Are Traffic Ticket Quotas Legal in Florida? – Video – Contests – Arrests in Florida

Ticket Quotas are used in Florida.

Are Traffic Ticket Quotas Legal in Florida?

 

Hillsborough County Florida Traffic Ticket Quotas Award Arrest

Hillsborough County Florida Traffic Ticket Quotas Arrest Award

The short answer is “No.” Traffic Ticket Quotas are illegal. The Florida Statute specifically forbids these contests. Florida Statute 316.640(8)(b) (2017) states: “A traffic enforcement agency may not establish a traffic citation quota.” The issue turns on the question: “What is a quota?” A quota is a quantity, in this case the number of citations issued. There are several agencies that are competing for prizes in Driving Under the Influence contests where vehicles, body-cameras, and other law enforcement tools can be won, if certain goals are met. This may be a contest, but law enforcement consistently takes the position that these do not violate the law.

 

The Florida traffic law was passed in 2015. the law is called the “Waldo Bill.” The new provision is named after Waldo, Florida, a notorious speed trap between Gainesville and Jacksonville. “As of October 1, 2014 the town’s police force has been disbanded.” says the Wikimachine. When caught, here is what the Florida cops had to say about the latest  traffic ticket shenanigans:


“We will immediately designate that quotas are prohibited by Florida law . . . .”


 

More ticket quota evidence includes offering days off  to law enforcement officers that met  their goals. Apparently, a supervisor wanted 2 tickets per hour and “1.3 tickets per hour was not good enough.” We have been covering arrest quotas and contests by cops in Florida for years. We have uncovered the rules of the contest and posted them here. Up until this week’s breaking news from the Saint Petersburg Times, we thought the gamifying of law enforcement was limited to DUI arrests. Now we know that is not so. Police have targets that one, soon-to-be former, Florida Highway Patrol Trooper was encouraging- –  hourly targets and giving prime weekend time off to those who met the illegal goals of the department. So, unless you have a Stay Out of Jail Card, watch out for gamesmanship by law enforcement.


“1.3 tickets per hour was not good enough.”


I have spent quite a bit of time in court defending people charged with a variety of traffic offenses. One of the most offensive things I have seen was this luxury SUV that was a trophy in a contest to see how many people could be arrested for driving while impaired, among other things.

This vehicle was parked right outside of the Hillsborough County Courthouse in Tampa Florida. Apparently, the vehicle is equipped with a sophisticated video system and a mobile breath testing machine. Florida law prohibits quotas for issuing traffic tickets. The cops were just caught.

These kinds of incentives given to law enforcement can encourage otherwise decent and law-abiding police officers to violate the law. Maybe they need a weekend off. Maybe they think winning a car for their agency will look good in their personnel file. Maybe they think the prosecutor will reduce the charge from DUI to some lesser charge. Nevertheless, these awards are given for the issuance of citations or the arrests of citizens. No one seems to care to remove these entries on their permanent records when they are ultimately cleared of the charges or negotiate a plea to a lesser charge. Many first-time DUI offenders are never even convicted of DUI.

Since 2009, I have been following this area closely. The stories that are linked below cover in detail the policies and procedures that have been used by police to take advantage of programs to acquire more assets for law enforcement.

The Hillsborough County Sheriff won an SUV. The vehicle is marked with a championship logo and other markings establishing that the sheriff had won a contest to enforce DUI laws. DUI prosecutions are begun with a traffic ticket and issues about whether or not these are quotas should be asked.  The cop who wrote a memo documenting the quota has resigned. Fox has reported, “A top official with the Florida Highway Patrol who told troopers they aren’t writing enough speeding tickets is resigning from his job.” Here is some video on the illegal  ticket game.

 

Video | Illegal Ticket Quotas in Florida


 


Traffic Tickets, Arrest Contests, and Quotas – History in Florida

Arrest Contest, Traffic Ticket, and Quotas - History in Florida

Arrest Contest and Traffic Ticket Quotas – History in Florida


Florida Arrest Contest Costs $1,720,000

www.dui2go.com/2014/09/florida-dui-arrest-contest-costs-1720000.html

Sep 24, 2015 – As a Georgia Lawyer noted, when contests and quotas are in play, some police agencies keep their eyes on the prize. In that case , there is …


Florida Traffic Ticket Arrest Quota Award

Florida Traffic Ticket Arrest Quota Award


Florida Arrest Contest Winners?

www.dui2go.com/2014/04/florida-dui-arrest-contest-winners.html

Apr 8, 2014 – Driving under the influence Arrest Contest … it appears that citizens’ arrests are prizes in this despicable contest.

Arrest Contest Rules and Prizes

www.dui2go.com/2011/12/dui-arrest-contest-rules-and-prizes.html

Dec 15, 2011 – Attorney on Florida’s West Coast just uncovered the “rules” for a recent Arrest Contest. The awards are characterized as …


Hillsborough County Florida Traffic Ticket Arrest Quota Award

Hillsborough County Florida Traffic Ticket Arrest Quota Award


Arrest Contests Continue

www.dui2go.com/2010/10/dui-arrest-contests-continue.html

 Oct 21, 2010 – Largo Cop wins money for Pinellas Arrests. As Florida Lawyer W.F. Casey Ebsary has previously reported, here, here, …

Video | DUI Arrest Contest Trooper Tasers Sober Driver

www.dui2go.com/2012/03/video-dui-arrest-contest-trooper-tasers.html

Mar 30, 2012 – Attorney in Tampa has just received a report that a 200 Arrest Award Winner in a DUI Contest has admitted to numerous violations of DUI …


DUI Traffic Ticket Arrest Quota Award

Traffic Ticket Arrest Quota Award


DUI Arrest Contests in Florida

www.dui2go.com/2016/01/tampa-florida-dui-lawyer-continues-to.html

Jan 9, 2016 – Attorney on Florida’s West Coast just uncovered the “rules” for a recent Arrest Contest. The awards are characterized as DUI …

More Arrest Contest News

www.dui2go.com/2011/02/more-dui-arrest-contest-news.html

Feb 25, 2011 – More Arrest Contest News. Defense Attorney Observes: As we continue to tally the awards given to police officers who arrest drivers, …

Arrest Contest Trophy?

www.dui2go.com/2011/08/dui-arrest-contest-trophy.html

Aug 8, 2011 – Attorney noticed this was parked outside of the Hillsborough County Courthouse in Tampa, Florida this morning. This is an …

Florida Arrest Contest Winners

www.dui2go.com/2009/06/florida-dui-arrest-contest-winners.html

 Jun 19, 2009 – There were 13 contest winners at the Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Office (HSCO) . There were 16 contest winners at the Tampa Police …

Arrest Contest Winner

www.dui2go.com/2011/04/pasco-dui-cop-arrest-contest-winner.html

Apr 21, 2011 – DUI Defense Attorney notes that Pasco DUI cops are continuing their efforts to win DUI arrest contests. Florida Highway Patrol spokesman for …

What happens if you are confused and refused a DUI Breathalyzer test in Florida? Refuse Breath Test

Refuse Breath Test | Confused and Refused – Confusion Doctrine

 

Confusion DUI Refusal Refuse Breath Test

Confused about refusing a Breath test? Refuse Breath Test

Drivers can seek to have an alleged refusal to take a breath test thrown out of court using the  “confusion doctrine,” when the implied consent warnings are given following the administration of the Miranda warnings. If successful, the refusal of a breath test was not willful and is inadmissible. Under Florida law, the driver to make his or her confusion known to law enforcement. Florida law “does not require law enforcement officers to advise DUI arrestees that the Miranda warnings do not apply to the breath test, and a licensed driver in Florida has consented to the test and is not entitled to consult with an attorney prior to the administration of the test.”

 

What happens if you are confused and refused a DUI Breathalyzer test in Florida?

 

“The “confusion doctrine” is a judicially created exclusionary rule that operates to exclude a licensee’s refusal to submit to a breath test if the licensee believed that he had the right to consult with counsel prior to taking the test. See Kurecka v. State67 So. 3d 1052, 1056-57 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) [35 Fla. L. Weekly D2162b]. Under this doctrine, “a licensee’s refusal to submit to [a] breath test will be excused if, due to a prior administration of the Miranda warnings, the licensee believes that he or she had the right to consult with counsel prior to taking a breath test.” Id. at 1056 (internal citations omitted).”

Miranda Warnings Do Not Apply to the Breath Test in Florida

 

“In Kurecka, the Fourth District Court of Appeal analyzed the history of the “confusion doctrine” in Florida and other states. Id. at 1057-60. That Court concluded that Florida’s implied consent statute does not require law enforcement officers to advise DUI arrestees that the Miranda warnings do not apply to the breath test, and a licensed driver in Florida has consented to the test and is not entitled to consult with an attorney prior to the administration of the test. Id. at 1060-61. “Accordingly, excluding evidence based on a suspect’s misconception about the right to counsel prior to taking the breath test would be contrary to the legislative intent of Florida’s implied consent law.” Id. at 1060.”


Video: Refusal to Take a Breath Test at Hillsborough County Jail in Florida

 

DUI Video from inside a jail where a cop is administering Florida’s Implied Consent warning given prior to requesting a suspect to take a breath test on an Intoxilyzer breath machine.


 

“The Fifth District Court of Appeal declined to apply the “confusion doctrine” on facts somewhat similar to the instant case. In Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Marshall848 So. 2d 482, 485-86 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) [28 Fla. L. Weekly D1553b], the DHSMV hearing officer presiding over the formal review hearing of the license suspension rejected Ms. Marshall’s self-serving testimony regarding her confusion about her right to counsel. Id. Further, none of the DHSMV documents supported Ms. Marshall’s claims, and she failed to subpoena law enforcement officers who could corroborate her testimony that she was told she could consult with an attorney prior to the breath test. Id.”

“The Seventh Judicial Circuit has once addressed the “confusion doctrine,” in a case where the an officer explained to the petitioner that he did not have the right to an attorney and that any answer other than “yes” to the breath test would be a refusal. Bosch v. Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles10 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 757a (Fla. 7th Cir. Ct. 2003). The Court found that Mr. Bosch’s reliance on the “confusion doctrine” was misplaced because the Miranda warnings were given after the implied consent notice, and Mr. Bosch must have made his confusion known to the law enforcement officer in order to invoke the doctrine. Id. See also Moore v. Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles13 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 932a (Fla. 9th Cir. Ct. 2006).”

Refuse Breath Test

 

“The Court finds that the hearing officer’s decision to reject the application of the “confusion doctrine” was based upon competent substantial evidence. Petitioner did not make his confusion known to Officer Jacobs, and the Miranda warnings were not given contemporaneously to the implied consent warnings. Other than his own testimony, there is no evidence to support Petitioner’s assertion that he was confused over his right to remain silent and the officer’s request for Petitioner to take the breath test. As the trier of fact, the hearing officer is in the best position to evaluate the evidence and the witnesses. See Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Satter, 643 So.2d 692, 695 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). The hearing officer is not required to believe the testimony of any witness, even if unrebutted. See Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Dean662 So.2d 371, 372 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) [20 Fla. L. Weekly D2179c]. Importantly, the hearing officer did not find that the “confusion doctrine” did not exist under Florida law; rather, he rejected the defense because Petitioner’s “testimony was not persuasive.” App. M at 5. This Court, therefore, rejects Petitioner’s reliance on the “confusion doctrine”.”

Sources: 24 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 412a Online Reference: FLWSUPP 2406CRAW ; 13 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 932a

 

What happens when a driver changes his or her mind and decides to take a breath test after initially refusing to take one?

 

Refusal Breath Test

Refusal Breath Test

Sometimes a driver may change their decision to take a breath test or chemical test to determine the content of their breath or blood. This refusal decision is important both in the administrative suspension of a Florida Driver’s license at the Bureau of administrative Reviews and in the criminal case prosecuted by the local State Attorney’s office in court. In driving under influence cases, the evidence of defendant’s refusal to submit to breath test is sometimes admissible. It certainly is admissible where the State seeks to administratively suspend the driver’s license for failure to comply with the implied consent law. How do you let the court know there is a problem with the police procedure? A motion in limine can be filed with the court.

 

What is a Pretrial Motion in Limine?

 

A pretrial motion can be filed to attack the use of statements of actions of the driver in the prosecution of a crime. This action results in a hearing in front of a judge and not a jury. If the motion is successful, the jury will never know about the alleged refusal. prosecutors use the argument that the reason for the refusal by the suspect was that they driver knew they would have failed the breath test by blowing over a .08.

What happens when a driver changes his or her mind about refusal to take a breath test?

 

The driver’s refusal is not admissible, if they timely retract their refusal. The court found, “There was no material inconvenience to the police, for two Intoxilyzers and two Intoxilyzer operators were available. [the Florida Highway Patrol officer]  actually ran his Intoxilyzer, after the retraction, to obtain the “refusal” on the Breath Test affidavit. ” Florida courts have ruled where the driver / defendant was continuously in presence of officers between refusal and retraction, and there would have been no inconvenience to law enforcement in permitting defendant to take test, the refusal cannot be held against them in a DUI case.

What must a driver be told by police seeking a DUI breath test?

 

  • Request to submit to a test
  • Suspend for 12 months for first refusal
  • Suspend for 18 months for subsequent refusal
  • Second or subsequent refusal can be a misdemeanor
  • Refusal is admissible in criminal case

“It is not hard to imagine circumstances where the defendant,

soon after declining to take the breath test, has second thoughts.”


Here is the  text of one court’s ruling:

STATE OF FLORIDA, Plaintiff, vs. STEVEN PAUL BURCH, Defendant. County Court, 12th Judicial Circuit in and for Sarasota County. Case No. 2015 CT 012729 SC. April 20, 2017.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION IN LIMINE

THIS CAUSE having come to be heard upon Defendant, Steven Paul Burch’s Motion in Limine, to preclude the State from introducing any evidence that the Defendant initially refused to submit to a breath test, the Court having held hearing and taking testimony and otherwise being fully advised finds as follows:

1. On August 8, 2015, Mr. Burch was arrested for DUI.

2. Mr. Burch initially refused to take a breath test at the scene of the arrest, but changed his mind and requested to take a breath test once he arrived at the Sarasota County Jail.

3. Mr. Burch was continuously in the presence of Trooper Angelicchi from the time of his initial refusal until his retraction of the refusal.

4. When Mr. Burch arrived at the Sarasota County Jail, an Intoxilyzer was available to conduct a breath as well as two permitted breath test operators to conduct the breath test: Trooper Angelicchi and Corrections Officer Rowe.

5. The breath test affidavit that is marked “subject test refused” shows that the Intoxilyzer was run at 11:37 pm, which was long after Mr. Burch retracted the refusal.

6. In Larmer v. State of Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, 522 So.2d 941 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988), the court stated:

. . .an “absolute rule” prohibiting a subsequent consent after an initial refusal could lead to unnecessarily harsh and self-defeating results. It is not hard to imagine circumstances where the defendant, soon after declining to take the breath test, has second thoughts. If the test results would remain valid, and if no material inconvenience is caused to the police, we fail to see the harm in permitting the defendant to subsequently consent to take the test.

The Court held:

. . .while petitioner was continuously in the presence of the police officers, and in circumstances where no inconvenience would result by permitting him immediately thereafter to take the test that would produce the evidence that is the object and intent of Florida’s Implied Consent Law.
Larmer citied to a Utah case that held a one hour delay was not a refusal.

7. In this case Mr. Burch was continuously in the presence of the police officers. There was no material inconvenience to the police, for two Intoxilyzers and two Intoxilyzer operators were available. Trooper Angelicchi actually ran his Intoxilyzer, after the retraction, to obtain the “refusal” on the Breath Test affidavit. There was no lawful reason not to let Mr. Burch submit to a breath test when Trooper Angelicchi was conducting the test for the ‘refusal.” The duration of the time between the refusal at the scene of the arrest and the retraction upon arrival at the jail was not of such length to render the breath test invalid.

8. While Mr. Burch initially refused the breath test, he later retracted his refusal and requested a breath test. Following Larmer, since Mr. Burch was continuously in the presence of the police officers and under circumstances where no inconvenience would result by permitting him to take a breath test, there was not a refusal within the meaning of Florida’s Implied Consent Law. Also see State v. Eng, 6 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 649a (Fla. Pinellas Cty. Ct. September 15, 1998).

Accordingly, the Defendant’s Motion in Limine is GRANTED.

Source: 25 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 289a Online Reference: FLWSUPP 2503BURC

How to get a Florida Driver’s License back after Suspension?

 

Recently courts have tried to help those with suspended licenses get their driver’s licenses back. According a recent report in the Florida Bar News, one judge organized a “clinic, the first of its kind in Leon County, in order to help resolve a significant problem in the area. Hundreds of Leon County drivers are operating a vehicle with a suspended or revoked license, and Smith says nine out of 10 drivers do not understand what is required of them to get their licenses back.” However, judges are limited in the help that can be provided to those who are subjected to the administrative license suspensions issued to those impacts from driving under the influence charges. Among the reasons these special programs apply: failure to resolve traffic infractions; accumulating too many points on a license; failure to have insurance; or failure to satisfy child support obligations.

Florida Implied Consent Warning Summary

Here is a summary of the language police use when threatening a suspect to take a breath or chemical test:

“If you fail to submit to the test I have requested of you, your privilege to operate a motor vehicle will be suspended for a period of one (1) year for a first refusal, or eighteen (18) months if your privilege has been previously suspended as a result of a refusal to submit to a lawful test of your breath, urine or blood. Additionally, if you refuse to submit to the test I have requested of you and if your driving privilege has been previously suspended for a prior refusal to submit to a lawful test of your breath, urine or blood, you will be committing a misdemeanor. Refusal to submit to the test I have requested of you is admissible into evidence in any criminal proceeding.”

“Do you still refuse to submit to this test knowing that your driving privilege will be suspended for a period of at least one year and that you will be charged criminally for a subsequent refusal?”

 

Search Warrant Required for Vehicle Event Data Recorder

Do Florida Police need a search warrant to download the data from a motor vehicle’s black box?

 

Search Warrant Vehicle Event Data Recorder

Search Warrant Vehicle Event Data Recorder

A court in Palm Beach Florida has just ruled that the police need a search warrant in a DUI case when they seek to recover the data from a car’s Black Box. This device is known as a vehicle event data recorder. In this case the police downloaded the data from a car’s Black Box 12 days after a crash without obtaining a warrant. The court in a first-ever ruling in Florida found that the cops should have gotten a search warrant. The court ruled. “the constant, unrelenting black box surveillance of driving conditions could contribute to a reasonable expectation of privacy in the recorded data. Considering that the data is difficult to access and not all of the recorded information is exposed to the public, [the driver] Worsham had a reasonable expectation of privacy, and we agree with the trial court that a warrant was required before police could search the black box.”


History of Vehicle Event Data Recorders in Florida Court

In 2009 we wrote and provided a copy of another court opinion on the issues surrounding cops breaking in to a vehicle event recorder.  “Prosecutors alleged recently, data from a Corvette that was downloaded from the black box revealed that a defendant’s speed was 103 m.p.h. five seconds before impact and 98 m.p.h. one second before impact. The Speed limit was 40 m.p.h. A recent court ruling noted, ”A search warrant for property may be issued ‘[w]hen any property constitutes evidence relevant to proving that a felony has been committed.’ Section 933.02(3), Fla. Stat. (2006).” Black Box Search Warrant Article from Florida. You can read the complete decision we posted here: 2009 Black Box Florida Court Ruling  http://duifla.com/BlackBoxSearchWarrant.pdf


I have included some key quotes from the recent  Court’s opinion and the complete Court’s opinion follows below.


Florida DUI Vehicle Event Data Recorder Key Quotes


“An event data recorder is a device installed in a vehicle to record “crash data” or technical vehicle and occupant information for a period of time before, during, and after a crash.”

“It is an issue of first impression in Florida whether a warrant is required to search an impounded vehicle’s electronic data recorder or black box.”

“17 states have laws addressing event data recorders, which provide under what circumstances the data may be downloaded.”

“[T]he constant, unrelenting black box surveillance of driving conditions could contribute to a reasonable expectation of privacy in the recorded data.”


“A car’s black box is analogous to other electronic storage devices for which courts have recognized a reasonable expectation of privacy.”


Complete Florida DUI Vehicle Event Data Recorder Opinion

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellant,

v.

CHARLES WILEY WORSHAM, JR.,
Appellee.
No. 4D15-2733
[March 29, 2017]

Appeal of a non-final order from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; Jack Schramm Cox, Judge; L.T. Case No. 2013CF012609AMB.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Mitchell A. Egber, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Jack A. Fleischman of Fleischman & Fleischman, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellee.
GROSS, J.

The state challenges an order granting appellee Charles Worsham’s motion to suppress. Without a warrant, the police downloaded data from the “event data recorder” or “black box” located in Worsham’s impounded vehicle. We affirm, concluding there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information retained by an event data recorder and downloading that information without a warrant from an impounded car in the absence of exigent circumstances violated the Fourth Amendment.

Worsham was the driver of a vehicle involved in a high speed accident that killed his passenger. The vehicle was impounded. Twelve days after the crash, on October 18, 2013, law enforcement downloaded the information retained on the vehicle’s event data recorder. The police did not apply for a warrant until October 22, 2013. The warrant application was denied because the desired search had already occurred.

Worsham was later arrested and charged with DUI manslaughter and vehicular homicide. He moved to suppress the downloaded information,
– 2 –
arguing the police could not access this data without first obtaining his consent or a search warrant. The state defended the search on the sole ground that Worsham had no privacy interest in the downloaded information, so that no Fourth Amendment search occurred.

1 The trial court granted Worsham’s motion.

“A motion to suppress evidence generally involves a mixed question of fact and law. The trial court’s factual determinations will not be disturbed if they are supported by competent substantial evidence, while the constitutional issues are reviewed de novo.” State v. K.C., 207 So. 3d 951, 953 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (internal citation omitted). An appellate court is bound by the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. The burden is on the defendant to show the search was invalid, “[h]owever, a warrantless search constitutes a prima facie showing which shifts to the State the burden of showing the search’s legality.” Id. (internal citation omitted).

In Florida, citizens are guaranteed the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by the Fourth Amendment to the Unites States Constitution and section 12 of Florida’s Declaration of Rights. Smallwood v. State, 113 So. 3d 724, 730 (Fla. 2013). “The most basic constitutional rule” in the area of Fourth Amendment searches is that “searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” The exceptions are “jealously and carefully drawn,” and there must be “a showing by those who seek exemption . . . that the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative.” “[T]he burden is on those seeking the exemption to show the need for it.”

Id. at 729 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454–55 (1971)).

“A Fourth Amendment search occurs when the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable.” State v. Lampley, 817 So. 2d 989, 990 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001)). This principle has been applied

1 The state raises inevitable discovery and good faith in its brief. We do not reach these issues because they were not preserved in the circuit court. Sunset Harbour Condo. Ass’n v. Robbins, 914 So. 2d 925, 928 (Fla. 2005).

– 3 –

“to hold that a Fourth Amendment search does not occur . . . unless ‘the individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search,’ and ‘society [is] willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable.’” Lampley, 817 So. 2d at 990-91 (quoting Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33)).

Katz v. United States explained “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,” so “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.” 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). One example is a car’s exterior, which “is thrust into the public eye, and thus to examine it does not constitute a ‘search.’” New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 114 (1986); see also Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 592 (1974) (permitting warrantless search of an automobile’s exterior).

Nevertheless, information someone seeks to “preserve as private,” even where that information is accessible to the public, “may be constitutionally protected.” Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. This is why “a car’s interior as a whole is . . . subject to Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable intrusions by the police.” Class, 475 U.S. at 114–15; see also United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 896 (1975) (“A search, even of an automobile, is a substantial invasion of privacy.”).

A car’s black box is analogous to other electronic storage devices for which courts have recognized a reasonable expectation of privacy. Modern technology facilitates the storage of large quantities of information on small, portable devices. The emerging trend is to require a warrant to search these devices. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (requiring warrant to search cell phone seized incident to arrest); Smallwood, 113 So. 3d 724 (requiring warrant to search cell phone in search incident to arrest); State v. K.C., 207 So. 3d 951 (requiring warrant to search an “abandoned” but locked cell phone).

Noting that cell phones can access or contain “[t]he most private and secret personal information, Smallwood, 113 So. 3d at 732, the Florida Supreme Court has distinguished these computer-like electronic storage devices from other inanimate objects:

[A]nalogizing computers to other physical objects when applying Fourth Amendment law is not an exact fit because computers hold so much personal and sensitive information touching on many private aspects of life. . . . [T]here is a far greater potential for the “inter-mingling” of documents and a

– 4 –

consequent invasion of privacy when police execute a search for evidence on a computer.

Id. (quoting United States v. Lucas, 640 F.3d 168, 178 (6th Cir. 2011)). Because of the “very personal and vast nature of the information” they contain, cell phones are “materially distinguishable from the static, limited-capacity cigarette packet in Robinson.”2 Smallwood, 113 So. 3d at 732. “[T]he search of a static, non-interactive container, cannot be deemed analogous to the search of a modern electronic device cell phone.” Id. The Smallwood court made clear that the opinion was “narrowly limited to the legal question and facts with which [it] was presented.” Id. at 741. Nonetheless, the court reiterated its desire to protect Fourth Amendment precedent “by ensuring that the exceptions to the warrant requirement remain ‘jealously and carefully drawn.’” Id. at 740.

The United States Supreme Court drew a similar distinction between a cell phone and other tangible objects in Riley v. California. The Court held that the search incident to arrest exception did not apply because neither rationale–the interest in protecting officer safety or preventing destruction of evidence–justified the warrantless search of cell phone data. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2486-88. “Cell phones differ in both a quantitative and a qualitative sense from other objects that might be kept on an arrestee’s person. The term ‘cell phone’ is itself misleading shorthand; many of these devices are in fact minicomputers . . . .” Id. at 2489.

Searches of these “minicomputers,” with their “immense storage capacity,” are far more intrusive than searches prior to the “digital age,” which were “limited by physical realities and tended as a general matter to constitute only a narrow intrusion on privacy.” Id. The capacity of these devices “allows even just one type of information to convey far more than previously possible.” Id. The Court concluded, “[t]he fact that technology now allows an individual to carry such information in his hand does not make the information any less worthy of the protection for which the Founders fought.” Id. at 2495.

It is an issue of first impression in Florida whether a warrant is required to search an impounded vehicle’s electronic data recorder or black box.3

2 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (permitting the warrantless search of an arrestee’s person incident to arrest if the officer had probable cause for the arrest).
3 As of this writing, 17 states have laws addressing event data recorders, which provide under what circumstances the data may be downloaded. Privacy of Data From Event Data Recorders: State Statutes, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE

– 5 –

An event data recorder is a device installed in a vehicle to record “crash data” or technical vehicle and occupant information for a period of time before, during, and after a crash. NHTSA, Event Data Recorders, 49 C.F.R. § 563.5 (2015). Approximately 96% of cars manufactured since 2013 are equipped with event data recorders. Black box 101: Understanding event data recorders, CONSUMER REPORTS, http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/2012/10/black-box-101-understanding-event-data-recorders/index.htm, (published Jan. 2014).

Most of these devices are programmed either to activate during an event or record information in a continuous loop, writing over data again and again until the vehicle is in a collision. Michelle V. Rafter, Decoding What’s in Your Car’s Black Box, EDMUNDS, https://www.edmunds.com/car-technology/car-black-box-recorders-capture-crash-data.html (updated July 22, 2014). However, if triggered, the device can record multiple events. 49 C.F.R. § 563.9.

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration has standardized the minimum requirements for electronic data recorders, mandating that the devices record 15 specific data inputs, including braking, stability control engagement, ignition cycle, engine rpm, steering, and the severity and duration of a crash. 49 C.F.R. § 563.7. Along with these required data inputs, the devices may record additional information like location or cruise control status and some devices can even perform diagnostic examinations to determine whether the vehicle’s systems are operating properly.

See Decoding ‘The Black Box’ with Expert Advice, AMERICAN BAR ASSOC. GP SOLO LAW TRENDS & NEWS, http://www.americanbar.org/content/newsletter/publications/law_trends_news_practice_area_e_newsletter_home/decodingblackbox.html (May 2005); Vehicular Data Recorder Download, Collection, and Analysis, COLLISION RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS INC., http://collisionresearch.com/services/event-data-recorder-0.

The information contained in a vehicle’s black box is fairly difficult to obtain. The data retrieval kit necessary to extract the information is expensive and each manufacturer’s data recorder requires a different type of cable to connect with the diagnostic port. Rafter, supra. The downloaded data must then be interpreted by a specialist with extensive training. Id.; see also Melissa Massheder Torres, The Automotive Black Box, 55 REV. DER. P.R. 191, 192 (2015).
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/privacy-of-data-from-event-data-recorders.aspx (Jan. 4, 2016). Florida does not have similar legislation.

– 6 –

The record reflects that the black box in Worsham’s vehicle recorded speed and braking data, the car’s change in velocity, steering input, yaw rate, angular rate, safety belt status, system voltage, and airbag warning lamp information.

Extracting and interpreting the information from a car’s black box is not like putting a car on a lift and examining the brakes or tires. Because the recorded data is not exposed to the public, and because the stored data is so difficult to extract and interpret, we hold there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in that information, protected by the Fourth Amendment, which required law enforcement in the absence of exigent circumstances to obtain a warrant before extracting the information from an impounded vehicle.

Although electronic data recorders do not yet store the same quantity of information as a cell phone, nor is it of the same personal nature, the rationale for requiring a warrant to search a cell phone is informative in determining whether a warrant is necessary to search an immobilized vehicle’s data recorder. These recorders document more than what is voluntarily conveyed to the public and the information is inherently different from the tangible “mechanical” parts of a vehicle. Just as cell phones evolved to contain more and more personal information, as the electronic systems in cars have gotten more complex, the data recorders are able to record more information.4 The difficulty in extracting such information buttresses an expectation of privacy.

Recently enacted federal legislation enhances the notion that there is an expectation of privacy in information contained in an automobile data recorder. The Driver Privacy Act of 2015 states that “[a]ny data retained by an event data recorder . . . is the property of the owner . . . of the motor vehicle in which the event data recorder is installed.” § 24302(a), 49 U.S.C. § 30101 note (2015). The general rule of the statute is that “[d]ata recorded or transmitted by an event data recorder . . . may not be accessed by a person other than an owner . . . of the motor vehicle in which the event data recorder is installed.” § 24302(b) (emphasis added). There are only five exceptions to this rule, which include authorization from a court or administrative authority or consent of the owner. § 24302(b)(1)-(5).

4 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., REPORT TO CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMM. ON PRIVACY, TECH. AND THE LAW, COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, U.S. SENATE, (Dec. 2013), http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/659509.pdf; Peter Gareffa, Senate Committee Approves Black Box Privacy Bill, EDMUNDS, (Apr. 18, 2014), https://www.edmunds.com/car-news/senate-committee-approves-black-box-privacy-bill.html.

– 7 –

A state court in California has addressed the Fourth Amendment’s application to a vehicle’s data recorder. That authority is not persuasive or controlling and was decided prior to the passing of the Driver Privacy Act of 2015.

People v. Diaz, held that the defendant lacked a privacy interest in his vehicle’s speed and braking data, obtained from the “sensing diagnostic module” after a fatal accident, 153 Cal. Rptr. 3d 90 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013). It was undisputed the search was conducted without a warrant, over a year after the accident. Id. at 96. There was testimony about the defendant’s speed at the time of the accident, but the officer conceded this was based on the information downloaded from the vehicle’s sensing diagnostic module. Id. at 94.

The court concluded that the defendant failed to demonstrate “a subjective expectation of privacy in the SDM’s recorded data because she was driving on the public roadway, and others could observe her vehicle’s movements, braking, and speed, either directly or through the use of technology such as radar guns or automated cameras.” Id. at 102. Since the diagnostic module “merely captured information defendant knowingly exposed to the public,” downloading that information without a warrant was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. (citing Smith v. Maryland 442 U.S. 735, 741–45 (1979) (holding installation of a pen register did not violate the Fourth Amendment because it only recorded information “voluntarily conveyed . . . in the ordinary course of business.”)).

Diaz is unpersuasive. It relied on Smith v. Maryland, which found no expectation of privacy in information “voluntarily conveyed” to a third party. 422 U.S. at 745. However, when addressing digital devices, the Supreme Court has moved away from the Smith rationale. In United States v. Jones, the Court could have relied on Smith when considering the constitutionality of placing a GPS tracking device on a vehicle without a warrant, since the vehicle’s position “had been voluntarily conveyed to the public.” 132 S. Ct. 945, 951 (2012). Instead, the Court relied on a trespass theory to find that while “mere visual observation does not constitute a search,” attaching a device to the vehicle or reaching into a vehicle’s interior constitutes “encroach[ment] on a protected area.” Id. at 952-53.

Additionally, the Diaz court’s reliance on Smith v. Maryland seems misplaced because, as the opinion acknowledged, sensory diagnostic modules can record much more information than what is observable to the public, including “the throttle, steering, suspension, brakes, tires, and wheels.” 213 Cal. App. 4th at 748. We disagree with Diaz that all black box data is “exposed to the public.”

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Although the issue was not before the Court, the majority in Jones acknowledged that acquiring data “through electronic means, without an accompanying trespass,” could still be “an unconstitutional invasion of privacy.” Id. at 953.

In his concurring opinion, Justice Alito expressed a preference for analyzing the case by “asking whether [Jones’s] reasonable expectations of privacy were violated by the long-term monitoring of the movements of the vehicle he drove.” 132 S. Ct. at 958. Justice Alito observed that the Katz expectation-of-privacy test, rests on the assumption that this hypothetical reasonable person has a well-developed and stable set of privacy expectations. Dramatic technological change may lead to periods in which popular expectations are in flux and may ultimately produce significant changes in popular attitudes. New technology may provide increased convenience or security at the expense of privacy, and many people may find the trade off worthwhile.
Id. at 962.

Under Justice Alito’s approach, the constant, unrelenting black box surveillance of driving conditions could contribute to a reasonable expectation of privacy in the recorded data. Considering that the data is difficult to access and not all of the recorded information is exposed to the public, Worsham had a reasonable expectation of privacy, and we agree with the trial court that a warrant was required before police could search the black box.

Affirmed.
KLINGENSMITH, J., concurs.
FORST, J., dissents with opinion.
FORST, J., dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. There are not many court opinions addressing a warrantless search of the “black box” event data recorder (“EDR”) attached to an individual’s motor vehicle.5 An opinion by a “Justice Court” in New
5 In General Motors vehicles, the EDR is also referred to as the “Sensing Diagnostic Module (SDM).” People v. Diaz, 153 Cal. Reptr. 3d 90, 92 n.2 (Ct. App. 2013); People v. Christmann, 776 N.Y.S.2d 437, 438 (Just. Ct. 2004). “The SDM . . . has multiple functions: (1) it determines if a severe enough impact has occurred to warrant deployment of the air bag; (2) it monitors the air bag’s
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York (similar to a circuit court in Florida)6 and an appellate court in California7 appear to be the only published precedent addressing the instant matter. Obviously, searches of EDRs in motor vehicles were not on the minds of the first United States Congress when the Fourth Amendment was introduced in 1789, and the United States Constitution’s right to privacy sheds no light on the subject (particularly since there is no provision actually describing such a right to privacy).8
Thus, there is no definitive answer to the question posed in this case—whether the warrantless search of Appellee’s car’s EDR constituted a violation of his Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches. Nonetheless, contrary to the well-reasoned majority opinion, I conclude that the “search” of the EDR attached to Appellee’s vehicle was not a search or seizure protected by the Fourth Amendment, as Appellee did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the data in this particular EDR.
Background
The relevant facts are set forth in the majority opinion.
Analysis
As noted in the majority opinion, “[a] Fourth Amendment search occurs when the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable.” State v. Lampley, 817 So. 2d 989, 990 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001)). The reverse is also true: “a Fourth Amendment search does not occur . . . unless ‘the individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search,’ and ‘society [is] willing to
components; and (3) it permanently records information.” Bachman v. Gen. Motors Corp., 776 N.E.2d 262, 271-72 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
6 Christmann, 776 N.Y.S.2d 437.
7 Diaz, 153 Cal. Reptr. 3d 90. Diaz is discussed in this opinion. Another California appellate court decision, People v. Xinos, 121 Cal. Rptr. 3d 496 (Ct. App. 2011), which held that the downloading of data from the vehicle’s EDR following an accident violated the driver’s Fourth Amendment rights, is not discussed as it predates Diaz and was ordered not to be officially published. Id. at 507-12.
8 Appellee does not rely upon the Florida Constitution’s Right of Privacy, Article I, Section 23. Further, that provision yields to Article I, Section 12 with respect to “searches and seizures,” with the Florida Constitutional right “construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.”
– 10 –
recognize that expectation as reasonable.’” Id. at 991 (alterations in original) (quoting Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33).
In contrast to a cellular phone, an EDR does not contain “a broad array of private information” such as photos, passwords, and other “sensitive records previously found in the home.” Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014). Significantly, the EDR in the instant case did not contain GPS information relative to the vehicle’s travels, which may be subject to privacy protection. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415-17 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (expressing concern with GPS information which “reflects a wealth of detail about [a person’s] familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations”). As noted in the majority opinion, the EDR in this case was only recording speed and braking data, the car’s change in velocity, steering input, yaw rate,9 angular rate, safety belt status, system voltage, and airbag warning lamp information. Moreover, this data had not been knowingly inputted by Appellee; in fact, it is likely that Appellee did not even know that the vehicle he was driving had an EDR. Therefore, it would be quite a stretch to conclude that Appellee sought to preserve this information as “private.”
The majority opinion references the United States Supreme Court’s Riley decision as well as this Court’s recent opinion in State v. K.C., 207 So. 3d 951 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016). Both cases involved cell phones. As distinguished from an EDR attached to an undercarriage of a motor vehicle, cell phones are usually carried close to an individual’s body, generally in a pants or shirt pocket or in a purse or belt case. The database of the EDR in this case carries extremely non-private, non-confidential information, such as the vehicle’s yaw rate; a cell phone, on the other hand, “collects in one place many distinct types of information—an address, a note, a prescription, a bank statement, a video—that reveal much more in combination than any isolated record.” Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489. A reasonably prudent seller of his/her used cellphone or personal computer would clear the hard drive of all personal information; the seller of a used vehicle would be unlikely to take similar action with respect to the vehicle’s EDR.
9 “A yaw rotation is a movement around the yaw axis of a rigid body that changes the direction it is pointing, to the left or right of its direction of motion. The yaw rate or yaw velocity of a car, aircraft, projectile or other rigid body is the angular velocity of this rotation . . . .” Yaw (rotation), WIKIPEDIA (Mar. 13, 2017, 2:37 PM), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yaw_(rotation) (emphasis omitted). Yes, I also didn’t know what this was.
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In our K.C. opinion, we emphasized that, though abandoned by the phone’s owner, “[the] contents [of the cell phone] were still protected by a password, clearly indicating an intention to protect the privacy of all of the digital material on the cell phone or able to be accessed by it.” K.C., 207 So. 3d at 955. The private data in a cell phone is, for the most part, created by the owner and is password protected by the owner for his/her own benefit and privacy. The data on the EDR, however, was not created by the owner and was not protected by a password by or for the benefit of the owner (even though there apparently was a password-like encryption on the data). This data is collected and stored in the interest of public safety, including the safety of the vehicle’s driver.
In the aforementioned New York Christmann decision which involved a prosecution for speeding and failing to exercise due care, the court held that the motorist had only a diminished expectation of privacy following an accident with respect to the vehicle’s mechanical areas, and therefore retrieval by law enforcement of data stored in the vehicle’s SDM did not constitute an unreasonable search and seizure. Christmann, 776 N.Y.S.2d at 441-42; see also People v. Quackenbush, 670 N.E.2d 434, 439-40 (N.Y. 1996) (similar, and specifically referring to the diminished expectation of privacy yielding to the overwhelming state interest in investigating fatal accidents).
The California case of Diaz involved a situation similar to the instant case. Diaz, 153 Cal. Rptr. 3d 90. There was a motor vehicle accident and, as part of their investigation, law enforcement personnel, without a warrant, downloaded the SDM. Id. at 96. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s ruling that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the data in the SDM, finding the defendant failed to demonstrate “a subjective expectation of privacy in the SDM’s recorded data because she was driving on the public roadway, and others could observe her vehicle’s movements, braking, and speed, either directly or through the use of technology such as radar guns or automated cameras.” Id. at 102. “[T]echnology merely captured information defendant knowingly exposed to the public—the speed at which she was travelling and whether she applied her brakes before the impact.” Id.
The majority opinion discounts the reasoning in Diaz, finding it neither “persuasive [n]or controlling.” Certainly, it is not controlling. However, it is persuasive, as the trial court’s decision denying the defendant’s motion to suppress, quoted in the District Court’s opinion, is particularly logical:
“Assuming the defendant had such knowledge [that there was an SDM in the car] and also had an expectation of privacy, it
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does not seem that such expectation would be reasonable. These computer modules were placed in cars as safety devices to gather information such as braking and speed, so as to be able to deploy the air bag at an appropriate time. They were not designed to gather any personal information nor designed or developed by the government to gather incrimination evidence from a driver. One cannot record communication of any kind on them. Indeed, they are not under the control of the individual driver at all.”
The trial court further held: “[Defendant] had no reasonable expectation of privacy in her speed on a public roadway or when and if she applied her brakes shortly before the crash. If a witness observed those actions and testified to them, the evidence would be admitted. If an expert in accident reconstruction testified to them, that evidence would be admitted. There is no difference in an electronic witness whose memory is much more accurately preserved, both to exonerate and implicate defendants.”
Id. at 97.
The majority opinion maintains that Diaz inappropriately relied on Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), and implies that Jones is the operative Supreme Court precedent for this issue. Actually, the Diaz opinion discusses Jones at some length, noting that the Supreme Court decision was based “on the common law theory of trespass in placing the GPS on the defendant’s personal property, combined with the police attempt to obtain information,” and the “trespass theory underlying Jones has no relevance [in this SDM search case] and, as the trial court aptly pointed out, the purpose of the SDM was not to obtain information for the police.” Diaz, 153 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 101. The majority in the instant case suggests that the Jones opinion’s reliance on this trespass theory when it could have relied on the Smith theory means that Smith is no longer binding precedent. But the fact that the Supreme Court chose to resolve Jones on the narrower trespass grounds rather than to wade into the waters of voluntary conveyance of information from Smith means only that trespass is a viable Fourth Amendment consideration, not that trespass is the only consideration remaining.
Furthermore, in Jones, the government placed a GPS tracking device on the defendant’s car to monitor the vehicle’s movement and location. Jones, 565 U.S. at 403. By contrast, an EDR is installed on vehicles before they are sold/leased to a driver and the purpose is not to track the vehicle’s
– 13 –
location or route. Moreover, although the EDR is placed under the vehicle and most vehicle owners and drivers are unaware that there is such a black box attached to the vehicle, there is no attempt on the part of the government to secretively attach the EDR and have it record this information. Unlike the situation in Jones, the attachment of the EDR is not directed at any individual; as noted in the majority opinion, “[a]pproximately 96% of cars manufactured since 2013 are equipped with event data recorders” and they are installed prior to the conveyance of the vehicle to any individual.
Conclusion
The data that the government extracted from the vehicle that was owned and driven by Appellee in this case was not information for which Appellee or any other owner/driver had a reasonable expectation of privacy. The data was not personal to Appellee, was not password protected by Appellee, and was not being collected and maintained solely for the benefit of Appellee. The EDR was installed by the vehicle’s manufacturer at the behest of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and, as distinct from Jones, the purpose of the data collection is highway and driver safety. See New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 113 (1986) (“[A]utomobiles are justifiably the subject of pervasive regulation by the State [and e]very operator of a motor vehicle must expect the State, in enforcing its regulations, will intrude to some extent upon that operator’s privacy.”).
Accordingly, as the extraction of data from the vehicle’s EDR in the instant case was not a search or seizure protected by the Fourth Amendment, I would reverse the trial court’s suppression of this evidence. Thus, I respectfully dissent.
* * *
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

Can the police force you to give up the Password to your phone?

iPhonePassword

Can Police Force You to Give Up iPhone Password?


“we are not inclined to believe that the Fifth Amendment should provide greater protection to individuals who passcode protect their iPhones “

 

A court in Florida just ruled that a defendant could be forced to provide the password to his iPhone. A distinction is important – they got a search warrant. Without a warrant, the case may have been decided in favor of protecting the phone owner’s privacy. The phone had a cracked screen and had been allegedly used to take photographs that would have been useful in the prosecution of the phone’s owner. You can review a typical  iPhone Search Warrant here. At the bottom of this article are numerous other articles we have written on this topic.


Right to Remain Silent

 

Usually, we think that we have a right not to incriminate ourselves. However, this Florida Court in the Tampa Bay area ruled that providing the password did not constitute testimony against one’s self. In a convoluted 19-page ruling the court found that while there may be evidence of a crime, providing the passcode was not testimonial.

Here are some excerpts from the iPhone Court’s ruling.


“That an accused may be “forced to surrender a key to a strongbox containing incriminating documents,” but he cannot “be compelled to reveal the combination to his wall safe,” Doe, 487 U.S. at 219 (Stevens, J., dissenting), is another often repeated quote. See, e.g., Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 43; Doe, 487 U.S. at 210 n.9; In re Grand Jury, 670 F.3d at 1345; Kirschner, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 669. Despite the many cases referencing the quote, we have found none that provide details of “surrender[ing] a key.” We question whether identifying the key which will open the strongbox—such that the key is surrendered—is, in fact, distinct from telling an officer the combination. More importantly, we question the continuing viability of any distinction as technology advances. See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 407 (“Several of Boyd[ v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)]’s express or implicit declarations have not stood the test of time.”). In that respect, we are not inclined to believe that the Fifth Amendment should provide greater protection to individuals who passcode protect their iPhones with letter and number . . . . ”


“In this case, the communication was sought only for its content and the content has no other value or significance.11 By providing the passcode, Stahl would not be acknowledging that the phone contains evidence of video voyeurism. See Doe, 487 U.S. at 215. Moreover, although the passcode would allow the State access to the phone, and therefore to a source of potential evidence, the State has a warrant to search the phone—the source of evidence had already been uncovered. See id. Providing the passcode does not “betray any knowledge [Stahl] may have about the circumstances of the offenses” for which he is charged. See id. at 219 (Stevens, J., dissenting). It does not implicitly “relate a factual assertion or disclose information.””


“The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination has been held to apply not only to verbal and written communications but also to the production of documents, usually in response to a subpoena or summons, because the act of production itself could communicate incriminatory statements. See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410. The courts that have addressed the Fifth Amendment implications for providing decryption keys and passcodes have largely applied the act-of-production doctrine and the foregone conclusion exception. See, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Huang, No. 15-269, 2015 WL 5611644, *1 (E.D. Penn. Sept. 23, 2015); United States v. Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1235 (D. Col. 2012); In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Boucher (In re Boucher), 2:06-MJ-91, 2009 WL 424718, *2-3 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009); Gelfgatt, 11 N.E.3d at 612; Commonwealth v. Baust, 89 Va. Cir. 267 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2014). But see United States v. Kirschner, 823 F. Supp. 2d 665, 669 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (concluding that providing the password was testimony protected by the privilege against self-incrimination).”


“Invoking the privilege still requires the accused to establish compulsion, a testimonial communication, and incrimination. And as we have said, in this case compulsion and incrimination are not at issue, leaving only the testimonial element. Testimonial elements of production include (1) the existence of the documents, (2) the accused’s possession or control of the documents, and (3) the authenticity of the documents. Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 36.”


” “The difficult question whether a compelled communication is testimonial for purposes of applying the Fifth Amendment often depends on the facts and circumstances of the particular case.” Doe, 487 U.S. at 214-15. Here, the trial court rested its determination that producing the passcode would be testimonial exclusively on the concept that production would require “the use of the contents” of Stahl’s mind. The phrase “the contents of the accused’s mind” has often been repeated in cases discussing the privilege. See, e.g., Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 43; Doe, 487 U.S. at 211; In re Grand Jury, 670 F.3d at 1345; Kirschner, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 669. And although the trial court correctly quoted the Eleventh Circuit’s statement in In re Grand Jury, that “[t]he touchstone of whether an act of production is testimonial is whether the government compels the individual to use ‘the contents of his own mind’ to explicitly or implicitly communicate some statement of fact,” 670 F.3d at 1345, the trial court did not consider the law as stated in Hubbell and Doe—that the contents of the accused’s mind must be “extensive[ly] use[d]” in creating the response, Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 43, or must “relat[e] him to the offense,” Doe, 487 U.S. at 2013.10 That is, “it is not enough that the compelled communication is sought for its content. The content itself must have testimonial significance.” Doe, 487 U.S. at 211 n.10 (emphasis added) (first citing Fisher, 425 U.S. at 408; then citing Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 267 (1967); and then citing United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222 (1967)). ”


“Although the phrase “the use of the contents of the accused’s mind” has been used in act-of-production cases, we note that the case cited by the Eleventh Circuit for its proposition that the use of the contents of the accused’s mind is the touchstone of whether an act of production is testimonial does not so hold. Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118 (1957), provides that there “is a great difference” between compelled production of documents and compelled testimony, specifying that testifying as to the location of documents “requires him to disclose the contents of his own mind.” Id. at 127-28. ”

Source: STATE OF FLORIDA v AARON STAHL Case No. 2D14-4283  Opinion filed December 7, 2016.

Previous Coverage of Cell Phone Searches

 

www.centrallaw.com/tag/cellphone/
Dec 3, 2015 Search Warrant for an Abandoned Cell Phone. Police search lost cell phone – The cops waited 23 days to get a search warrant. A Florida Court …
www.centrallaw.com/search-warrant-i-phone-cell-phone-florida-attorney/
Jul 17, 2010 Search Warrant for a Cell Phone? Tell Me Your Story Toll Free 1-877-793-9290 or Click the Call Me Button to Your Right at the top of this page.
www.centrallaw.com/search-warrant-for-cell-phone-handset-required-florida- supreme-court-says/
May 2, 2013 Search Warrant for Cell Phone Handset Required – Florida Supreme Court Says a police officer is not authorized to search through …
www.centrallaw.com/defense-attorney-on-cell-phone-search-evidence- suppressed/
Apr 27, 2011 Criminal Defense Attorney / Lawyer notes a recent Cell Phone Search ruling on a Motion to Suppress Evidence, filed pursuant to Rule 3.190(h), …
www.centrallaw.com/police-search-lost-cell-phone/phone/
Dec 3, 2015 Search Warrant Cell Phone. Search of Lost Cell Phone. What happens when you lose a cell phone and it has illegal material on it?
www.centrallaw.com/cell-phone-searches-supreme-court-to-rule-on-warrant- requirement/
Jan 21, 2014 One friend has said, “Wow, the Supremes are taking a serious look at cell phone searches! There’s been talk for a while now about the …
www.centrallaw.com/cell-phone-search-incident-to-arrest/
May 6, 2011 One Florida court has just ruled in a 33 page opinion that pictures in a cell phone obtained from a suspect who had been arrested were …
www.centrallaw.com/search-warrant-cell-phone-update/
May 21, 2013 Wurie, Cell Phone, Search, Warrant. Florida Criminal and DUI Defense Attorney notes a Federal Court has lined up with the Florida Supreme …
www.centrallaw.com/cell-phone-and-gps-location-data-in-criminal- prosecutions/
Dec 15, 2011 Board Certified Criminal Trial Lawyer at Law Office of W.F. ”Casey” Ebsary, Jr. notes recent developments in Cell Phone Location Data used in …
www.centrallaw.com/cell-phone-tower-data-admissible/
Sep 11, 2010 Historical cell phone records of the tower sites used by a defendant were deemed admissible and efforts to suppress the records were for …

What Happens When a Victim Makes a False Report of Criminal Behavior and a Citizen is Accused or Arrested – Then Cleared of the Charges?

False Report of Criminal Behavior

False Report of Criminal Behavior

Bank of America in Florida can by hit hard for customer injured during a false robbery alarm. A team of police officers armed with heavy weapons responded to a false alarm and cops responding hit one of their customers. In this case a guy was at a bank and there was a false alarm for a robbery. An alarm was triggered at a bank and “at some point the police realized that after [the customer] had been seriously injured, it was a totally false alarm . . . .” Bank of America had a video system, but “video showing [their customer] being kicked is conveniently missing.  Bank of America denies that this footage was erased, and asserts that the surveillance program is written to purposely create gaps in footage to create an easily downloadable file.”

The customer was neither arrested nor prosecuted and he had no action for malicious prosecution. There are, “parameters within which the law should operate regarding reports made to law enforcement by discussing the importance of a judicially created qualified privilege for those who may incorrectly but innocently report criminal conduct.” The bank can be held accountable for the actions taken after it initiated and failed to quickly correct the situation it created by the false alarm.

Florida Law Weekly summarized the case as follows, “Action against bank by plaintiff who was injured by police after bank employee mistook plaintiff for bank robber and activated silent robbery alarm, and then failed to cancel alarm when it became apparent that plaintiff was not attempting to rob bank — Negligence is a valid cause of action for injuries arising from mistaken reports to law enforcement when the conduct complained of demonstrates reckless, culpable conduct to the level of punitive damages — Parties who engage in reckless, wanton, or culpable conduct in connection with reporting a suspected crime to law enforcement are not protected by qualified privilege . . . .”

False Report of Criminal Behavior Case Excerpts

“We hold that negligence is a valid cause of action for injuries arising from mistaken reports to law enforcement when the conduct complained of demonstrates reckless, culpable conduct to the level of punitive damages.”

“the jury found that the bank employees engaged in punitive conduct and the bank was liable for punitive damages. The jury awarded $3,000 in past medical expenses; $100,000 in future medical expenses; $1.5 million for past pain and suffering; and $1 million for future pain and suffering for a total of $2,603,000 in compensatory damages. The jury additionally awarded $700,000 in punitive damages.”

“[U]nder Florida law a private citizen may not be held liable in tort where he neither actually detained another nor instigated the other’s arrest by law enforcement officers. If the private citizen makes an honest, good faith mistake in reporting an incident, the mere fact that his communication to an officer may have caused the victim’s arrest does not make him liable when he did not in fact request any detention.”

Complete Text of the False Report of Criminal Behavior Opinion

 

Supreme Court of Florida

____________
No. SC14-1629
____________
RODOLFO VALLADARES,
Petitioner,
vs.
BANK OF AMERICA CORP., etc.,
Respondent.
[June 2, 2016]

LEWIS, J.

This case is before the Court to review the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in Bank of America Corp. v. Valladares, 141 So. 3d 714, 715 (Fla. 2014). This case concerns a falsely reported robbery that resulted in injuries to Petitioner Rodolfo Valladares. The issue we must address today is whether those who falsely report criminal conduct to law enforcement have a privilege or immunity from civil liability for the false report. This issue implicates both police officer and citizen safety concerns. Valladares asserts that the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal expressly and directly conflicts with Pokorny v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n of Largo, 382 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 1980). Further,

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the district court decision expressly disagreed with and rejected the decision in Harris v. Lewis State Bank, 482 So. 2d 1378 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). We conclude that the decision below is in conflict with both Pokorny and Harris. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. We hold that a cause of action is available to one injured as a result of a false report of criminal behavior to law enforcement when the report is made by a party which has knowledge or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have knowledge that the accusations are false or acts in a gross or flagrant manner in reckless disregard of the rights of the party exposed, or acts with indifference or wantonness or recklessness equivalent to punitive conduct.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Falsely Reported Robbery

 

On the morning of July 3, 2008, an e-mail was circulated in the Williams Island branch of Bank of America that advised staff to be on the lookout for a bank robber. The e-mail included several photos of a white male wearing a Miami Heat baseball cap, a T-shirt, and sunglasses.

At approximately 3:00 p.m. that same day, Rodolfo “Rudy” Valladares walked into his local Bank of America with the intent to cash a $100 check. Valladares, a Hispanic male, wore a loose-fitting athletic shirt, gym pants, a black Miami Heat baseball cap, and dark sunglasses. Although sunglasses and Miami

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Heat attire are not at all uncommon, nor are they significantly descriptive in South Florida, Meylin Garcia believed that Valladares, a Bank of America customer, was the bank robber depicted in the morning e-mail as soon as he entered the bank. At the time, she did not have possession of the e-mail to compare the robber’s photos with Valladares’s appearance, and the bank had not provided copies of the photos for the tellers’ desks. As Valladares approached her desk, without any suspicious conduct, Garcia pushed the silent alarm.

Failure to Correct the Alarm

 

Valladares reached Garcia’s desk and properly presented her with his check and driver’s license. Specifically, the check was a Bank of America check with Valladares’s name on it, for which there was absolutely no suspicion. The name on the check matched the name on his driver’s license, for which there was also no suspicion. Yet, Garcia still failed to do anything to cancel the robbery alarm. When asked why she did not do anything to cancel the alarm after being presented with the matching check and license, Garcia testified:

I honestly thought that he was a bank robber at that moment as soon as he walked in . . . . I had it set in my mind according to the description I had seen that morning about the e-mail. As soon as Mr. Valladares walked in the bank, I saw him, and since he was wearing a Miami Heat hat, the sunglasses—I mean I saw him, and automatically I panicked, I got scared.
After accepting the license and the check, Garcia excused herself and informed Valladares that she would return shortly. Valladares had hoped to

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complete the transaction without delay because he had $400 worth of food in his car in preparation for a Fourth of July family barbecue the next day.

As these events were occurring, assistant manager trainee Jimmy Alor received a call from corporate security, which asked him to verify the basis for the silent alarm that had been activated from Garcia’s teller station. Unaware of any emergency, Alor scanned the area and saw that Garcia had left her desk to speak with another bank employee. He approached them and asked about the silent alarm that had been triggered. Notwithstanding that Garcia already had ample opportunity to examine Valladares’s face, check, and driver’s license, and that no hint of a robbery was presented, and Alor had ample time to know the true facts, Garcia replied, “the robber is at my window.” Alor did not make any inquiry or take any steps to confirm that Valladares was or was not in fact an armed bank robber or a customer because he simply assumed from her body language that she perceived a threat. Alor made only a quick glance toward Garcia’s window and saw no suspicious conduct, but he did not attempt to gather or develop any further information. Alor walked back to his desk and, without any confirmation or verification, simply repeated Garcia’s words to the corporate security caller: the robber is at her window. When asked by corporate security if the suspect was armed, Alor responded that he had no idea but he had not seen any type of weapon.

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Alor then returned to his duties and simply acted as if there were no emergency and ignored what was happening in his bank.

Garcia returned to her position with Valladares. Valladares proceeded to make conversation with Garcia, asking her if she had plans for the Fourth of July holiday, and even invited her to his family barbecue. She replied that she had a boyfriend, to which he responded, “he’s welcome to come too.” She then studied his license again and looked at Valladares, but still failed to differentiate Valladares’s Hispanic characteristics from those of the white male depicted in the e-mail she had seen earlier that day and failed to take any steps to report the innocent transactional facts. Garcia asked Valladares to endorse the check, and handed Valladares a pen.

Garcia left her desk again, with Valladares’s check and license in hand, to present them to her manager, Bianca Mercado. In an attempt to further stall the transaction, Garcia returned to her desk and informed Valladares that she could not cash the check because the computers were down. Valladares was confused, as it was apparent that other transactions were still taking place at the bank. He asked to see the manager. When Mercado arrived, Valladares said, “What seems to be the problem? It’s just a $100 check, on a Bank of America check. Look at my driver’s license.” As yet another ruse to confuse Valladares, Mercado replied that they could not cash his check because it was endorsed in the wrong colored ink.

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Mercado added that he had to leave the bank immediately. Valladares, understandably, became irritated with the employees’ strange and rude behavior. He expressed that he could not believe he was being thrown out of the bank on these grounds, but turned around and started to leave. Approximately fifteen to twenty minutes had elapsed from the time Valladares first presented his check to his attempted exit. Absolutely nothing had occurred, suspicious or otherwise, during the entire time to suggest or hint that Valladares was anything other than a regular bank customer conducting normal banking business.

Garcia confirmed that during the entirety of Valladares’s interaction with bank employees, he did not make any threats, present a note, make a demand, or appear in any way to be armed or have a criminal intent. She conceded that Valladares did nothing to elicit any suspicion that he intended to rob the bank or engage in any unlawful behavior. Garcia even agreed that Valladares was very nice to her during their interaction. Garcia simply attempted to insist that at no point during the incident did she doubt that Valladares was the bank robber, notwithstanding all of the facts to the contrary.

As Valladares attempted to exit the bank, he saw a team of police officers armed with heavy weapons emerging from multiple sides of the building. The team was led by Officer Sean Bergert, who was the only SWAT member among the officers present. Upon arrival, Bergert realized the other non-SWAT officers

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had created a “fatal funnel,” meaning that they were taking cover behind the glass windows of the building, which provides a dangerously false sense of security. Bergert decided to take charge and had several officers line up with him to enter the bank. Notwithstanding that multiple bank employees had been presented with the valid check and matching proper license only moments earlier, Mercado and the other bank employees not only failed to take any action to intervene when the police stormed inside the bank, but Mercado even went a step further and pointed to Valladares, signaling him as the robber. Bergert instructed everyone to lie on the floor with their hands extended. Everyone in the bank, including Valladares, complied with the command.

Valladares testified that he immediately went to the floor as ordered and outstretched his hands, with his license and check still in hand. Then, a police officer placed his boot on the back of Valladares’s head, handcuffed him, and screamed at him, “Where’s the weapon?”. Valladares further testified that the police officer kicked him in the head while he was already handcuffed:

[The police officer] started kicking me handcuffed on the floor . . . . He kicked me on the side of the head. You know, they were lifting me up by my hands . . . and sticking their hands all through my shirt and everything, asking me, Why are you doing this? Why are you doing this? Where is the weapon? And I’m like, I’m not doing anything. I’m not doing anything.

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The officer with an AR-15 rifle admitted that he kicked Valladares in the head. Valladares recalled, “I was in pain. I was terrified . . . I was afraid for my life. I didn’t know what they were going to do with me.”

There is some limited surveillance video from the day of the incident, however there happen to be suspicious, convenient breaks in the footage. The video provided by the bank contains footage of Valladares as he lay on the floor without handcuffs, and Valladares after he was already on the floor and handcuffed, but the segment of the video showing Valladares being kicked is conveniently missing. Bank of America denies that this footage was erased, and asserts that the surveillance program is written to purposely create gaps in footage to create an easily downloadable file.

The opinion below, in rendering a decision as a matter of law, incorrectly relied exclusively on the police officer’s version of the facts. Valladares, 141 So. 3d at 715. However, we view the facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party—in this case, Valladares. See Friedrich v. Fetterman & Assocs., P.A., 137 So. 3d 362, 365 (Fla. 2013). Furthermore, the evidence provided in the video does not support the version of the facts that a kick occurred before Valladares was handcuffed. The video revealed no kicks to the head before Valladares was fully secured in handcuffs on the floor.

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The record does not clearly establish the exact moment that the officers realized that Valladares was not a robber, but it does indicate that at some point the police realized that after Valladares had been seriously injured, it was a totally false alarm, and officers asked to speak with Garcia. Valladares testified that the police verified his license and the check while he was still handcuffed.

An officer observed redness and bruising on the side of Valladares’s head and called the paramedics. The paramedics advised Valladares to go to the hospital. Alor, the assistant bank manager trainee who had spoken with corporate security, approached Valladares while he was with the paramedics and asked if he was okay. Valladares stated that Alor also admitted to him that they realized that they had the wrong person and were terribly wrong.

During trial, Garcia admitted and confirmed that she was wrong in failing to properly and fully inform Alor and Mercado that Valladares was a customer, and that she was wrong in failing to say something to the police officers when they rushed in and attacked Valladares.

Damages

 

Following the kicks to the head, Valladares experienced headaches that were unlike any he had ever experienced, and was placed on pain medication. Valladares sought attention at a local hospital for his head pain that became

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unbearable. However, after waiting about twenty hours in the emergency room, the hospital refused to treat him because he lacked health insurance.
He next sought treatment with a neurologist, a neuro-ophthalmologist, and a psychologist. The examinations by the neurologist revealed that Valladares suffers from muscle contractions that cause persistent headaches on a daily basis. Valladares suffers from sudden blurry vision, and as a result he can no longer work. His neuro-ophthalmologist diagnosed Valladares as having traumatic optic neuropathy, which could not be cured or corrected with corrective lenses.

Valladares’s older sister established that her brother, once a happy person who hosted social gatherings at his apartment, became a social recluse after the incident. Valladares was forced to return to live with his parents because he spent the majority of his days bedridden and could no longer pay his rent. He has become a hoarder and is embarrassed to allow others into his bedroom. Valladares has installed a camera at his home because he fears he is being watched, and also has installed two locks on his bedroom door. Valladares avoids the area where the bank is located, no longer has any friends, and is unable to maintain a romantic relationship as a result of sexual dysfunction. Based on these various medically related problems, his psychologist diagnosed him as having post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) with anxiety and depression. The psychologist is of the opinion

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that Valladares is “[a]t the severe end of the [PTSD] spectrum” and opines that the condition will only worsen.

Legal Proceedings

Following the incident at the bank, Valladares filed an action against Bank of America for negligence, battery, and false imprisonment.1 In an apparent attempt to comply with the legislatively established permissive scope of punitive damages pursuant to Florida Statutes, section 768.72 (1999), Valladares did not include an allegation for punitive damages in his initial complaint. Instead, he sought punitive damages for the counts of battery and false imprisonment in his Second Amended Complaint. However, as evidence developed, it became clear that Valladares sought relief for punitive conduct, and the bank was aware of the allegations. Further, Valladares consistently asserted acts beyond negligent reporting. Specifically, the negligence count in Valladares’s original complaint provided in part:

10. The Defendant, BANK OF AMERICA, breached its duty of reasonable care in one or more of the following ways:

(a) Negligently and carelessly activating and failing to cancel the silent robbery alarm, and failing to cancel said alarm when it knew or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known that the Plaintiff was not attempting to rob the bank;
(Emphasis added).

1. Because Valladares was neither arrested nor prosecuted, he had no action for malicious prosecution.

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Following a lengthy trial, the jury was instructed on claims of negligence, comparative negligence, false imprisonment, battery, and punitive damages. With respect to vicarious liability, the jurors were instructed, “Bank of America is responsible for any negligence of its employees in failing to supervise other employees.” Furthermore, the punitive damages instruction provided:

Valladares claims that punitive damages should be awarded against Bank of America for its employees’ conduct in in [sic] the battery and false imprisonment of Valladares. Punitive damages are warranted if you find by clear and convincing evidence that Bank of America’s employees were personally guilty of intentional misconduct, which was a substantial cause of injury to Valladares.
The verdict form itself did not specify that the punitive damages should be awarded only if the jury found that Bank of America committed one of the intentional torts.

The jury found that Bank of America was negligent, and that there was no negligence attributed to Valladares. However, the jury found in favor of the defendant bank on the claims for battery and false imprisonment. The instructions stated that punitive damages should be awarded in conjunction with findings against the bank if the bank employees were personally guilty of intentional misconduct. Notwithstanding the battery and false imprisonment findings, the jury found that the bank employees engaged in punitive conduct and the bank was liable for punitive damages. The jury awarded $3,000 in past medical expenses;

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$100,000 in future medical expenses; $1.5 million for past pain and suffering; and $1 million for future pain and suffering for a total of $2,603,000 in compensatory damages. The jury additionally awarded $700,000 in punitive damages.

At the close of trial, the jury verdict appeared to be inconsistent in that the jury found in favor of the bank on the battery and false imprisonment claims, but the jury found in favor of Valladares that bank employees were personally guilty of punitive misconduct on punitive damages. Valladares’s counsel brought this verdict inconsistency to the attention of the trial judge and the bank. Valladares requested that the matter be resubmitted to the jury. The bank objected to having the jury consider the inconsistency, disagreed, and waived any objection to the verdict. The bank later moved to set aside the judgment, for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, for new trial, and for remittitur. Each was denied and judgment was entered in favor of Valladares.

District Court Proceedings

The Third District reversed and remanded for entry of judgment for the bank. After offering only one paragraph summarizing the incident in a light most favorable to the bank contrary to well established appellate principles, the Third District concluded that a person who contacts law enforcement to report criminal activity cannot be liable under a theory of simple negligence. Valladares, 141 So. 3d at 715.

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Primarily relying on Pokorny, the Valladares court determined that those who report crimes are protected by a qualified privilege, and thus cannot be held liable for making a good faith report to the police, absent a showing of malice. Id. at 717. The court analogized the malice requirement to cases that concern malicious prosecution, arrest, defamation, or slander. Id. at 718. Ultimately, the court determined that the same malice standard should be applied to physical injury caused by mistaken reports to law enforcement. Id. Based on this standard, the court reasoned that the plaintiff failed to prove the elements required to establish a cause of action because he failed to present a claim beyond simple negligence.

Further, the court acknowledged that Harris was a case that cut against applying a qualified privilege to reports of suspected criminal activity: “To the extent Harris holds that a person can be liable for a negligent, but good faith, mistake in summoning the police, it conflicts with the authority summarized above which governs analogous situations. We respectfully disagree with it.” Id. at 718 (emphasis added). Valladares now seeks review by this Court.

ANALYSIS

 

This question presents a pure question of law and is, therefore, subject to de novo review. See Jackson-Shaw Co. v. Jacksonville Aviation Auth., 8 So. 3d 1076, 1084-85 (Fla. 2008).

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A misunderstanding of Florida law in connection with reports of criminal conduct to law enforcement has generated the foundation for the conflict we must now resolve, which involves this case, Pokorny, and Harris. Contrary to the understanding of the district court and Bank of America, Pokorny did not fully resolve all issues of negligence in this false reporting context. Pokorny did outline some parameters within which the law should operate regarding reports made to law enforcement by discussing the importance of a judicially created qualified privilege for those who may incorrectly but innocently report criminal conduct. Harris, on the other hand, directly discussed negligence, recognizing that a cause of action for negligent reports to law enforcement exists when the conduct goes beyond an innocent misunderstanding. The decision below expressly states that it disagrees with Harris. In addition, the decision below is in conflict with Pokorny because it has improperly applied Pokorny to the facts in this case. It is critical that we recognize and maintain a real, meaningful distinction between intentional torts, malicious prosecution, false arrest, and negligent acts arising from conduct in this context.

Although Valladares did not assert a claim of malicious prosecution, slander, or defamation, the Third District nonetheless incorrectly looked only to these types of cases for guidance. The confusion is not uncommon because these are the causes of action that most commonly arise from incorrect reports to the police. See

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Valladares, 141 So. 3d at 718. However, the facts in the instant case are different. Although similar to certain victims of malicious prosecution, slander, and defamation, Valladares was wrongfully accused of committing a crime and suffered damages as a result. This reliance upon Pokorny is misplaced because it is not a negligence case. Further, Valladares lacked a cause of action under a malicious prosecution theory because he was never arrested, nor was he prosecuted.

The Third District primarily relied on Pokorny, which also involved a falsely reported bank robbery. In Pokorny, the plaintiff alleged that the bank had engaged in negligent, reckless, or intentional misconduct that proximately caused the false imprisonment of the plaintiff. 382 So. 2d at 680. This Court considered two of the five questions submitted for review:

1. Did the actions of the employees of the defendant, First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Largo, Florida, constitute “direct procurement” of an arrest under the teachings of Johnson v. Weiner, 19 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 1944), and its progeny?

2. Do the rules governing arrest and imprisonment by private citizens apply in this case?

Id. at 680-81.2

2. Three other questions were certified to this Court but were not answered. Pokorny, 382 So. 2d at 681, 683.

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The jury was instructed that the bank could not be held liable if it found that the teller who reported the robbery acted reasonably in believing that a robbery was occurring, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the bank. Id. at 680. This Court concluded that the teller acted reasonably and in good faith, and ultimately held in the arrest context that:

[U]nder Florida law a private citizen may not be held liable in tort where he neither actually detained another nor instigated the other’s arrest by law enforcement officers. If the private citizen makes an honest, good faith mistake in reporting an incident, the mere fact that his communication to an officer may have caused the victim’s arrest does not make him liable when he did not in fact request any detention.

Id. at 682.

Harris also involved a false report of criminal activity at a bank. 482 So. 2d 1378. Harris was a customer at Lewis State Bank who realized that a strange name, “John Lewis,” had appeared on her account. Id. at 1381 n.8. After informing Lewis State Bank of the apparent mistake, the bank told Harris that she could continue to withdraw money from the account. Id. Harris returned to Lewis State Bank and provided it with her social security and voter registration cards. Id. The bank also taught her how to fill out a withdrawal slip and allowed her to complete another withdrawal. Id. Harris made four additional withdrawals without issue. Id. When John Lewis finally realized that $975 had been withdrawn from his account, the bank indicated that someone had fraudulently

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withdrawn money from his account. Id. Over three months later, Harris returned to Lewis State Bank and was apprehended by bank employees, who then reported her to the sheriff’s department and delivered her into custody. Id.

Harris’s negligence claim was dismissed at the trial level based on the language regarding negligence in Pokorny. Id. at 1383. Lewis State Bank argued the negligence count should fail because the only cause of action available was malicious prosecution.3 See id. The court in Harris found that this was a misreading of Pokorny, reasoning:

It is at least arguable that in the case sub judice, the misinformation allegedly reported to the police was not the result of an honest, good faith mistake on the part of the bank. The allegations upon which all the counts of appellant’s complaint are based include acts beyond the innocent misunderstanding portrayed in Pokorny.
Id. at 1384 (emphasis added).

Ultimately, the Harris court held that a negligence action was proper once the conduct of the bank passed a certain threshold:

Because appellant’s complaint sufficiently alleged a relationship voluntarily entered into by the bank which created a duty on the part of the bank to protect appellant from false accusations of forgery and theft, and because the allegations of the complaint, if taken as true, indicate that the bank had knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence would have had knowledge, that its acts and omissions were likely to result in injury to appellant, the trial court improperly dismissed the count for negligence.

Id. at 1385 (emphasis added).

3. Lewis State Bank additionally claimed that false imprisonment and fraud were not legitimate claims.

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Rather than relying on the direct holding of Pokorny, the district court in this case focused on dicta—the discussion suggesting that malice is required to state a cause of action for mistakenly reporting a crime in the arrest context—in concluding that Valladares failed to allege a proper cause of action. However, Pokorny did not address a cause of action for negligent reporting. Indeed, the holding in Pokorny defined “direct procurement” under an arrest and false imprisonment cause of action. The only statements made by this Court in Pokorny regarding a cause of action for negligent reporting were made in dicta. Furthermore, there is no statement in Pokorny that abolishes negligent reporting as a cause of action, nor did Pokorny point to any other cases that prohibit a cause of action for negligent reporting. Therefore, the Third District erred in holding that this Court’s decision in Pokorny precluded a cause of action for negligent reports to law enforcement.

Of course, this Court and others have long recognized that a judicially created qualified privilege exists in regard to injuries resulting from malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, defamation, and slander. See Fridovich v. Fridovich, 598 So. 2d 65, 68-69 (Fla. 1992) (holding that a qualified privilege exists for defamatory statements made to police when such statements are not made maliciously); Burns v. GCC Beverages, Inc., 502 So. 2d 1217, 1220 (Fla. 1986) (holding that a company was not liable for malicious prosecution when an

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employee, in good faith and without specifically requesting arrest, reported suspected criminal activity to law enforcement); Myers v. Jim Russo Prison Ministries, Inc., 3 So. 3d 411, 412 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (applying the qualified privilege to slander arising from false reports made to police); Harris v. Kearney, 786 So. 2d 1222, 1225 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (reasoning under Pokorny that there was no false imprisonment claim against Department of Children and Family agents who filed a complaint that resulted in the arrest of the appellant because the complaint was made in good faith); Manis v. Miller, 327 So. 2d 117, 118 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976) (holding that there is no liability “for false imprisonment upon a witness making an honest, good faith mistake in identifying a criminal suspect where the identification contributes to arrest and prosecution of the suspect”).

This qualified privilege for mistaken, but good faith reports of suspected criminal activity is rooted in a public policy concern. In Pokorny, this Court recognized the dangers of a standard that would deter citizens from reporting crimes for fear of liability:

Prompt and effective law enforcement is directly dependent upon the willingness and cooperation of private persons to assist law enforcement officers in bringing those who violate our criminal laws to justice. Unfortunately, too often in the past witnesses and victims of criminal offenses have failed to report crimes to the proper law enforcement agencies. Private citizens should be encouraged to become interested and involved in bringing the perpetrators of crime to justice and not discouraged under apprehension or fear of recrimination.

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Pokorny, 382 So. 2d at 682 (quoting Manis, 327 So. 2d at 117).

At the same time, this Court has considered the dangers of a standard that would provide absolute immunity or an absolute privilege for those who report crimes. In Fridovich, this Court considered whether false statements made to an officer are absolutely privileged from liability for defamation, even when made maliciously. This Court held that the privilege was not absolute because such a privilege would prevent the Court from providing a forum for redress of every wrong. Fridovich, 598 So. 2d at 69. The Court instead opted for a qualified privilege that precluded intentional or malicious reports from privilege. Id. at 69.

Therefore, the standard necessary is one that maintains a balance between protecting individuals from abusive accusations to the police, and encouraging citizens to report suspected criminal activity, as expressed in Burns:

The tort of malicious prosecution is premised on the right of an individual to be protected from unjustifiable litigation or unwarranted criminal prosecution. Against this right, the need of society to bring criminals to justice by protecting those who, in good faith, report and legally prosecute persons apparently guilty of crime must be balanced. The latter need, in addition to the public policy in favor of the termination of litigation, dictates the plaintiff’s heavy burden of proof.

Burns, 502 So. 2d at 1219.

Bank of America incorrectly interprets Pokorny to mean that the only cause of action available to Valladares was malicious prosecution. However, Valladares had no cause of action for malicious prosecution because he was never arrested or

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prosecuted. See id. A standard that would preclude any cause of action for conduct beyond mere negligent reporting simply because the plaintiff was not arrested would not support a careful balance between protecting victims of falsely reported crimes and encouraging good faith reports. Indeed, the standard proposed by the bank would prejudice victims such as Valladares. Further, such a standard would shield negligent defendants from incurring liability for their tortious conduct simply because law enforcement chooses not to prosecute an individual. Thus—regardless of whether a wrongful reporting resulted in an arrest—public policy supports the conclusion that those who are injured as a result of incorrect reports to the police should have access to redress for injuries. Moreover, this Court is obliged by the Florida Constitution to provide access to courts for every wrong. See art. I, § 21, Fla. Const. We cannot turn a blind eye to those who cannot allege malicious prosecution, but nonetheless sustain injuries due to incorrect reports to police. At the same time, we recognize the importance of encouraging citizens to report suspected crimes. Therefore, we hold that a cause of action for negligent reporting arises when there is incorrect reporting plus conduct on the part of the reporting party that rises to the level of punitive conduct.
The conduct required to allege punitive conduct reaches beyond simple negligence. U.S. Concrete Pipe Co. v. Bould, 437 So. 2d 1061, 1064 (Fla. 1983) (“Punitive damages cannot be assessed for mere negligent conduct, but must be

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based on behavior which indicates a wanton disregard for the rights of others.” (citing Winn & Lovett Grocery Co. v. Archer, 171 So. 214 (1936))). This Court has defined the level of negligent conduct necessary to warrant punitive damages as follows:

The character of negligence necessary to sustain an award of punitive damages must be of a “gross and flagrant character, evincing reckless disregard of human life, or of the safety of persons exposed to its dangerous effects, or there is that entire want of care which would raise the presumption of a conscious indifference to consequences, or which shows wantonness or recklessness, or a grossly careless disregard of the safety and welfare of the public, or that reckless indifference to the rights of others which is equivalent to an intentional violation of them.”
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Ballard, 749 So. 2d 483, 486 (Fla. 1999) (quoting White Const. Co. v. Dupont, 455 So. 2d 1026, 1029 (Fla. 1984), receded from on other grounds by Murphy v. Int’l Robotic Sys., Inc., 766 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 2000)); Am. Cyanamid Co. v. Roy, 498 So. 2d 859, 861-62 (Fla. 1986) (also quoting White Const. Co., 455 So. 2d at 1029); Chrysler Corp. v. Wolmer, 499 So. 2d 823, 824 (Fla. 1986) (citing Carraway v. Revell, 116 So. 2d 16, 19-20 (Fla. 1959)); see also W.R. Grace & Co.—Conn. v. Waters, 638 So. 2d 502, 503 (Fla. 1994) (“Punitive damages are appropriate when a defendant engages in conduct which is fraudulent, malicious, deliberately violent or oppressive, or committed with such gross negligence as to indicate a wanton disregard for the rights of others.”). In this context, Florida Standard Jury Instruction (Civil) 503.1(b)(2)

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defines gross negligence as conduct that is “so reckless or wanting in care that it constitute[s] a conscious disregard or indifference to the life, safety, or rights of persons exposed to such conduct.”
Relatedly, this Court has recognized that the required level of negligence for punitive damages is equivalent to the conduct involved in criminal manslaughter. Como Oil Co., Inc. v. O’Loughlin, 466 So. 2d 1061, 1062 (Fla. 1985) (discussing the holding in White Const. Co., 455 So. 2d at 1029); see also Carraway, 116 So. 2d at 18-19 (“[T]he character of negligence necessary to sustain a conviction for manslaughter is the same as that required to sustain a recovery for punitive damages.”).

By requiring something more than simple negligence, but less than intent or malice, a requirement that the conduct rise to the level of punitive conduct in cases of incorrect reports to law enforcement accomplishes the task of encouraging legitimate criminal reports while providing a safeguard against abuse. At one time reporting criminal activity to law enforcement was viewed as a circumstance that would not lead to unexpected problems. Unfortunately, with the amount of violence and force that law enforcement officers face and encounter daily when they respond to reports of suspected criminal activity, officers at times respond with what may appear to the layman as significant force. The necessity of this force is a harsh reality in a world that has become increasingly violent. However,

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if a party has information that he or she has incorrectly reported a particular individual, or should have known it was incorrect, and the force was applied, such a report is above and beyond a simple, innocent report of conduct. Therefore, parties who engage in reckless, wanton, or culpable conduct in connection with reporting a suspected crime to law enforcement are not protected by the qualified privilege. Public policy supports a limited immunity for those who make innocent, simple mistakes, but that limited immunity cannot extend to conduct that recklessly disregards the rights of others. In the case of Valladares, the bank had ample information and ample time to know the true facts and to correct the false report, but failed to do so. Once there is information indicating that a crime is not being committed, this limited privilege should not extend to a person’s failure to alert law enforcement that a reported crime is a mistake or simply wrong. This goes a step beyond negligence. A standard that demands more than simple negligence, but does not overburden the plaintiff with proving intent or malice, serves the interest of encouraging reports of criminal activity while protecting victims from punitive conduct. It also protects law enforcement from being incorrectly and unnecessarily involved in an event with force and violence that can be avoided.

The Third District improperly applied the limited qualified privilege discussed in Pokorny to the facts in the instant case. We hold that the privilege

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does not apply to incorrect and wrongful reports made to law enforcement when the conduct rises to the level of punitive conduct. When the conduct in connection with reporting suspected criminal activity evinces a reckless disregard of the safety and rights of others—or as in this case—the parties involved either knew or should have known that their conduct was likely to cause harm, the qualified privilege cannot provide immunity to such behavior. Such an absolute immunity would frustrate the purpose of the qualified privilege, which is meant to encourage police reports by protecting only those who make innocent mistakes.

Additionally, we conclude that the case below is in conflict with Harris. The case below interpreted Harris to hold that there is a cause of action for simple negligence when a crime is misreported in good faith, and thus expressly disagreed with it. Valladares, 141 So. 3d at 718. This was a mischaracterization of Harris.

Because we have confirmed that Pokorny did not abolish negligence as a cause of action for incorrect reports to law enforcement, the holding in Harris is consistent with Florida law. The trial court in Harris erred when it dismissed a negligence claim because the acts of the defendant went “beyond the innocent misunderstanding” in Pokorny. This language demonstrates a cause of action for something beyond simple negligence, but not necessarily something at the level of malice or intent. There is no basis to support that the trial court in Harris was required to make a finding of actual knowledge or intent. Rather, the holding in

– 27 –

Harris is consistent with the public policy concern to encourage reports to law enforcement without condoning reckless, culpable conduct where the defendant knows or should know that the conduct would result in harm to others. Bank of America’s behavior was analogous to the behavior of the bank in Harris in that it also committed acts that went beyond an innocent misunderstanding.

Valladares did not specifically allege punitive damages under the negligence count in his original complaint in an attempt to comply with section 768.72, Florida Statutes. Although this presents a problem with his award for punitive damages, it should be noted that this statute, precluding an allegation of punitive damages in the initial complaint, has no application to a cause of action for negligent reporting of criminal conduct. Section 768.72 pertains only to a demand for punitive damages. Thus, a plaintiff asserting a cause of action for conduct that rises to the level of punitive conduct in the context of criminal reporting must include that allegation in the initial complaint.

In this case, Valladares did plead beyond simple negligence in reporting in his Second Amended Complaint. Valladares’s Second Amended Complaint provides, in relevant part, under the count for negligence:

9. The Defendant, BANK OF AMERICA, owed a duty to use reasonable care for the Plaintiff’s safety.
10. The Defendant, BANK OF AMERICA, breached its duty of reasonable care in one or more of the following ways:

– 28 –

(a) Negligently and carelessly activating and failing to cancel the silent robbery alarm, and failing to cancel said alarm when it knew or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known that the Plaintiff was not attempting to rob the bank;

(b) Failing to properly train its employees, including but not limited to Defendants ALOR and GARCIA, concerning the identification of suspected bank robbers, and the handling of suspected robberies that turn out to be unfounded.

(Emphasis added).

Here, Valladares did not allege negligent reporting alone. Valladares alleged negligent reporting, and separately alleged the bank’s failure to cancel the report after the bank had sufficient information to know that Valladares was not a bank robber.

Moreover, the bank cannot avoid responsibility by claiming that it does not owe a duty to its customers. We have long recognized that businesses owe a duty of reasonable care to their invitees to maintain safe conditions on business premises. Fetterman & Assocs., 137 So. 3d at 365. Specifically, businesses owe their invitees a duty of care to (1) maintain their premises in a way that ensures reasonably safe conditions, and (2) advise the invitee of any reasonably unknown hidden dangers of which the owner either knew or should have known. Id. at 365 (quoting Morales v. Weil, 44 So. 3d 173, 178 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)). This duty not only applies to dangerous conditions that arise and require correction, but also to taking action to mitigate or eliminate the possibility of a foreseeable risk of harm before it occurs. See Markowitz v. Helen Homes of Kendall Corp., 826 So. 2d

– 29 –

256, 259-60 (Fla. 2002) (discussing the mode of operation theory). One may establish foreseeability by a showing that the business had actual or constructive knowledge that a dangerous condition that is likely to cause harm exists on the premises. Hall v. Billy Jack’s, Inc., 458 So. 2d 760, 761 (Fla. 1984) (discussing foreseeability in the context of a tavern’s knowledge of a person’s inclination to be violent). If despite knowledge or actual knowledge of a risk of danger, management still fails to take steps to avoid that danger, the business may have breached its duty and thus be required to pay damages for resulting injuries to its invitee. See id. at 762.

In this case, the jury instructions provided that a finding of negligence against the bank was warranted if the jury found the bank to be vicariously liable for the negligent actions of its employees, and the jury did make such a finding. Additionally, our own review of the record reveals numerous wrongful actions from the time Valladares entered the bank until he was severely injured by a violent kick to the head.

However, because there was a failure to allege punitive conduct in the pleadings, improper instructions to the jury regarding punitive conduct and intentional conduct, an inconsistency in the verdict, and an inappropriate argument that an intentional act is required for a cause of action for negligent reporting, we

– 30 –

cannot simply reinstate the jury verdict. This case must be remanded for a new trial.

CONCLUSION

 

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the decision below expressly and directly conflicts with the decisions in Pokorny and Harris. We hold that negligence is a valid cause of action for injuries arising from mistaken reports to law enforcement when the conduct complained of demonstrates reckless, culpable conduct to the level of punitive damages. We therefore quash the decision below, and remand this case for new trial.

It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, QUINCE, and PERRY, JJ., concur.

CANADY, J., dissents with an opinion, in which POLSTON, J., concurs.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF FILED, DETERMINED.

CANADY, J., dissenting.

Because I conclude that the decision of the Third District in Bank of America Corp. v. Valladares, 141 So. 3d 714 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014), does not expressly and directly conflict with our decision in Pokorny v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n of Largo, 382 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 1980), or the decision of the First District in Harris v. Lewis State Bank, 482 So. 2d 1378 (Fla.

– 31 –

1st DCA 1986), I would dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution.

“This Court may only review a decision of a district court of appeal that expressly and directly conflicts with a decision of another district court of appeal or the Supreme Court on the same question of law.” Jenkins v. State, 385 So. 2d 1356, 1359 (Fla. 1980). This Court’s jurisdiction to review decisions of courts of appeal for express and direct conflict is invoked by “the application of a rule of law to produce a different result in a case which involves substantially the same [controlling] facts as a prior case” or “the announcement of a rule of law which conflicts with a rule previously announced by this court or another district[.]” Mancini v. State, 312 So. 2d 732, 733 (Fla. 1975); see Adams v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 296 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1974).
Valladares does not expressly and directly conflict with Pokorny because the cases do not announce conflicting rules of law.

In Valladares, the Third District addressed whether a person can be held liable for simple negligence for contacting the police to report suspected criminal activity and held that
[a] person calling the police to report a possible crime is not liable for a good faith mistake even if the individual reported suffers personal injuries at the hands of the police. Calling the police to report a crime rises to the level of a tort only if the reporter acts maliciously, meaning the reporter either knows the report is false or recklessly disregards whether the report is false.

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Valladares, 141 So. 3d at 715, 718. In contrast, this Court in Pokorny addressed whether a person may be held liable for unlawful detention or false imprisonment based on contacting the police to report suspected criminal activity. In Pokorny we held that under Florida law a private citizen may not be held liable in tort where he neither actually detained another nor instigated the other’s arrest by law enforcement officers. If the private citizen makes an honest, good faith mistake in reporting an incident, the mere fact that his communication to an officer may have caused the victim’s arrest does not make him liable when he did not in fact request any detention.

Pokorny, 382 So. 2d at 682. Although both Valladares and Pokorny involve fact patterns in which the defendant allegedly made an erroneous report to the police, they deal with different theories of liability. Valladares addresses a claim of simple negligence and Pokorny addresses claims of unlawful detention and false imprisonment. But the reasoning of the two cases is consistent: both recognize a rule of no liability for good faith mistakes associated with erroneous reports to the police. And nothing in Pokorny suggests that the good faith rule it articulates should not be extended to a claim of simple negligence for making an erroneous report to the police. Pokorny thus provides no basis for the Court to exercise conflict jurisdiction over Valladares.

Nor does Valladares expressly and directly conflict with Harris. As explained previously, Valladares addressed whether an individual can be held liable for simple negligence for contacting the police to report suspected criminal

– 33 –

activity, and the Third District held that a person calling the police to report a possible crime is not liable for a good faith mistake even if the individual reported suffers personal injuries at the hands of the police. Valladares, 141 So. 3d at 715, 718. The First District in Harris addressed the sufficiency of a negligence cause of action to withstand a motion to dismiss, reasoned that “[i]t is at least arguable that in the case sub judice, the misinformation allegedly reported to the police was not the result of an honest, good faith mistake on the part of the bank[,]” and held that [b]ecause appellant’s complaint sufficiently alleged a relationship voluntarily entered into by the bank which created a duty on the part of the bank to protect appellant from false accusations of forgery and theft, and because the allegations of the complaint, if taken as true, indicate that the bank had knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence would have had knowledge, that its acts and omissions were likely to result in injury to appellant, the trial court improperly dismissed the count for negligence.

Harris, 482 So. 2d at 1384-85 (emphasis added). Specifically, the complaint in Harris alleged the bank had encouraged and facilitated withdrawals by the appellant from a third person’s account; that “the bank did not reveal to [that person] what had transpired between bank employees and appellant, but instead led him to believe that someone with criminal intent had” made withdrawals based on a forged signature; and that the appellant was “seized by bank employees” and turned over to the custody of the police. Id. at 1381 n.8. These facts in Harris set the case apart from Valladares, where a bank teller simply “mistook Valladares for a bank robber” and made a report to the police. Valladares, 141 So. 3d at 715.

– 34 –

Nothing in Harris suggests that liability can be predicated on a good faith mistake in reporting a suspected crime to the police. There is no express and direct conflict with Valladares.
This Court lacks jurisdiction under the Florida Constitution to review Valladares. Accordingly, I dissent.

POLSTON, J., concurs.

Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – Direct Conflict of Decisions
Third District – Case No. 3D12-1338 (Miami-Dade County)

Joel Stephen Perwin of Joel S. Perwin, P.A., Miami, Florida; and Mark Gabriel DiCowden of Mark G. DiCowden, P.A., Aventura, Florida,
for Petitioner Adam Matthew Topel, J. Randolph Liebler, and Tricia Julie Duthiers of Liebler, Gonzalez & Portuondo, Miami, Florida,
for Respondent

Source: http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/decisions/2016/sc14-1629.pdf

Computer Hacker Guilty of Intrusions – Computer Forensics E Discovery

Defacing Websites

“The United States Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of California announced that [a man from] Pleasant Hill, California, pleaded guilty today in federal court in Oakland to hacking into government computers and then defacing government websites with material illegally obtained from those intrusions.

He pleaded guilty to each count of a five-count indictment charging computer crimes in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1030. In pleading guilty, [the man] who is known as one of the members of the self-titled hacking group called ‘The Deceptive Duo,’ admitted that he unlawfully accessed computer systems of various federal agencies in April 2002, including the Department of Defense’s Defense Logistic Information Service (DLIS), the Office of Health Affairs (OHA), and NASA’s Ames Research Center (ARC). In particular, [the man] admitted that he: Gained unauthorized accessed to DLIS computers in Battle Creek, Michigan, for the purpose of obtaining files that he later used to deface an OHA website hosted on computers in San Antonio, Texas. “

Computer Crimes Experts, Mobile Phones, Devices, and SD Card Storage

Computer Crimes Experts Cell Phone SD Forensics

Computer Crimes Experts, Cell Phones and SD cards

Recently I reviewed a computer crime case where the dates on files on an SD card seized by the police, examined by the police computer forensic laboratory, and by a defense expert in computer forensics showed some unusual patterns in the dates of files that allegedly contained contraband. Those files on the SD-card were later the basis of criminal charges and an arrest. There were claims of evidence spoliation. “Spoliation” is a fancy word for tampering. Sometimes a Computer Crimes Experts can come in handy. During a lengthy interrogation by the Prosecutor there were some answers given that may apply to virtually any cases involving data stored on a mobile phone SD card.

Questions and Answers from Computer Crimes Expert testimony on SD Storage Devices in Mobile Devices

 

What are hash values in SD cards and stored files?

 

“These are the hash values of that. That is a method that I use to be able to correlate that picture with the picture on the SD cards, things like that; but it’s a fingerprint. Every file has a unique fingerprint.”

What is the creation date on a file stored on an SD card?

 

“I have seen instances where if a file was moved to another system, the creation date is what the current date is of that system. Because, as far as that system’s concerned, hey, it was created on my system today.”

What about iPhone, where there are no SD storage devices?

 

“For example, with iPhone being a proprietary system, you’re — you’re talking about something that’s an encrypted system and we constantly stay abreast . . . . “-

Do both police and forensic examiners use Cellebrite?

 

“[W]e — as a company, in general, stay abreast of that, the changes there, as I’m sure your group has the same — same challenges. With that, we’re — we ‘ re always challenging our vendors. There’s three primary vendors we use, including Cellebrite, which you guys use, as well. But challenging them to stay abreast of it.”

What is the job of a computer forensic examiner in case involving cell phone data and SD storage devices?

 

“To look at it with the eyes of a computer forensic expert to determine whether the evidence being portrayed was accurate or if there was evidence being omitted or not looked at from a different way and we all know that when you’re looking at it from a prosecution point of view, you look at evidence from that angle. If you’re looking at it from a defense point of view, since I work both sides, I know I’m going to look at the evidence differently in cases because in one you’re trying to find underlying causes one way or another. So I felt my job in this was to look at the evidence to determine whether or not everything was being described accurately and completely.”

Are there different types of files stored on mobile device SD cards?

 

“When you talk about system files, it’s a little bit more complex. The system does many, many things to make your life work better on a computer. And storage locations could be temporary areas; the system just uses and works with. That’s very beneficial to us in a forensic area because that can be very telling as far as how the system was used, what the system is doing, who’s doing what and what’s automatic, what’s not, what’s user initiated, what’s system initiated, all that is good. You can tell that from the temporary areas. There’s also caching areas.”

What are Cache files on an SD card?

 

“Caching areas are when the computer does something and then it goes and does something else, it caches it out, caches something back in; that’s very telling of what’s going on in the system to us. Who initiated, whether it’s automatic, whether it’s deliberate, stuff like that. There is allocated resources, unallocated resources, deleted areas; there’s just a — just a plethora of stuff that the system does and there’s a lot of different storage locations. Now the ones that I’m focusing in on, for this particular case and this particular report, are the ones that, you know, give us telltale sign of something. And I would have to read it real quick here to know what we’re getting at. I was hoping you were going to ask something specific in here, but that’s basically an overview of what storage locations are.”

What is the significance of where files are stored on an SD Card?

 

“So storage locations, I gave you an example to help you understand how storage locations work, the difference between pictures and documents, stuff like that. The system is the same way. It does certain things, it will store them in different places. The other key point here then, also is that in — when you’re talking about the system storage locations, they’re not accessible by the user. These are areas that obviously if the user could access those, you could — you could destroy your system. But these are typically areas that are not accessible by the user. By us, yes, from a forensic point of view.”

Why are system storage files important?

 

“Because, depending on how the device acquired a particular piece of information, whether it be media or text or whatever, how it was — how it came to exist on the phone matters. And system storage can help us to determine that.”

Can date meta data on an SD storage device used on a phone be altered?

 

“I’ve seen people fool that and they’ll put a cell phone in a shield bag in which case it doesn’t make connection; and there is an app, I think, that can change the date. So there’s people that could do things like that but in these particular cases, these were active and that’s really not the issue that I want to get into. The problem is that depending on the software use or how things come about — and it’s called a feature. And there’s a feature that when you take a file and you put it onto a system, that it maintains the original creation date that that particular, let’s say photograph you made, was maintained. And it’s a feature because you want to know that the Christmas of 2004 occurred on December of 2004, not when you happened to move it over there. So it is a feature of something. But then there are some operations when you move things over, and I’ve seen it before because I’ll see stuff come to be on a system, and they’re milliseconds apart, the creation date. And I know that those were — that was a copy operation performed.”

“You plug in the SD card and the metadata is put on the SD card. Last access date in — in doing the correlation was — would be updated on the phone, as well. But let’s say, for instance, if you put
an image, a brand new image on there, and the creation date was last year and you put another image on there, maybe you copied three images and the way you copied it it happened to pick up the date of the computer which was, you know, maybe you changed the date of the computer and you wanted to show it to be last month. Then when you take that SD card and you plug it in the phone, you’re going to see one image with that date from last year as a create date and then you’re going to see three images, milliseconds apart, that are from last month. What I’m saying is that the phone becomes slave to the SD card as far as the metadata –“

Can computer crimes experts discover data files placed on a mobile device without the user’s knowledge?

 

“[J]ust realize that when I’m talking about the push, that the technology is there, that the . . . potential is there for stuff to be pushed on your computer. And of course, the user is oblivious to all this going on. And that’s why you could actually go to a website that had unfortunate information on it and your computer now is a recipient of that information and you, the user, are none the wiser.”

“Sometimes the user doesn’t even know they went somewhere. Sometimes in — in this world of malware and viral attacks and exploitation of compu — of people’s identities, there’s a lot of times — like, and I use the term unfortunate, is if you do a search, one thing these search engines do not do is assess where it’s going to take you and you could click on something and then it could actually take you to a site that doesn’t display anything but it certainly puts stuff on your computer and then redirects you to something else to show you what you think you wanted to see. There’s a lot of smoke and mirrors going on behind the scenes that the user’s not aware of. That’s the push technology I’m
talking about . . . .”

“Whether or not you saw it, whether or not you meant to go there, that’s — that does not — those two statements don’t come into play when it comes to push. . . . Push includes whatever the — and I’ll call it malicious in some cases, but whatever the site, or whatever the originating prospect that might be. It could be a server, it could be a site, it could be almost anything. Whatever it is, it will push on there
and I can’t tell you what that will be. In — I can tell you in general what it is. In general it’s thumbnails.’

“The fact that Windows does that, is a feature to allow you to operate better. But how many times have we heard about there being a hole, an exploited hole in Windows that Microsoft had to go in
and patch with a new release or with — with a new update they patched this hole or they discovered this — this whatever was open and they come in. You take a feature on something and you get a
website that exploits that feature, I think you kind of then answered your question because then okay, well whose fault is it? Well, it’s a feature of Windows to do this. But they’re — the reason it was written was to optimize web browsing, that’s it. Now to push big stuff on there, and push other stuff on there, when people are taking it to its limit and exploiting it and doing the wrong thing, then I’d say it’s the fault of the site.”

Top 50 Ways Into Hillsborough County Jail | Tampa

Hillsborough County Jail

Top 50 Ways to End up Inside the Hillsborough County Jail

Here are some statistics from Tampa’s Hillsborough County Jail. We have collected the top 50 ways to end up in Tampa, Florida’s jail and have shared them below.

Drug and Traffic charges dominate the Top Ten. Theft charges seem to take the second group of ten. We have reviewed a number of other arrest records and it appears there are 1656 different ways to end up arrested for criminal charges and inside of  this major metropolitan jail.

Top 50 Ways Into the Hillsborough County Jail

 

 

Ranking

Charge Description

Form Code

Statute

Level

Degree

1. Driving W/License Canc Susp  Or Revoked TRAF6075 322.34.2A Misd 2nd
2. Possession Of Cocaine DRUG1101 893.13.6A Fel 3rd
3. Possession Of Drug Paraphernalia DRUG8100 893.147. Misd 1st
4. Grand Theft 3rd ($300 – $5,000) THEF2001 812.014.2C1 Fel 3rd
5. Possession Of Cannabis  Less Than 20 Grams DRUG2103 893.13.6B Misd 1st
6. Battery (Domestic Violence) BATT1002 784.03.1AB Misd 1st
7. Driving Under The Influence TRAF1012 316.193.1 Misd 2nd
8. Obstructing Or Opposing An Officer Without Vio COPS1000 843.02. Misd 1st
9. Driving While License Revoked-Habitual Offendr TRAF6078 322.34.5 Fel 3rd
10. Petit Theft ($100 Or Less) THEF1011 812.014.3A Misd 2nd
11. Possession Of Controlled Substance DRUG9101 893.13.6A Fel 3rd
12. Dealing In Stolen Property THEF5000 812.019.1 Fel 2nd
13. Uttering A Forged Instrument FORG2000 831.02. Fel 3rd
14. Battery (Touch Or Strike) BATT1000 784.03.1AB Misd 1st
15. Trespass On Prop Other Than Structure Or Conve TRES4001 810.09.1A2A Misd 1st
16. Grand Theft Motor Vehicle THEF2201 812.014.2C6 Fel 3rd
17. Contempt Of Court ADMIN007 901.11. Infractions
18. Obtain.Prop. For Worthless Ck.(Less Than $150) WOCK2000 832.05.4 Misd 1st
19. False Name To Law Enforcement Officer COPS2060 901.36.1 Misd 1st
20. Delivery Of Cocaine DRUG1200 893.13.1A Fel 2nd
21. Possession Of Open Container TPOR0064 003.40.B Municipal/Local
22. Manufacture Dist Dispense Posses Con Sub- Fed USCA0003 021.841.
23. Operating Unregistered Vehicle TRAF5015 320.02.1 Misd 2nd
24. Petit Theft 1st THEF1010 812.014.2E Misd 1st
25. No Valid Drivers License TRAF5099 322.03.1 Misd 2nd
26. Possession Of Cocaine With Intent To Sell Or D DRUG1300 893.13.1A Fel 2nd
27. Possession Of Cannabis DRUG2102 893.13.6A Fel 3rd
28. Aggravated Assault With Deadly Weapon ASSA5005 784.021.1A Fel 3rd
29. Battery On A Law Enforcement Officer BATT1010 784.03.1A Fel 3rd
30. Driving Under The Influence  Unlawful Breath A TRAF1015 316.193.1C Misd 2nd
31. Attaching Tag Not Assigned TRAF5040 320.261. Misd 2nd
32. Possession Of Cannabis With Intent To Sell Or DRUG2300 893.13.1A Fel 3rd
33. Aggravated Battery   Deadly Weapon BATT5000 784.045.1A2 Fel 2nd
34. Aggravated Battery (Deadly Weapon) BATT5000 784.045.1A2 Fel 2nd
35. False Info On Pawnbroker Form (Under $300) PAWN8010 539.001.8 Fel 3rd
36. Criminal Mischief   Less Than $200 CRMS1000 806.13.1B1 Misd 2nd
37. Obstructing Or Opposing An Officer With Violen COPS2000 843.01. Fel 3rd
38. Burglary Of An Unoccupied Conveyance BURG0022 810.02.1B4B Fel 3rd
39. Reckless Driving TRAF3030 316.192. Misd 2nd
40. Felon In Possession Firearm   Firearm  Possess GUNS0420 790.23.1 Fel 2nd
41. Obtain.Prop. For Worthless Ck (More Than $150) WOCK3000 832.05.4 Fel 3rd
42. Disorderly Conduct MISC0124 877.03. Misd 2nd
43. Fraudulent Use Of Credit Card Over $100 FRAU3000 817.61. Fel 3rd
44. Robbery (Less Than $300) ROBB3000 812.13.12C Fel 2nd
45. Aggravated Battery Great Bodily Harm BATT5050 784.045.1A1 Fel 2nd
46. Criminal Mischief    $200 To $1000 CRMS2000 806.13.1B2 Misd 1st
47. Worthless Check WOCK1000 832.05.2 Misd 1st
48. Forgery FORG1000 831.01. Fel 3rd
49. Criminal Mischief   $1000 Or More CRMS3000 806.13.1B3 Fel 3rd
50. Carrying Concealed Firearm WEAP1000 790.01.2 Fel 3rd

 

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