In criminal law, structuring currency transactions to avoid reporting requirements has become a subject of intense scrutiny. A recent case highlights the complexities surrounding such charges, shedding light on the evidentiary standards, jury instructions, and the legal nuances involved. This post delves into the case, analyzing the evidence, jury instructions, and the implications for convictions under 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(3).

Video

Secrets Behind Structuring: Don’t Get Caught! ????️ | #Shorts

Transcript:

Let’s talk about structuring under the United States code, an individual who engages in a transaction involving currency and structuring the transaction in an attempt to avoid reporting requirements can be indicted for structuring. By the way that’s United States district court house behind me that’s where you’ll end up if you are indicted for structuring.

Questions and Answers – Structuring Charges

Case Background

The case at hand involves a defendant who made a series of cash deposits below $10,000 over a span of seven days, which were intended to fulfill the first payment due on a land-sale contract. Subsequently, the defendant continued to make multiple cash deposits, each below $10,000, over several months to satisfy the second payment. The question before the court was whether these transactions were indicative of structuring intended to evade reporting requirements that are triggered for transactions exceeding $10,000.

Evidentiary Basis for Structuring

The prosecution relied on the pattern of cash deposits to build its case. A total of 22 deposits were made within a week to meet the initial payment, and an additional 38 deposits were made over several months for the second payment. These deposits were consistently kept below the $10,000 threshold. The prosecution argued that this consistent pattern of deposits, each falling just under the reporting threshold, demonstrated a clear intent to evade reporting requirements.

Jury Instructions and Elements of Conviction

The jury instructions in this case were crucial in guiding the jury’s deliberations. The court properly informed the jury of the three elements required to sustain a conviction under 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(3):

1. The defendant knowingly engaged in a financial transaction.
2. The transaction involved currency.
3. The defendant structured the transaction with the intent to evade reporting requirements.

Replacing Form 4789 and Intent to Evade

A noteworthy aspect of this case involves the defendant’s alleged intent to evade Form 4789, the currency transaction report that had been replaced at the time of the defendant’s transactions. The defense argued that any reference to Form 4789 was irrelevant since it was no longer in use. However, the court maintained that this did not undermine the soundness of the verdict.

What Do the Feds Say About Structuring?

“The definition of structuring, as set forth in 31 CFR 1010.100 (xx) (which was implemented before a USA PATRIOT Act provision extended the prohibition on structuring to geographic targeting orders and BSA recordkeeping requirements), states, “a person structures a transaction if that person, acting alone, or in conjunction with, or on behalf of, other persons, conducts or attempts to conduct one or more transactions in currency in any amount, at one or more financial institutions, on one or more days, in any manner, for the purpose of evading the [CTR filing requirements].” “In any manner” includes, but is not limited to, breaking down a single currency sum exceeding $10,000 into smaller amounts that may be conducted as a series of transactions at or less than $10,000. The transactions need not exceed the $10,000 CTR filing threshold at any one bank on any single day in order to constitute structuring.”

Read More About Federal Structuring Laws Here:

What About Suspicious Activity Reports SAR?

“In April 1996, a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) was developed to be used by all banking organizations in the United States. A banking organization is required to file a SAR whenever it detects a known or suspected criminal violation of federal law or a suspicious transaction related to money laundering activity or a violation of the BSA.”

Download Suspicious Activity Report Form SAR6710-06

Read More About Suspicious Activity Reports SAR Here:

Conclusion

The case exemplifies the complexities involved in proving structuring charges in criminal law. The evidentiary trail of consistent cash deposits below $10,000, combined with accurate jury instructions and the recognition of intent to evade, led to a conviction under 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(3). This case serves as a reminder that even subtle patterns of behavior can have significant legal implications. As the landscape of financial reporting continues to evolve, courts continue to prioritize the intent behind transactions when assessing structuring charges.

By analyzing this case, we gain insights into the legal considerations that underpin convictions related to structuring currency transactions to avoid reporting requirements. As regulations and circumstances change, the core principles of intent and evidentiary support remain crucial in upholding the integrity of the financial system.

“You may infer from the Government’s failure to preserve these messages, or the fact that they were deleted by agents, that the missing text “messages were relevant to this case and that they were favorable to both Defendant[s]”

Penalties for Destruction or Spoliation of Cyber Evidence

Tampa Cyber Crime Attorney just received this tip from a source. “A recent non-published opinion [for your convenience we have published it below] from the District of New Jersey (United States v. Suarez, 2010 WL 4226524 (D.N.J. Oct. 21, 2010)) will be of interest for those who are following issues involving electronic discovery in criminal cases. In this case, the court imposed an adverse jury instruction against the government when it failed to preserve text messages that were sent between FBI agents and a cooperating witness. The instruction allowed the jury to infer (though did not require) that the deleted messages were favorable to the defendant.

“this is one of the first known cases to address spoliation of electronic discovery in the criminal context”

The issue of spoliation of evidence is frequently litigated in civil electronic discovery cases, but this is one of the first known cases to address spoliation of electronic discovery in the criminal context. Though the opinion is not for publication, counsel will want to consider that communications between agents and witnesses can often [sic] be in electronic form, and to remember this reality with when they or the defense team communicates with their own witnesses. It is hard to say what affect the jury instruction had in this instance, but it is worth mentioning that Mr. Suarez was ultimately acquitted.”

Spoliation US v. Suarez Complete Opinion

Download is Here:

drive.google.com

Spoliation Case Excerpts:

“The key considerations for determining the appropriate spoliation sanction (e.g., dismissal, suppression, fines, or an adverse inference instruction) are:

(1) The degree of fault of the party who altered or destroyed the evidence;

(2) The degree of prejudice suffered by the opposing party; and

(3) Whether there is a lesser sanction that will avoid substantial unfairness to the opposing party and, where the offending party is seriously at fault, will serve to deter such conduct by others in the future.

Schmid v. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 13 F.3d 76, 79 (3d Cir.1994).”

“The Court finds the adverse inference instruction appropriate because:

(1) The text messages were within the Government’s control;

(2) The text messages were intentionally deleted by the agents, and the U.S. Attorneys’ Office failed to take steps to preserve them;

(3) The text messages that were deleted or not preserved were relevant to claims or defenses; and

(4) It was reasonably foreseeable by the Government that in the context of this investigation and in light of the actions of the cooperating witness the text messages would later have been discoverable.

These findings by the Court fall squarely within the four elements set forth in Mosaid Technologies Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., 348 F.Supp.2d 332 (D.N.J.2004). Under Mosaid, the Court may only give an adverse inference instruction based on spoliation if the following elements are satisfied:

(1) The evidence in question must be within the party’s control;

(2) It must appear that there has been actual suppression or withholding of the evidence;

(3) The evidence destroyed or withheld was relevant to claims or defenses; and

(4) It was reasonably foreseeable that the evidence would later be discoverable.

348 F.Supp.2d at 336.”

“Thus, given the F.B.I.’s analogous preservation duty under Vella and Ammar and the failure of the Government to preserve relevant data in the midst of an ongoing investigation specifically aimed at prosecution, and thus where litigation was reasonably anticipated, the Government had a duty to preserve the Jencks material contained in the text messages.”

Destruction of Evidence | Jury Instruction | Spoliation

“At the close of evidence, the Court will issue the following charge to the jury:

During the course of this trial you have heard evidence by way of stipulation and testimony that during the Government’s investigation of Defendants, the cooperating witness, Solomon Dwek, exchanged numerous text messages with F.B.I. agents supervising the investigation. The Government was obligated to preserve all of these text messages, but they were either deleted by the agents themselves or not preserved by the Government. Specifically, although some text messages were in fact preserved, the Government failed to preserve other text messages, which pertained to Agent Russ and Agent McCarthy, from two key time periods: March 1 through March 16, 2009 and the entire month of July 2009. You may infer from the Government’s failure to preserve these messages, or the fact that they were deleted by agents, that the missing text messages were relevant to this case and that they were favorable to both Defendant Suarez and Defendant Tabbachino. You are not required to make this inference, however, and you must consider any rebuttal evidence that has been offered by the Government with regard to this issue. Whether you ultimately choose to make the inference is your decision as the finder of fact.”