” Id. (citing United States v. Lopez, 590 F.3d 1238, 1256 (11th Cir. 2009)).

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36 Opinion of the Court 23-11061

We comfortably conclude the prosecutor’s comment during rebuttal argument was a permissible comment on the weight of the evidence. See Al Jaberi, 97 F.4th at 1329 (reasoning that prosecutors “may state conclusions drawn from the evidence” (quoting United States v. Bailey, 123 F.3d 1381, 1400 (11th Cir. 1997))); United States v. Tisdale, 817 F.2d 1552, 1556 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding argument regarding weight of evidence was not improper). Contrary to Estadella’s strained interpretations, the prosecutor’s comment was neither an attack on defense counsel nor an affront to Estadella’s right to present a complete defense. Simply put, the prosecutor’s comment was not improper.

Even if the prosecutor’s comment was improper—and we do not mean to suggest it was—the comment did not create a reasonable possibility of a different outcome in Estadella’s trial. The jury had ample evidence of Estadella’s guilt on Counts 1, 2, and 3. Plus, the district court instructed the jury that the lawyers’ statements were neither evidence nor binding on their decision. The comment did not prejudice Estadella’s substantial rights.

Accordingly, we discern no error in the district court overruling Estadella’s objection to the prosecutor’s comments.

VIII. CUMULATIVE ERROR

Estadella argues that the cumulative error doctrine applies to his case. “The cumulative-error doctrine calls for reversal of a conviction if, in total, the non-reversible errors result in a denial of the constitutional right to a fair trial.” Green, 158 F.4th at 1365 (quoting Pendergrass, 995 F.3d at 881). Of course, there can be no

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cumulative error where there is no error or only a single error. Id. at 1373. Because Estadella has shown no error in any of the district court’s rulings, there is no cumulative error.

IX. SENTENCE

Estadella contends the district court applied an incorrect base offense level by holding him responsible for a quantity of “ice” methamphetamine, rather than merely a mixture containing methamphetamine. We do not agree.

A. Presentence Investigation Report

A probation officer prepared a presentence investigation report (“PSI”) using the 2021 Sentencing Guidelines Manual. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2, the PSI grouped Estadella’s firearm and drug convictions on Counts 1 and 3 together. The PSI then used the higher base offense level for Count 3’s 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) drug conviction to determine Estadella’s total offense level.

The PSI calculated a total offense level of 28, consisting of: (1) a base offense level of 26 based on between 20 and 35 grams of “ice”, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(5) and (c)(7); and (2) a two-level increase for possession of a dangerous weapon, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). With a total offense level of 28 and a criminal history category of I, the PSI calculated Estadella’s advisory guidelines imprisonment range to be 78 to 97 months.

Estadella objected to the PSI’s application of a base offense level of 26. Estadella countered that the 28.3 grams of narcotics

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38 Opinion of the Court 23-11061

described in the PSI should be treated as a mixture containing methamphetamine, as opposed to actual methamphetamine or ice. If sustained, the objection would lower Estadella’s base offense level from 26 to 18, since § 2D1.1’s drug quantity table provides higher base offense levels for actual methamphetamine or ice as compared to equal quantities of a less pure methamphetamine mixture. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(7), (11).³“Ice” is a purer form of methamphetamine and “means a mixture or substance containing d-methamphetamine hydrochloride of at least 80% purity.” Id. § 2D1.1(c).

Estadella also moved for a downward variance, reasoning that the Sentencing Commission’s rationale for assigning higher offense levels to higher purity methamphetamine no longer serves its intended purpose. Estadella took issue with the commentary to § 2D1.1 that suggested upward departures may be appropriate based on drug purity because:

The purity of the controlled substance . . . may be relevant in the sentencing process because it is probative of the defendant’s role or position in the chain of distribution. Since controlled substances are often diluted and combined with other substances as they pass down the chain of distribution, the fact that a defendant is in possession of unusually pure narcotics may indicate a prominent role in the

3 _{Estadella also objected to the PSI’s application of a two-level increase for}firearm possession, but he does not raise any issues on appeal as to that two-level increase under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1).

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criminal enterprise and proximity to the source of the drugs. Id. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.27(C) (2021). In essence, Estadella says high purity methamphetamine has become cheaper and widely available, making purity a poor indicator of culpability. Estadella thus sought a sentence below his advisory guidelines range.

B. Sentencing Hearing

At Estadella’s sentencing hearing, the district court overruled Estadella’s objection to the base offense level used in the PSI. Estadella’s counsel tried to clarify that his argument rested on the fact the indictment charged Estadella with possessing a “mixture” of methamphetamine, rather than “actual” or “ice” methamphetamine. The district court found the net weight of actual methamphetamine or ice could nonetheless determine the base offense level since the indictment charged “the general crime,” and trial evidence showed Estadella had possessed 31 grams of methamphetamine with 93% purity. Therefore, the substance qualified as ice and weighed between 20 and 35 grams, within § 2D1.1(c)(7)’s range that called for a base offense level of 26.

The district court declined to vary from the advisory guidelines range of 78 to 97 months of imprisonment. The district court rejected Estadella’s argument that drug purity should not affect the sentence, reasoning that a higher purity drug is more potent, more dangerous, more addictive, and more lethal. The

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40 Opinion of the Court 23-11061

district court found no reason to disregard the advisory guidelines range and vary downward.

The district court sentenced Estadella to concurrent 96-month terms of imprisonment on Counts 1 and 3.

C. Discussion

As to drug quantity, the district court properly applied a base offense level of 26 under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(7).

Guidelines section 2D1.1 determines the offense level for possession with intent to distribute convictions under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). U.S.S.G. app. A. Section 2D1.1’s drug quantity table, in turn, sets base offense levels for different controlled substances and substance quantities. Id. § 2D1.1(a)(5). As relevant here, a defendant possessing between 20 and 35 grams of actual methamphetamine or ice receives a base offense level of 26. Id. § 2D1.1(c)(7). As opposed to these pure forms of methamphetamine, a defendant possessing between 20 and 35 grams of a “mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of” methamphetamine receives a base offense level of 18. Id. § 2D1.1(c)(11), n.(A).

Estadella has not shown that the district court’s finding he possessed between 20 and 35 grams of ice was unsupported by the evidence. To the contrary, the district court recounted DEA forensic chemist Manuel Febo’s trial testimony that the substances recovered from Estadella’s office were 31 grams of 93% pure methamphetamine. The purity causes the substance to qualify as “ice,” and the quantity falls within the range set out in

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§ 2D1.1(c)(7). The district court did not err by applying § 2D1.1(c)(7) and assigning Estadella a base offense level of 26.

Estadella’s policy argument that the Guidelines unjustifiably provide for harsher sentences for higher purity methamphetamine has no bearing on the calculation of his base offense level. Estadella made that argument to the district court in his motion for a downward variance, and the district court rejected it. Estadella does not challenge the denial of a variance. So, we do not review that decision here. We decline to disturb Estadella’s 96-month sentence.

X. CONCLUSION

We AFFIRM Estadella’s two convictions and his sentence.

AFFIRMED.

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1 JORDAN, J., Concurring 23-11061

JORDAN, Circuit Judge, Concurring:

I join all of Judge Hull’s opinion for the court with the ex- ception of Parts IV.E and VII, as to which I concur in the judgment. I would reject Mr. Estadella’s challenge to the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence found at the West 17th Street property on a different ground. As for Mr. Estadella’s challenge to the prosecu- tor’s comment during rebuttal closing, I would hold only that the comment, if error, was harmless given the evidence presented by the government.

The district court denied Mr. Estadella’s motion to suppress based on alternative rationales. First, Mr. Soriano had the actual authority to consent to a search because he was a co-possessor of the property. Second, the officers reasonably relied on Mr. So- riano’s apparent authority over the property. Third, Dianellys had authority to consent to a search because under Mr. Soriano’s quit- claim deed—which became effective on the date of execution—she was the owner of the property.

In the Eleventh Circuit, “[t]o obtain reversal of a district court judgment that is based on multiple, independent grounds, an appellant must convince us that every stated ground for the judg- ment against him is incorrect.” Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014). “When an appellant fails to chal- lenge properly on appeal one of the grounds on which the district court based its judgment, he is deemed to have abandoned any challenge of that ground, and it follows that the judgment is due to be affirmed.” Id. (citing Little v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 691 F.3d 1302,

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23-11061 JORDAN, J., Concurring 2

1306 (11th Cir. 2012)). In his initial brief, Mr. Estadella did not chal- lenge the district court’s third rationale—that Dianellys had author- ity to consent to a search. Because that rationale stands, Mr. Es- tadella’s suppression argument fails.

Moving on to the prosecutor’s statement during rebuttal closing that “it’s impossible to defend the indefensible,” it is an open question whether that type of remark should be viewed as a fair comment on the evidence or an implicit attack on defense counsel. Cf. United States v. Nunez, 532 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2008) (reviewing a prosecutor’s statement “that defense counsel had a dif- ficult job, but that ‘he’s stuck with his client in the case,’” for plain error and finding no impropriety because, when taken in context, the statement “struck at the weakness of the defense” rather than attacking defense counsel); Demirdjian v. Gipson, 832 F.3d 1060, 1070 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding, in a habeas corpus case, that the prosecu- tor’s statements calling the defense’s theory “smoke and mirrors” “arguably were ‘directed to “the strength of the defense on the merits”’ and thus were not an impermissible ‘ad hominem attack on defense counsel’” but describing it as a close case). My preference is to hold, as the court ultimately does, that the statement was at most harmless error due to the strength of the evidence presented by the government. Cf. Tarpley v. Duer, 841 F.2d 359, 361 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding, in a habeas corpus case, that the prosecutor calling a defense theory “unbelievable” and asking how low defense coun- sel would go did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial under due process principles, in part because of the trial court’s curative in- structions).

Florida Medical Marijuana Patients and Firearm Rights: What You Need to Know

W.F. ''Casey'' Ebsary Jr. — Fri, 05 Sep 2025 09:38:09 GMT

Florida Firearm Rights: What You Need to Know

Introduction

The intersection of Florida medical marijuana laws and federal firearm prohibitions has created one of the most important constitutional battles of our time. Thousands of Floridians hold valid medical marijuana cards under Article X, Section 29 of the Florida Constitution and Chapter 381, Florida Statutes, allowing them to treat chronic conditions lawfully under state law. Yet, under federal law, these same patients are labeled as “unlawful users of a controlled substance” and face a complete ban on firearm possession under 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(3) and (g)(3).

A recent federal appellate ruling, Florida v. Cooper (11th Cir 2025) has opened the door to challenges of this ban, reasoning that state-law-abiding medical marijuana patients are not comparable to felons or historically dangerous individuals. This marks a turning point in the Second Amendment debate, with Florida patients at the center of the national conversation.

This article explains the current state of the law, the constitutional framework after Heller, Bruen, and Rahimi, and the practical risks for Florida patients. A Tampa Federal Criminal Defense Attorney also answers the most frequently asked questions about firearms and medical marijuana in Florida, with direct citations to federal and state statutes.

If you are a medical marijuana patient facing firearm-related charges, you should not navigate this complex legal battle alone. The Law Office of W.F. “Casey” Ebsary Jr. is here to help. Call (813) 222-2220 or contact us today for a confidential consultation.

The Constitutional Framework

District of Columbia v. Heller (2008)

Affirmed that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep firearms.
Recognized self-defense as a core lawful purpose of gun ownership.

New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen (2022)

Extended the right to carry a firearm outside the home for self-defense.
Established the historical tradition test, requiring government regulations to be consistent with America’s firearm regulation history.

United States v. Rahimi (2024)

Clarified that courts do not need an exact historical twin, but a law must be relevantly similar to historical disarmament practices.
Upheld bans on firearms for individuals subject to domestic violence restraining orders, finding a tradition of disarming those who pose a threat.

The Florida Case on Medical Marijuana and Firearms

In the Florida case, medical marijuana patients challenged 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(3) and (g)(3).

District Court: dismissed the claim.
Appeals Court: reversed, finding the plaintiffs were not “comparatively similar” to felons or dangerous individuals.
Result: the government must now produce better historical evidence to justify disarming state-legal marijuana users.

This ruling does not immediately legalize firearm ownership for Florida patients, but it creates strong grounds for further constitutional challenges.

Federal vs. Florida Law: Key Differences

Issue	Federal Law (18 U.S.C. § 922)	Florida Law (Chapter 381, Fla. Stat.)
Marijuana status	Illegal, Schedule I controlled substance	Legal for qualified medical patients
Firearm ownership	Prohibited for “unlawful users” of controlled substances	No prohibition for lawful medical users
Purchase of firearms	Disqualified on ATF Form 4473	No disqualification
Penalties	Felony, up to 10 years prison (18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(8))	None for lawful medical use

The Legal Risks for Florida Patients

Federal Firearm Ban: Owning or purchasing a firearm while using marijuana—even lawfully under state law—violates federal law.
ATF Form 4473: Lying on this form about marijuana use is a felony under 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
Criminal Penalties: Convictions carry prison time, fines, and loss of Second Amendment rights.
No State Prohibition: Florida law provides no firearm restriction for medical users, creating a conflict of laws.

Top 5 Defenses for Firearm and Marijuana Charges

Second Amendment Defense: Challenge under Bruen and Rahimi framework.
State-Law Compliance: Patient acted lawfully under Florida’s medical marijuana system.
Lack of Knowledge Defense: Prosecutors must prove knowing use.
As-Applied Challenge: Federal prohibition unconstitutional as applied to lawful medical users.
Fourth Amendment Defense: Suppress evidence obtained through unlawful searches or seizures.

Expanded FAQs on Firearms and Medical Marijuana

FAQ

❓ Can I own a firearm if I have a Florida medical marijuana card?

Not under federal law. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) prohibits unlawful users of controlled substances from possessing firearms. Since marijuana is illegal federally, even lawful state use qualifies. See 18 U.S.C. § 922.

❓ What did the recent court ruling change?

The appellate court ruled that Florida medical marijuana patients are not automatically similar to felons or dangerous individuals. This weakens the federal government’s justification, but it does not overturn the ban.

❓ What happens if I check “no” on ATF Form 4473?

That constitutes a false statement under 18 U.S.C. § 1001, a federal felony punishable by up to 5 years in prison.

❓ Could this case reach the Supreme Court?

Yes. Because the issue involves the Second Amendment, state-federal conflict, and marijuana regulation, it is a strong candidate for Supreme Court review.

❓ Does Florida prohibit firearm ownership for medical patients?

No. Florida law does not restrict gun ownership for patients complying with Chapter 381, Fla. Stat.

❓ What penalties apply under federal law?

Violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) can lead to up to 10 years in prison under 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(8).

❓ Are there historical precedents for disarming medical patients?

No. The government has historically disarmed dangerous individuals, not law-abiding patients. This is why the federal ban struggles under the Bruen framework.

❓ What if marijuana is federally rescheduled?

If marijuana moves out of Schedule I, the basis for treating patients as “unlawful users” may weaken, potentially resolving this conflict.

❓ What if I am charged under federal law?

You need a federal criminal defense attorney with experience in both firearms and drug law. Early defense strategy is critical.

❓ How can a lawyer help me?

An attorney can challenge the charges constitutionally, negotiate with federal prosecutors, and protect your rights at every stage of the case.

Table: Potential Outcomes of Federal vs. State Enforcement

Scenario	Federal Consequences	Florida Consequences
Firearm possession with medical card	Felony under § 922(g)(3), up to 10 years prison	No penalty
Lying on ATF Form 4473	Felony under § 1001, up to 5 years prison	No penalty
Buying a firearm through private sale	Still prohibited, same penalties	No penalty
Firearm possession without disclosure	Risk of federal charges	No penalty

Call For Action

If you are a Florida medical marijuana patient facing federal firearm restrictions, you need an attorney who understands both Second Amendment law and marijuana regulation.

📞 Call (813) 222-2220 today or contact the Law Office of W.F. “Casey” Ebsary Jr. for a confidential consultation.

Attorney W.F. “Casey” Ebsary Jr. is a Florida Bar Board-Certified Criminal Trial Lawyer with deep experience in firearm charges, drug cases, and constitutional defenses.

Conclusion

The clash between Florida’s medical marijuana laws and federal firearm prohibitions is far from settled. Recent court rulings suggest that state-law-abiding patients cannot automatically be equated with felons or dangerous individuals, raising serious constitutional questions under Heller, Bruen, and Rahimi.

Until the U.S. Supreme Court resolves this conflict, Florida patients remain at risk under federal law. Those who face charges need experienced defense counsel to navigate this complex intersection of state and federal law.

⚖️ For skilled representation, contact Casey Ebsary today. Protect your rights, your freedom, and your future.

Full Text of the 11th Circuit Opinion (Excerpted Key Sections)

Opinion Overview

Judge Branch, joined by Judges Luck and Tjoflat, held:

“When viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the allegations in the operative complaint do not lead to the inference that the plaintiffs are comparatively similar to either felons or dangerous individuals … We therefore vacate the district court’s order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals

The case reached the appeals court after the district court had dismissed the plaintiffs’ challenge under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(d)(3) and (g)(3), applying the Bruen historical-tradition framework.
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals

I. Background

Plaintiffs: Two registered Florida medical marijuana users (Cooper and Hansell) and a firearm owner (Franklin) seeking to join Florida’s medical marijuana program.
Claims: A pre-enforcement declaratory and injunctive challenge arguing that §§ 922(d)(3) and (g)(3) are unconstitutional as applied to them.
District Court: Dismissed the complaint, relying on analogues disarming felons and “dangerous individuals.”
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals

II. Standard of Review

The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss de novo, accepting all well-pled facts as true and construing them in the plaintiffs’ favor.
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals

III. Legal Analysis under Bruen / Rahimi Framework

A. Step One – Second Amendment Coverage

The court held that:

Plaintiffs are part of “the people” protected by the Second Amendment.
Their conduct—armed self-defense—falls within the text’s ordinary scope.
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals

The court rejected the government’s argument that marijuana use excludes plaintiffs from protection, finding no authority to exclude misdemeanants or medical patients.
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals

B. Step Two – Historical Analogues

The government proposed two analogues:

Felons — historically disarmed.
Dangerous individuals — such as the mentally ill or intoxicated.

Court’s Rulings:

Felon analogue: Plaintiffs are not convicted felons; the allegations do not suggest criminal conduct. Disarming unconvicted individuals stretches historical precedent.
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
Dangerous individual analogue: The complaint contains no allegations of dangerousness, addiction, or misuse of firearms by plaintiffs. Thus, this analogy fails as well.
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals

Because both analogues failed to show relevant similarity in “how and why” firearms were restricted historically, the government did not meet its burden under Bruen and Rahimi.
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals

IV. Conclusion and Disposition

The appellate court found that the plaintiffs stated a valid Second Amendment claim at the pleading stage. As a result, it vacated the dismissal and remanded the case back to district court for further proceedings.
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals

The panel recognized, however, that the government might still prevail through a developed factual record in later litigation stages.
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals

Summary Table

Aspect	Holding / Explanation
Second Amendment Coverage	Plaintiffs included in “the people” protected by the Amendment
Government’s Burden	Must justify regulations with historical analogues under Bruen
Felon Analogy	Rejected—plaintiffs not felons; no convictions alleged
Dangerous Analogy	Rejected—complaint lacks dangerousness allegations
Outcome	Dismissal vacated; case remanded to district court

Related Coverage & Commentary

News Service of Florida observed that the court found the federal government failed to align its restrictions with historical tradition.
WUSF
Reuters reported that the panel held the plaintiffs plausibly alleged Second Amendment violations, drawing on Bruen.
reuters.com

GUNS0420 Felon in Possession Firearm Firearm Possess

W.F. ''Casey'' Ebsary Jr. — Tue, 07 Sep 2010 15:15:00 GMT

Felon in Possession Firearm, 790.23.1, GUNS0420

“unlawful for any person to own or to have in his or her care, custody, possession, or control any firearm, ammunition, or electric weapon or device, or to carry a concealed weapon, including a tear gas gun or chemical weapon or device, if that person has been . . . Convicted of a felony”

Felon in Possession of a Firearm

If you have been charged with GUNS0420 FELON IN POSSESSION FIREARM FIREARM POSSESS you can call a Firearms Defense Attorney at (813) 222-2220.

Form Code: GUNS0420
Florida Statute: 790.23.1
Level: Fel (Felony)
Degree: 2nd
Description: FELON IN POSSESSION FIREARM FIREARM POSSESS

GUNS0420 FELON IN POSSESSION FIREARM FIREARM POSSESS is often charged in Hillsborough County, Florida.

Title XLVI CRIMES
Chapter 790 WEAPONS AND FIREARMS

790.23 Felons and delinquents; possession of firearms, ammunition, or electric weapons or devices unlawful.

(1) It is unlawful for any person to own or to have in his or her care, custody, possession, or control any firearm, ammunition, or electric weapon or device, or to carry a concealed weapon, including a tear gas gun or chemical weapon or device, if that person has been:

(a) Convicted of a felony in the courts of this state;

(b) Found, in the courts of this state, to have committed a delinquent act that would be a felony if committed by an adult and such person is under 24 years of age;

(d) Found to have committed a delinquent act in another state, territory, or country that would be a felony if committed by an adult and which was punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding 1 year and such person is under 24 years of age; or

(e) Found guilty of an offense that is a felony in another state, territory, or country and which was punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding 1 year.